Wade Locke has graciously provided his latest news release, which is reproduced below in its entirety:
Updated Estimates of Newfoundland and Labrador Treasury Impacts for the Equalization Options Contained in Budget 2007
Table 1: Updated Estimates Based on Accord Eligibility Criterion Contained in the Budget Implementation Act for the Impacts of the Equalization Options on the NL Treasury from the 2007 Federal Budget - 2007/08 to 2019/20
| | Status Quo | 50% w Cap (original estimate) | 50% w Cap (updated estimate) |
| Period 2007/08 – 2011/12 |
| Oil Revenue | $7.30 B | $7.30 B | $7.30 B |
| Accord Payments | $2.51 B | $2.37 B | $1.72 B |
| Equalization | $0.59 B | $0.76 B | $0.76 B |
| Combined | $10.40 B | $10.43 B | $9.78 B |
| Period 2012/13 – 2019/20 |
| Oil Revenue | $7.37 B | $7.37 B | $7.37 B |
| Accord Payments | $0.0 B | $4.96 B | $0.0 B |
| Equalization | $0.76 B | $0.0 B | $0.35 B |
| Combined | $8.13 B | $12.33 B | $7.72 B |
| Period 2007/08 – 2019/20 |
| Oil Revenue | $14.67 B | $14.67 B | $14.67 B |
| Accord Payments | $2.51 B | $7.34 B | $1.72 B |
| Equalization | $1.35 B | $0.76 B | $1.11 B |
| Combined | $18.53 B | $22.76 B | $17.50 B |
On Wednesday, April 4, 2007 at 7:00 pm a presentation was given by Dr. Wade Locke in St. John’s on the estimated impacts for the Newfoundland and Labrador treasury of the equalization options specified in Budget 2007 (Government of Canada). The purpose of this presentation was to provide an objective and unbiased assessment of the net revenue impacts (oil revenue, equalization payments and payments under the Atlantic Accords) for the Newfoundland and Labrador treasury. As well, it is important to appreciate that the intent of the presentation was to provide some clarity to a complicated issue and to facilitate a more focused and informed debate. Moreover, there was a conscious effort in the presentation, and since, to stay away from the politics of this sensitive issue and deal only with the numbers in a professional manner. Although I will continue to do deal with this in a professional, non-political manner, it is my intention that after explaining the contents of this press release to interested individuals, I will have nothing else to say on this particular issue nor will I be undertaking further analysis in this specific area. I will leave it to federal and provincial officials to inform the public.
Given the sensitivity and the emotion surrounding this particular issue, I feel it is important to document how things have evolved to this point. This should enable others to judge the credibility of the approach and the results derived there from.
In any empirical assessment, it is necessary to make assumptions about how elements of each province’s fiscal capacity are expected to evolve over time. The assumptions used in the Locke analysis are clearly specified in the original presentation and interested individuals are referred to www.arts.mun.ca/arts to view the original presentation. While different assumptions will yield different specific results, they are unlikely to change the basic finding listed in Table 1. However, I would encourage both officials in Finance Canada and the Department of Finance, Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to present their own simulations to test the robustness of the results presented above. If this provides more credible information that is appropriately explained and independently vetted, then the public should be in a better position to understand the specific impacts of each of the options on Newfoundland and Labrador. I would encourage both parties to release their own analyses and expose them to public scrutiny as I have done.
The crucial assumption utilized in the original presentation was the eligibility criterion for payments under the Atlantic Accord. Specifically, the original analysis assumed that, under the 50% option, Newfoundland and Labrador qualified for Accord payments so long as it qualified for equalization before the equalization cap was imposed. This assumption was based on the fact that it seemed reasonable to assume that pre-cap equalization was the eligibility criterion because pre-cap equalization was used to calculate the value of the Accord payments. But, more importantly, before finalizing my analysis, I consulted with provincial government officials who confirmed that the pre-cap equalization eligibility criterion was their assumption as well. In addition, I sent emails to two separate officials in Finance Canada on April 1, 2007 requesting clarification on the eligibility criterion to be used for the Accord. Based on the responses that I received from those officials on April 2, 2007, I finalized my assumption about the pre-cap equalization eligibility criterion. In particular, my reading of those emails in the context of the questions asked was that the pre-cap equalization was the appropriate criterion to employ in judging Newfoundland and Labrador’s eligibility for payments under the Atlantic Accord. Without attribution, I have reproduced both the questions and the responses to the emails to allow others to judge the reasonableness of my assumption on eligibility.
The specific questions asked and the responses received were:
Question #1: In calculating the accord under the new arrangement, is it the case that NL receives the accord if it qualifies for equalization on the new arrangement prior to the cap being imposed? In other words, while the cap can remove all equalization payments, but before that happens, the province could qualify to receive equalization pre-cap and as such be eligible to receive the accord. Is that correct?
Response #1: Your assumption is correct; it is the pre-cap equalization amounts that are used in the Accord calculations.
Question #2: In calculating the accord under the new arrangement, it is my interpretation that the province is entitled to receive the accord so long as it qualifies for equalization before the cap is imposed, rather than after. Is that correct?
Response #2: The legislation before the House proposes that under the new arrangement, the test for determining whether or not NL qualifies for the 2005 Accord is whether or not it would receive Equalization payments under the base O’Brien formula – that is, 50% inclusion of resources plus the cap. If it receives EQ under that formula, then the next steps are taken to determine how much. In this case, the offsets are determined before the cap is applied.
On the afternoon of the presentation, at approximately 2:00 pm, I was contacted by telephone by officials from Finance Canada to explain that the eligibility criterion for the Atlantic Accord that was contained the Budget Implementation Act, 2007 was not pre-cap equalization as I had assumed in my presentation. As it turned out, the Budget Implementation Act, which contained relevant legislation on the eligibility criterion for the Accord, was tabled approximately one week prior to my presentation. As explained in a follow-up email at 4:40 pm on Wednesday afternoon, government policy, as outlined in the Budget Implementation Act, specified an eligibility criterion that was different than the pre-cap equalization criterion that was assumed in my presentation. The specific criterion that was identified in that email was:
In effect, NL would be eligible to receive Equalization and offsets as long as long its own-source per capita fiscal capacity (including non-resource yields and 100% of resource revenues) is not equal to or greater than the own-source per capita fiscal capacity of the non-receiving province with the lowest per capita fiscal capacity.
At that point, I had asked for the specific legislation so that I could review it myself. I received it the next day after my presentation and reviewed it on Easter weekend. However, between 4:40 pm (the time of the email) and 7:00 pm (the scheduled start of the presentation) it was impossible to re-analyze the data with the alternate eligibility assumption. Instead, I modified the original presentation to flag the crucial assumption about Accord eligibility. I, as well, indicated in the presentation that if the eligibility assumption was changed, then the estimates under the 50% option would have to be modified, not realizing the extent of the change that would be required.
After reviewing the legislation, it was clear that a new analysis was needed. This was completed on the weekend and sent with an accompanying email to Finance Canada officials on Monday at 5:00 pm NL time and followed-up on Wednesday with a conference call. It was in that call that all remaining technical issues were addressed as Finance Canada officials explained in great detail how the legislation worked. This enabled me to finalize the revised analysis on Thursday for release on Friday, April 12, 2007.
As is clear from Table 1, the impact on net revenues flowing to the provincial treasury, if the 50% option is invoked immediately, is $17.5 B. This is reduced from the $22.8 B estimated previously. The primary reason for the reduction in the estimated impact is that the Accord eligibility standard outlined in the Budget Implementation Act is more stringent than the pre-cap-equalization criterion utilized in the original analysis.
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