The General Situation
Residents of the northeast Avalon came through the
largest blizzard in the province’s recorded history with relatively few
fatalities and virtually no reported incidents of significant damage to
property or infrastructure. That is
remarkable in itself given the storm and a smaller snowfall that followed on
its dropped more than 100 centimetres on
parts of the region and wind gusts hit between 1305 and 150 kilometres an hour
during the peak of the blizzard.
Of the roughly 250,000 affected by the storm, only
about 10% - 27,000 - lost power during
the storm and the bulk of those had their power restored within 48 hours of the
last snow flake. This contrasts with 2014 when a series of events knocked out power
to a significant portion of the island for several days.
Two avalanches reported publicly damaged houses and
caused people to leave their homes but without injury. This is in contrast to a relatively minor
blizzard in 1959 that caused an avalanche that The Battery in St John’s that
killed nine people.
Municipalities in the region had cleared at least
passable cuts on all streets within 48 to 72 hours after the storm subsided on
Saturday and by Tuesday all major municipalities had begun to lift their states
of emergency to one degree or another. The provincial government had also
cleared the major highways to the city within two days of the storm.
The City of St. John’s and the 2020 Blizzard
The City of St. John’s and its neighbouring
municipalities declared states of emergency quickly after the onset of the
blizzard on 17 January. This was
evidently co-ordinated with the provincial government in advance of the storm,
consistent the relevant legislation and emergency plans (see below).
However, the City of St. John’s took a noticeably
different approaches from that of its neighbours. Mount Pearl, Paradise, and Conception Bay
South lifted their states of emergency entirely during daylight hours as soon
as they had cleared most streets with at least one cut and had cleared the
major arteries entirely.
By contrast, the City of St. John’s placed the
greatest emphasis on containing residents within their homes and limiting their
opportunities to venture outside, even for necessities. Ostensibly this was for
public safety, however, all municipalities ear to have achieved roughly the
same level of street opening at the same time.
Based on repeated comments by the mayor, the City’s approach appears to
have been driven by concern to keep residents out of the way of snow clearing
equipment. In other words, it appears that the City’s management of the storm
response was driven by its streets department.
The difference in approach was clear from the
outset. In addition to closing all
business and prohibiting the use of vehicles within the city - except for
emergency vehicles and other exempt vehicles - the City declaration of a state
of emergency prohibited residents from using skis and snowshoes to get about. This
was clearly intended to keep people off the street as much as possible.
This was , in effect, an illegal order since the
powers granted under section 34 of the City of St. John’s Act
only allow the city council to control residents with a curfew. Bans are limited to vehicles. The ban on using snowshoes and skis
undoubtedly hampered some people from offering assistance to relatives and
friends who lived within walking distance. Yet the City clearly intended to
keep people hemmed in so its snow clearing and removal from the streets went on
unimpeded for as long as possible.
The City’s public information program was troubled
from the start. The City’s first attempt
at holding a media briefing – by conference call – collapsed because of
problems with the phone lines. City
communications officials never thought of using Face book and Periscope, for
example, to broadcast messages straight to residents.
Neither the provincial government nor any of the
municipalities affected by the storm provided daily, public operational briefings background briefings on
the state of region, the progress of
recovery, and the issues affecting the recovery. They did use social media and periodic media
statements and hastily called scrums to announce changes to the state of emergency
restrictions.
Such daily operational briefings are typically conducted by the officials responsible for
directing the recovery, not politicians.
They are standard practise in emergency response in other parts of North
America. Publicly broadcast operational
briefings give the senior emergency response decision-makers (typically not
politicians) to inform the public directly about the emergency and the state
of recovery operations.
These types of briefings ensure that the public
receives a single, authoritative statement about the current status of the
region affected by the emergency, rules
and restrictions and the reasons for them, and, ideally, some sense of how long
the emergency may last. The briefings
minimise the potential for misunderstanding and miscommunications and should,
ideally, help to bring confidence in the recovery operation. Quick passage of basic, factual information
about the emergency and the recovery allows individuals to make informed
decisions about their own situation.
This would include rationing of supplies etc, how to go about
resupplying, procedures for obtaining
essential care and so forth.
The City of St. John’s Emergency Plan
(2017) includes a specific reference to a media centre, which would typically
be used for such daily media briefings. It
is also a way of channelling media to a single point of contact and a single source of authoritative information
for all emergency responders. This
reduces the load and helps to manage the pressures on the individual responder
organisations.
Since 2001 (the 9/11 attacks), such an approach has not been standard practise
for government agencies in Newfoundland and Labrador. Like the response to the emergency
itself, public information tends to be
politicised. Politicians are put in
front of cameras, typically to make generic, positive statements. Frequently,
as was the case with Mayor Danny Breen,
politicians are unable to answer basic questions about the emergency
response. This is because the
politicians are not directing the day-to-day operations involved in responding
to an emergency.
Public information released by the City caused
additional confusion for residents. The City did not consistently indicate in its announcements of
partial ban lifts what types of transportation residents could use and other
crucial details. In announcing that grocery stores could open at 10 AM, for
example, the City made no reference to whether city residents could drive in
advance of 10 AM or could only leave their homes at 10 AM. Additionally, in that case, since the City
announcement suggested the stores would not be open again for more than 48
hours, residents flocked to grocery stores and added unnecessary strain on
employees and police resources, who turned up in some locations to ensure
residents stayed orderly.
Another example of the poor standard of public
information was a news release posted on the City website at 10:45 AM Sunday morning.
It is poorly written, does not indicate on what date the access is
permitted and for how long, puts irrelevant information at the front of the
release, and repeats the City mantra that residents should stay indoors and,
most importantly for the City, stay off streets.
Sunday, January 19,
2020 - 10:45 AM
City Lifts Some Restrictions as State of Emergency
Continues
City of St. John’s snow clearing
crews continue to work around the clock to clear streets for regular traffic.
While progress is being made after the significant snow fall experienced on
Friday and Saturday, January 17 and 18, at this point we do not feel that the
roads are cleared adequately for general city movement and traffic.
·
Private snow contractors will be permitted to conduct snow clearing
operations effective immediately.
·
Gas stations are permitted to open effective immediately for the
purposes of fuel for snow clearing.
·
Pharmacies are permitted to open from noon until 7pm for emergency
medication needs.
More snow is expected on Sunday
evening into Monday. The state of emergency is still in effect.
Please stay in[doors] and off city
streets.
Details of the partial access allowed on Sunday came
from the mayor in media interviews and from City councilors who spread word of
the City’s decisions via social media.
In the event, residents ignored the strict letter of
the emergency order as well as the City’s inconsistencies and did what they
felt was necessary. They ventured
outdoors to clear their driveways down to the street edge. They walked, snowshoed, skied, used snow mobiles
or drive their cars to various locations. Some convenience stores opened to serve
customers, chiefly in the downtown area where residents had limited access to drug
stores and gas stations.
At the same time, the police public communications
throughout the emergency emphasised the restrictions on travel at the same time
that the City was announcing access – limited as it was - to some emergency supplies. The Royal
Newfoundland Constabulary at one point released delays of fines it had levied
for violations of the emergency order.
The day after the city issued the announcement about
gas stations and pharmacies, the City
announced that pharmacies would not be allowed to open for a second day,
although gas stations would. An
intervention by the provincial health minister and a subsequent involvement of
the pharmacy regulatory board led to a handful of drug stores being open. The result of the way the city disseminated
the information using social media and its own website, both messages – no pharmacies,
and some pharmacies – circulated simultaneously. The handful of pharmacies that did open on
the second day did not cover the entire city and had a limited ability to
provide medication to residents. They also cut residents off from a readily
accessible source of household supplies and food.
City decision-making during the emergency appeared to
be taken on a day by day basis and was, generally, haphazard. One city council was able to convince the
mayor to allow a grocery to open so that its meals section could feed
firefighters and other emergency responders even though these people already
had access to food. The mayor also allow
a pizza franchise to provide the responders with free pizza and, in the
process, earned considerable free advertising for what amounted to a publicity
stunt. At the same time, residents - including those without power - were not
able to purchase food anywhere in the city.
Messages from the police warned residents they would be fined for
violating the state of emergency order.
When the city allowed taxis on the road again, it
initially limited the exemption to two firms.
After some protests, the list of exempt taxi firms expanded although,
once again, two messages – two taxi firms and all taxi firms – circulated publicly
at the same time.
The politicisation of public emergencies
The transformation of public emergencies into political events
took place in 2001 and accelerated after 2003.
The response in Newfoundland and Labrador to Hurricane Igor saw
political considerations placed ahead of practical ones and political photo
opportunities replaced the passage of practical information by emergency
responders.
As noted earlier, reporters asked Mayor Danny Breen
simple, factual questions about details of what he was announcing. Breen was frequently unable to answer. Even as he lifted the state of
emergency, Breen could not or would not
estimate how long it would take to ensure that all streets in the city outside
the heavily congested downtown core were wide enough for two cars to pass
safely.
By contrast,
federal briefings included both the federal cabinet representative for
the province but chiefly were run by the officer commanding the military
contribution to the recovery effort.
Other problems
Because St. John’s is a strategic hub for the entire
province, closing the city for a week produced disruptions in the rest of the
province. Oceanex could not deliver
containers of food destined for outside St. John’s even though the city streets
and the arteries connecting to the Trans Canada Highway were cleared within 48
hours of the storm. Similarly, the main postal sorting and distribution
centre remained closed for the entire week despite its being located on a major
artery that connected to the highway.
There were also problems in the storm phase of the
emergency. The City of St. John’s did
not open warming centres in advance of the event. Warming centres are places with limited
amounts of food but with heat and electricity to allow those affected by any
power outages. The city did warn that it might open such centres but by the
time it made that statement – repeated by the deputy mayor on social media –
most people had their power restored.
Other municipalities did establish warming centres.
Nor were problems in the emergency response confined
to the City of St. John’s. Eastern Health
had no plan to get staff to and from its major facilities in the region during
a state of emergency. The result was
that staff worked excessively lengthy shifts although some nurses did report for
work by violating the admittedly absurd ban on using snow shoes in the City. A
mental health clinic opened in St. John’s part way through the recovery but
again, there was no reference officially to lifting the restriction on travel
in order to get to the clinic, located in the city centre.
Misinformation from City and Media
Mayor Danny Breen blamed problems in the City’s
response on the provincial government.
CBC’s John Gushue
repeated Breen’s comments and affirmed them in a piece on Saturday about the
supposedly demolished provincial emergency measures organisation. Breen also made repeated references to the
fact the City had not declared a state of emergency since the 1980s.
“Other
things have been exposed,“ Gushue
wrote. “For instance, the legislation
governing states of emergency in St. John's is 35 years old. But the
biggest gap has to be at the provincial level. A number of us noted the absence
of EMO or equivalent, especially in the early days of the blizzard and the
aftermath.”
The problem
for both Breen and Gushue is that none of this is true.
The City’s
emergency plan dates from 2017 and the province’s plan dates from 2014. The section of the City
of St. John’s Act related to states of emergency dates from 1971. It
gives the City the power to declare an emergency, which is really all that it
needs. The rest of the authority the
City needs is from the Emergency
Services Act, passed by the House of Assembly in 2008. The details of how the City would actually
manage an emergency are contained in its emergency management plan, which was
revised – as already noted – in 2017.
As for the
Emergency Measures Organization, it
still exists. Had Gushue done some basic
research, he would have found that EMO – under that name – disappeared when the
provincial government amalgamated EMO with the fire commissioner’s office in 2007.
In
2017, the provincial government blended
the separate agency with the Department of Municipal Affairs and created a
division called Fire, Emergency, and Corporate Services. The new division has
the same responsibilities as it predecessors.
Managing
Emergencies
What Gushue
and others noted was the absence of the provincial government dominance of
public communications, even though those communications have been more
political than practical.
In response
to the 2020 blizzard, the provincial
government said little to nothing publicly about its own emergency response
operations. Once the Premier returned to St. John’s from Deer Lake, he and some of his cabinet colleagues spoke
to media regularly. They limited their
comments to political matters, such as compensating some workers for lost
wages. The provincial government did not
conduct operational media briefings.
The City of
St. John’s emergency management plan is consistent with the provincial Emergency Management Plan (2012,
updated 2014), the Emergency Services Act, 2008,
and generally accept emergency response practise across Canada. It provides for an integrated approach to
response involving all levels of government as well as the private sector and
not-for-profit sector.
Municipalities play the crucial role in responding to
emergencies. The province looks after
its particular responsibilities. It
assists municipalities with additional resources and can assist in
co-ordinating efforts with other municipalities, provincial departments and agencies, and the
federal government, as needed.
The City’s emergency plan is predicated on that
approach. The plan includes a diagram of
the municipal emergency operations centre.
That diagram has stations available for provincial representatives from
different agencies (health, social services, etc) as well as individuals from
the not-for-profit sector (such as the Salvation Army.
The Problems, Unanswered Questions, and Apparent
Failures
Assuming the City activated its emergency plan, city managers had at their disposal all the
information resources and points of contact they needed to provide appropriate
responses to the storm and to carry out recovery operations.
We simply do not know why the City failed in so many
respects – many of them noted here – nor why the City took so much longer than
other municipalities to loosen the restrictions on citizens.
It appears the City placed the greatest emphasis on
street cleaning, not public welfare. It
failed to provide the public with basic, factual, timely information about the
emergency and the emergency response. During the storm, it failed to provide
warming centres for residents without power. It failed to provide adequate,
factual public information about the emergency.
The series of haphazard, brain fart (like the pizza
and chicken tenders examples), or completely bone-headed (two taxi companies,
and omitting food banks from its exempt list) decisions suggest deeper problems
with the way the senior city officials made decisions. There appears to have been too much
involvement by politicians, much as occurred at the provincial level in the
response to Igor.
We can assume the province also activated its
emergency plan at least to the Level II stage. This took place after the storm,
once the military arrived. The province operated a call centre to despatch
military teams even though the bulk of their work was apparently in the City of
St. John’s. There remains confusion
about whether there was a need for them outside St. John’s. Because the provincial government did not
conduct operational briefings and news media did not cover the emergency
outside St. John’s and the immediate surrounding areas, we do not know what
other problems took place.
The public deserves an explanation of why the City of
St. John’s and the provincial government allowed Oceanex containers to sit at
the terminal and why mail delivery outside the storm area was hampered by the
state of emergency in St. John’s. The
City was able to provide an exemption in both cases and if the provincial
government was aware of the situation, it remains to be seen why the province
failed to intervene.
Eastern Health’s emergency plans are clearly
deficient. We do not know how other
agencies, such as social services, fared.
In at least one neighbourhood,
residents of a temporary social services shelter relied on neighbours
for food. This may have occurred in
other cases as well, given that the City placed such an extreme emphasis on
prohibiting travel even after streets had been cleared to a basic level.
The issues raised here do not warrant a public
inquiry. They do, however, require a
detailed post-operational assessment by a knowledgeable individual or group
outside the provincial government. Too
many things went very badly for the provincial government and the City of St.
John’s at the senior management level for anyone to be satisfied with the
string of attaboys and attagirls that have been flowing since the storm.
-srbp-
