Cougar to replace gearbox on S-92 #nlpoli

Local media – CBC and Telegram for example – reported on Friday that Cougar Helicopters would “replace the  gearbox” on an S-92 that showed an indication of metal in the fluid of the Number 2 Input Module earlier in the week.

“Sikorsky analyzed data from its global Health and Usage Monitoring system and that analysis indicated an upward trend in a component,” she stated in an email to The Telegram this afternoon.

“This information, when combined with the information shown following an assessment of the elements related to the chip indication, reveal a possibility that this could be an early indicator of reduced performance.”

The Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) is operated by the aircraft manufacturer, Sikorsky.  It analyses information from sensors located on Sikorsky helicopters operating worldwide.   A photograph from cougar.ca shows the sensor locations:

HUMS can be used to detect changes in how different parts of an individual aircraft work in daily flight and compare performance across the entire fleet of aircraft. Both the pilot and the co-pilot can monitor HUMS read-outs during flights.  Daily maintenance procedures include downloading the information from the helicopter’s onboard computers and feeding the information Sikorsky Aircraft

In this case, it appears that the HUMS analysis by Sikorsky Aircraft showed a pattern of readings for this particular aircraft  - the “upward trend” – for the gearbox that might indicate a problem at some point in the future.  Cougar opted to replace the engine components involved. 

Cougar Helicopters did not release the aircraft serial number for the helicopter involved in this incident.

- srbp -

S-92 incident: March 2012, Newfoundland offshore #nlpoli

From the offshore regulatory board, March 21, 2012:

The C-NLOPB has been notified that on approach to the Terra Nova FPSO,  Cougar Helicopters experienced a #2 Input Module Chip Light illumination. On deck the crew discussed the matter with Cougar's Maintenance Control Centre (MCC).  It was decided to shut the aircraft down and complete a restart.  After restarting the light was still illuminated.  An engineer will be dispatched to the installation to investigate.

The input modules are part of the helicopter’s drive system.  They translate the energy from the two engines into the main rotor.  You can see the bits labelled in this diagram of a section of the main rotor assembly from the UH-60 Blackhawk.  The S-92 is derived from the Blackhawk.

The sensor that tripped is designed to detect metal fragments in the input module connected to the Number 2 engine.  Metal fragments would indicate wear inside a set of gears that turn at incredibly high rates.  That would not be good. The system also includes a device to get rid of tiny fragments and “fuzz” that might give false positive readings.

Here’s a portion of a U.S. Army training presentation on the transmission’s warning systems:

This is not the first time S-92’s flying offshore have reported this type of indicator.  Here are some extracts from the CADORS system, as posted to a helicopter pilots’ discussion site in 2009:

Date 1/18/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0038
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description TSB Update A06A0005: CHI21, a Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S-92A, with 18 passengers and two flight crew on board, was enroute from St. John's, NL to the Terra Nova FPSO oil production vessel when the number two engine chip light illuminated. …

Date 2/3/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0073
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description CHI22,S92, enroute St. John’s (CYYT) to – Henry Goodrich Oil Platform (CHEN) requested to return to CYYT due indication light at 1800Z, position 35NM southeast of CYYT(St. John's). Aircraft advised no emergency. At approximately time 1813Z flight requested ERS on arrival. Landed without further incident at time 1823Z. Pilot advised of engine chip light. TSB Case Closed
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 2/3/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0073
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE : TSB A06A0010: CHI22, a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky S-92A, with 19 passengers and two flight crew onboard, was enroute from St. John's, NL to the Henry Goodrich oil platform and was approximately 35 NM Southeast of St. John's when the number two engine chip light illuminated (General Electric CT7-8A). The crew followed checklist procedures and reduced the #2 engine power to idle and elected to return to St. John's. The crew did not initially declare an emergency, however, ten minutes prior to landing requested ERS. The aircraft landed without further incident. After the aircraft landed, maintenance inspected the chip plug on the #2 engine and in consultation with the engine manufacturer, it was felt that the metal found on the chip plug was from the #3 bearing. This engine had a total of 42.2 hrs time in service since new. The engine was replaced with a new engine before the aircraft was returned to service.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: The number 2 engine had not failed rather a chip light had illuminated resulting in the flight crew reducing power for that engine.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A06A0071: Cougar 33 (C-GSCH), a Sikorsky S-92, was outbound from St. John's to Hibernia. At approximately 75 nm from St. Johns the INPUT CHIP 2 light came on. The crew followed the checklist, reduced No.2 engine to IDLE, descended to 500 feet, and joined Route B back to St. John's airport. Once level at 500 feet the crew briefed the passengers and ATC. Approximately 5 minutes after the INPUT CHIP 2 indication the INPUT CHIP 1 also illuminated. The crew declared a "PAN" and continued in to St. John's at 500 feet. A Cormorant on exercises in the area (OUTCAST 903) joined the aircraft and escorted the flight in to St. John's airport. The crew flew a running landing onto Runway 02, then shut down the aircraft on the runway to prevent damage to the gearbox inputs. Upon inspection, the chip plugs in the main transmission and in the associated accessory modules were found to be contaminated. The affected components will be changed out, and the company and manufacturer are investigating the cause of the chip lights.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Declared emergency/priority
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A06A0071: Cougar 33 (C-GSCH), a Sikorsky S-92, was outbound from St. John's to Hibernia. At approximately 75 nm from St. Johns the INPUT CHIP 2 light came on. The crew followed the checklist, reduced No.2 engine to IDLE, descended to 500 feet, and joined Route B back to St. John's airport. Once level at 500 feet the crew briefed the passengers and ATC. Approximately 5 minutes after the INPUT CHIP 2 indication the INPUT CHIP 1 also illuminated. The crew declared a "PAN" and continued in to St. John's at 500 feet. A Cormorant on exercises in the area (OUTCAST 903) joined the aircraft and escorted the flight in to St. John's airport. The crew flew a running landing onto Runway 02, then shut down the aircraft on the runway to prevent damage to the gearbox inputs. Upon inspection, the chip plugs in the main transmission and in the associated accessory modules were found to be contaminated. The affected components will be changed out, and the company and manufacturer are investigating the cause of the chip lights.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Engine malfunction - other
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: The number 2 engine had not failed rather a chip light had illuminated resulting in the flight crew reducing power for that engine.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: A06A0071: Cougar 33 (C-GSCH), a Sikorsky S-92, was outbound from St. John's to Hibernia. At approximately 75 nm from St. Johns the INPUT CHIP 2 light came on. The crew followed the checklist, reduced No.2 engine to IDLE, descended to 500 feet, and joined Route B back to St. John's airport. Once level at 500 feet the crew briefed the passengers and ATC. Approximately 5 minutes after the INPUT CHIP 2 indication the INPUT CHIP 1 also illuminated. The crew declared a "PAN" and continued in to St. John's at 500 feet. A Cormorant on exercises in the area (OUTCAST 903) joined the aircraft and escorted the flight in to St. John's airport. The crew flew a running landing onto Runway 02, then shut down the aircraft on the runway to prevent damage to the gearbox inputs. Upon inspection, the chip plugs in the main transmission and in the associated accessory modules were found to be contaminated. The affected components will be changed out, and the company and manufacturer are investigating the cause of the chip lights.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 7/25/2006
CADORS Number 2006A0549
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC
Description UPDATE TSB: The number 2 engine had not failed rather a chip light had illuminated resulting in the flight crew reducing power for that engine.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 6/13/2007
CADORS Number 2007A0519
Event Diversion
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description A Canadian registered Sikorsky S92A, after departure from St. John’s (CYYT), requested to return to the airport due to an input chip light indication. The aircraft landed without further incident at 11:12Z. Nil TSB.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

Date 4/24/2008
CADORS Number 2008A0501
Event Engine failure
Owner COUGAR HELICOPTERS INC.
Description UPDATE TSB: A08A0059: The Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky-S92A , operating as CHI91, was in cruise flight en route from the Hibernia Gravity Based Platform to St. John's Intl. When the helicopter was approximately 100 NM SE of St. John's, NL the crew contacted Gander ACC to advise they were declaring an emergency and had shutdown engine #1 (GE CT7-8A). The engine shutdown was required due to a Gear Box chip light. The helicopter landed uneventfully at 12:35 NDT while ARFF were standing by. Maintenance determined the chip light was due to an accumulation of "nuisance fuzz" in the form of a "sliver" on a recently installed Main Gearbox accessory input.
Aircraft Model S92A
Aircraft Make SIKORSKY

- srbp -

TSB issues S-92 crash report, recommends major changes to civil helo safety regime

A complex series of events involving 16 significant factors contributed to the crash of Cougar Helicopters Flight 491 in early 2009 and the loss of 17 souls according to the Transportation Safety Board released Wednesday after a two year investigation.

The complete report is available here:  S-92 investigation report.  It is comprehensive and covers all relevant factors from crew backgrounds to key operating systems to passenger injuries and safety equipment.

The TSB investigation made four recommendations:

• The Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Canada and the European Aviation Safety Agency remove the "extremely remote" provision from the rule requiring 30 minutes of safe operation following the loss of main gearbox lubricant for all newly constructed Category A transport helicopters and, after a phase-in period, for all existing ones.
• The Federal Aviation Administration assess the adequacy of the 30 minute main gearbox run dry requirement for Category A transport helicopters.
• Transport Canada prohibit commercial operation of Category A transport helicopters over water when the sea state will not permit safe ditching and successful evacuation.
• Transport Canada require that supplemental underwater breathing apparatus be mandatory for all occupants of helicopters involved in overwater flights who are required to wear a Passenger Transportation Suit System.

- srbp -

Sikorsky settles with NL S-92 families/survivor

There’s a settlement in the lawsuit launched by the sole survivor and the families of passengers and crew who died in the crash last march of a Sikorsky S-92 operated by Cougar helicopters.

A spokesperson for Sikorsky told Canadian Press:

"All of the claims in regard to the Cougar Flight 491 crew and passengers have been resolved…The settlement agreements are private and confidential, so I must decline to provide any details."

Last June, the families and the sole survivor filed a lawsuit against Sikorsky and related companies in Pennsylvania.  The case was withdrawn in July in an effort to reach a settlement.

-srbp-

“Twisting it to suit their purposes”: CBC misrepresents DND search and rescue study

A 2003 report by the Canadian Forces’ operational research and analysis centre concluded that “the coverage offered by Gander is better than that offered by St. John’s at all distances.  Moreover there are notable differences at 400 and 500 nautical miles (nm) where the coverage given by Gander is better by 20 and 15 percent respectively.” (p. vi)

The report is available online at the DND operational research and analysis website.  It provides a detailed analysis of search and rescue issues and assesses the relative merits of using St. John’s as a primary operating base for SAR helicopters compared to  Gander.

The 2003 report concludes that  - based on all factors including weather and the likelihood of Cougar helicopter incidents - Gander is preferable overall. The existing location provides optimum coverage across the entire range of potential missions, including any involving oil industry helicopters.

The report makes no observations on deploying helicopters to St. John’s (as opposed to basing), on the use of civilian search and rescue as currently provided by Cougar Helicopters under contract to the oil companies or on other ways to enhance overall SAR capabilities.

But the 2003 study clearly rejects the idea of moving DND SAR helicopters to St. John’s.

A careful reading of the report also suggests that under certain circumstances weather conditions at St. John’s might also erase any time advantage St. John’s would have at incidents less than 100 nautical miles from shore.

Since Monday, CBC St. John’s has been presenting an entirely different – and wrong - version of the DND report on east Coast search and rescue. An online story uses the title “St. John's best SAR base for offshore oil: DND” for example and uses a December 2000 presentation apparently obtained through the federal access to information laws.

Bond Papers discussed that initial CBC report story  - and it’s inaccuracies - on Monday. The conclusion CBC claims the 2000 presentation reached is especially important since the later (2003) study used more data to develop a better picture of east coast search and rescue operations and the requirements posed by offshore oil operations.

But even given that,  the initial review clearly concluded that :

While the modelling used in the report appeared to show St. John’s as a better location for what it terms “Cougar-related” incidents,  “since incident rates for Cougar will probably be quite small, the analysis performed on the historic data should prove greater utility in a direct comparison of Gander with St. John’s.”

CBC has been linking to a December 2000 slide show that represented an early version of the work leading up to the 2003 study.   A note at the end of the 2000 presentation – erroneously labelled ‘2003 report on SAR’ in the CBC’s pdf  – indicates that a detailed report will follow in 2001.

It was actually published in 2003, as confirmed by a simple e-mail request to the operational research and analysis communications officer.  For some reason, CBC hasn’t referred to the actual report, preferring instead to quote – and in some instances misquote  - the 2000 slide show.

Your humble e-scribbler found the e-mail address for the operational research and analysis division on line and fired off an e-mail request for the later detailed report.  A link to the publicly accessible database of reports and the title of the 2003 study came back within a few hours.

A second CBC story based on the same December 2000 pdf file also mashes sentences to create a completely false impression of what the 2000 presentation said.  In a story on reaction to CBC’s initial reports titled “Renewed call for rescue base in St. John's”, there is this paragraph:

"For a Cougar [offshore oil industry helicopter] incident … if a Cormorant deploys from St. John's, then it will be the first asset on the scene," concluded the report, obtained by CBC News through an access to information request. "Deployment from Gander will result in 48 minutes of additional waiting time."

The actual information comes from a specific slide (number 26) discussing hypothetical Cougar helicopter incidents. It involves a comparison of flying a helicopter from Newfoundland versus flying a CC-130 fixed wing transport  - with a higher flying speed than a helicopter– from Greenwood, Nova Scotia.  Both aircraft would be deployed to a SAR incident involving a Cougar helicopter.

As can be easily seen, CBC lifts out the first bullet in the last section.  The whole citation notes that for distances greater than 100 nautical miles, the Hercules would be the first one the scene. That’s hardly surprising given the relative speeds of the two aircraft over the distances involved in the DND projections.

The sentence mash-up conveys entirely incorrect and ultimately misleading information about the 2000 presentation and what it said. 

It isn’t clear why the CBC stories have been persistently misrepresenting the DND report, but there is no question that CBC has twisted the DND reports to give conclusions the reports didn’t reach.

-srbp-

Related:

April 2009:  “Continuing the Cougar S-92 Spin:  CBC or Cougar”

October 2009:  “When it comes to reckless speculation”

CBC SAR story grossly misleading

A CBC story on search and rescue off Newfoundland and Labrador seriously misrepresents the conclusions of a study conducted by air operational research and analysis staff of the Canadian Forces.

CBC’s online story claims in its title that “St. John’s [is the] best SAR base for oil: DND”. 

The story also claimed that:

The 2000 report for DND, titled The Impact of Offshore Oil Operations on East Coast Search and Rescue, questioned whether Gander was the best location for DND to base its Cormorant SAR helicopters.

But the report itself -  linked on the same CBC web page  - tells a very different story. Incidentally, the report, really just the slides and notes for a presentation, is also erroneously dated 2003 in the pdf version title even though the document clearly comes from December 2000. 

A detailed version apparently released in 2001 is mentioned at the end of the slides but CBC makes no reference to it in either the on air or on line stories.

The DND report looked at the impact offshore oil-related flights might have on search and rescue services.  It did not question “whether Gander was the best location” for search and rescue service in Newfoundland and Labrador.   The goal of the research was to determine what impact – if any – offshore flights to oil rigs would have on search and rescue service

In order to conduct the study, the researchers reviewed information on search and rescue performance generally in eastern Canada.  They then projected the potential impact of offshore helicopter operations.  They used several scenarios to try and forecast the potential impact  because, as the study notes, there was only two to three years of data on which to base experience.

As it turned out the DND study, like offshore board projections, grossly over-estimated the number of crashes in the offshore.

The conclusions – listed clearly on Slide 37 of the presentation – show that Gander is clearly the optimal location of search and rescue service based on a number of factors including weather. 

While the modelling used in the report appeared to show St. John’s as a better location for what it terms “Cougar-related” incidents,  “since incident rates for Cougar will probably be quite small, the analysis performed on the historic data should prove greater utility in a direct comparison of Gander with St. John’s.” 

In other words, because Cougar was unlikely to have a high number of incidents, the overall experience operating from a permanent base in Gander would likely tip the scales in favour of the continued use of Gander as the operating base.

-srbp-

Cougar 491 survivor’s statement

Robert Decker survived the crash of Cougar 491 on March 12, 2009. The S-92 ditched in the ocean off St. John’s Newfoundland after aborting a routine resupply run to two of the province’s offshore oil production platforms.

He testified this week at the Wells inquiry into offshore helicopter safety. That’s an important point lost on some reporters and most of the ghouls – political and otherwise – who’ve busily been trying to capitalize on the tragedy for their own purposes. This is an inquiry primarily focussed on offshore safety.

Decker’s testimony was riveting and added considerable new detail to the events on that late winter day. The testimony was, however, tightly controlled, with Decker agreeing only to respond to previously agreed upon questions. The trauma of the event and its effect on him were painfully evident.

There’s an account of it at the Telegram. The full transcript is also available at the helicopter inquiry website.

Decker also read a prepared statement. His closing words should be heeded by all, particularly those who have used this tragedy for their own purposes. The ghouls should take note:

"If we really want to make offshore helicopter travel safe, what we have to do is to make sure that every helicopter does not crash.

"The best way to keep every offshore worker safe is to keep every helicopter in the air where it belongs.

"Safety starts with the helicopter, and I think everything else is secondary."

-srbp-

Big Oil’s New L’il Buddies and helicopter safety

While the offshore helicopter safety inquiry has given some people a platform for their false statements about search and rescue again, let’s try a scenario that is based on facts and reasonable suppositions. 

Let’s suppose, for example, that after the whole thing is over, former Supreme Court Judge Robert Wells makes some recommendations that – in the opinion of the offshore oil companies – would adversely affect the projects. 

Let’s take the Hebron project as a typical one.

Adverse affect might be cost in this case. 

For example, let’s suppose that Wells decides that – despite the very best and most intense lobbying by everyone from Jack Harris to lawyer Randall Earle – the cost burden for providing search and rescue for the offshore in St. John’s should still be borne by the oil companies.

Let’s suppose that Big Oil’s L’il Buddies fail miserably in their efforts to shift the cost to taxpayers.  Let’s imagine that – contrary to the campaign being waged -  Wells requires that the companies continue to provide SAR support for their own employees and their own helicopters. 

And let’s imagine Wells decides to up the ante arguing that they should do it 24/7.

All of that is either established fact (there is such a campaign underway, even if it is hodge-podge and disorganized) or is a likely outcome of the inquiry.

And further, let’s suppose the oil companies find that – for a whole bunch of arguable reasons – that cost is just too much to bear. 

Maybe oil prices have dropped down again to levels far below the current US$80 a barrel.  And hey, it’s not like oil prices will go up and up and up forever.

So there’s our scenario.

What does the provincial government do?

Well, the provincial cabinet would likely find themselves bound by section 5.1 of the Hebron financial agreements:

The Province shall, on the request of the Proponents…support the efforts of the Proponents in responding to any future legislative and regulatory changes that may be proposed by Canada or a municipal government in the Province that might adversely affect any Development Project, provided such action does not negatively impact the Province or require the Province to take any legislative or regulatory action respecting municipalities.

And before you start arguing that opposing the SAR regulation “negatively impact the Province”, you are really not reading carefully enough.  When the word “province” is written with a capital “P” it means the Government of the place.

So since the provincial government as such would not be negatively affected, they wouldn’t have the one and only ground that applies on which they could slip out from under their legally binding obligation to back Big Oil.

Of course, the provincial government is also really an oil company these days.  Therefore it would liable for the cost of providing those helicopters for SAR.  It  would be in the provincial government’s interest to work with the other oil companies against the Wells safety recommendation anyway. 

If money is really tight - after all  - and these extra costs threaten the Lower Churchill project too, there might be lots of reasons for the provincial government/oil company to fight such a recommendation.

This inquiry might turn out to be very interesting after all. 

Oh.

And we can expect the lobbying effort that benefits Big Oil – Jack Harris is a witness in the schedule, for example – to intensify over the next few weeks.

-srbp-

When it comes to reckless speculation…

at least CBC commentator Brian Callahan is an expert on the subject.

Since the Cougar helicopter crash this past spring Callahan has been pushing an attack on 103 Rescue Squadron based on the speculation that somehow 103 Squadron could have materially changed the outcome had it not been training at Sydney Nova Scotia at the time of the incident.

Callahan continued his irresponsible attack during a CBC commentary on Wednesday.  Give it a listen, if you will. 

Notice that he actually doesn’t make a case on this.  He never has.   

Rather, Callahan makes false statements.  He claims, for example, that the Department of National Defence will be as absent from the helicopter safety inquiry “as they were on March 12th.”  Callahan knows of course that both coast guard and the Canadian Forces were far from absent on the day of the crash and subsequently during the recovery of the bodies.  Callahan clearly knows nothing about search and rescue as he claims that 103 Squadron left its task to others on that fateful day.

And he suggests – in his reference to 26 years ago – that the recommendations of the Ocean Ranger Royal Commission were ignored.  That too is an utterly false suggestion. 

Words from last spring remain appropriate:

This sort of misrepresentation amounts to an abuse. 

It tortures the families of the victims of the crash by suggesting a hope which is false. 

This attack – and that’s what it amounts to – tortures the men and women of the search and rescue services.  103 Search and Rescue Squadron flies twice the national average in SAR missions.  Hercules from 413 Squadron join them far out to sea.  They all train hard and fly hard and risk their lives in weather when the rest of us are huddled by a fire safe at home. They do it to save the souls whose lives are at risk in the harsh North Atlantic. When lives are lost, as in this case, they will inevitably search their souls to ensure that all that could be done was done.

This attack abuses the men and women of Cougar. The company has an exemplary safety record.  The company has such a record because every single employee is committed to safe service.  Over 48,000 accident free flying hours don’t happen without such a level of personal commitment. The company’s crews also fly search and rescue services every bit as good and every bit as dangerous as the work done by 103 and its sister squadrons.

These misrepresentations abuse the members of the public who are shocked by the tragedy and who share in the grief of those who have lost loved ones. They are misled into believing things which are not true.

In a time of tragedy, it is hard to imagine more monstrous abuses. The tortures will continue until someone decides to put an end to them. Maybe a wise editorial hand needs to rest on someone’s shoulder.

In the meantime,  all that the rest of us can do is hope that somewhere in the midst of their self-absorption, the perpetrators of the abuse can realize the harm they are doing.

Sadly, Brian is not alone.  Some politicians have also taken to building platforms for themselves out of corpses and grief.

Sadder still, Callahan continues to get a paid platform from which to spread his misinformation;  the wise editorial hand is still missing.

Since the perpetrators of the abuse have clearly not realized what they doing, perhaps it remains a hope that Judge Robert Wells’ inquiry will provide enough fact to silence the reckless speculation once and for all.

-srbp-

Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry - links

The offshore board’s inquiry into offshore helicopter safety started in St. John’s on October 19.

You can find the inquiry website via the offshore board website or here: www.oshsi.nl.ca.

For the record, you can also find:

• A schedule of witnesses;
• transcripts and exhibits; and,
• live video streaming.

Transcribing is fast.  You can find the testimony from this morning already posted.

-srbp-

When politicians become ghouls

My grandmother used to tell the story of going to a funeral in a small community where one her distant relatives had passed away. 

The story happened so long ago that neither the place nor the time was important.  What is worth recollecting is her account of the people who attended at the cemetery for the committal of the body to the ground.

They didn’t stand around, a lot of them.  The onlookers  arranged themselves sitting along the top-most rail of the little white fence with the heels of their shoes hooked in the bottom rail.  My grandmother described them as being very creepy and ghoulish.

That image has come to mind several times over the last few months.  Too many politicians in Newfoundland and Labrador have tried to make a political platform out of the tragic deaths of 17 people on Cougar 491.

They were quick to rush forward with a bunch of ideas that all turned out to be completely false and they have persisted, especially in attacking the federal government generally and the brave men and women of the Canadian Forces search and rescue service.

These politicians want to have search and rescue service in St. John’s.

But here’s the thing:  their entire argument is based on the case of Cougar 491.  In that incident – as the events themselves showed – the passengers and crew died pretty much on impact. 

There is virtually no way – even in the highly unlikely situation that a rescue helicopter had been flying alongside the ill-fated Cougar helicopter – that a single additional life could have been saved.

Sad. Tragic, even. 

But true.

Now that the consensus among politicians of all stripes has taken hold, it is apparently spreading to some of the lawyers at the Wells helicopter inquiry.  To wit, we have the bizarre case of the lawyer representing offshore workers at the inquiry.    The lawyer claims that “if DND does not have the resources or the federal government is not willing to alter the distribution of  search and rescue resources,” then the oil companies will have to do the job.

That’s an “if” that is based on the false premise that additional Canadian Forces equipment would have made a difference in this case or others like it and that the only solution worth talking is that the federal government  - correction – the taxpayers like you and me - must pay instead of perhaps requiring that the offshore operating companies bear a heftier burden for life safety, including a SAR service that doesn’t take an hour to get ready and that can fly when the weather is bad or it’s dark.

That’s actually one of the rather interesting things about the position taken by politicians, Liberal Conservative and New Democrat, who have taken up the position on the fence-top calling out advice from the sidelines:  they’ve all leaped to a conclusion that doesn’t involve the offshore operators and instead fingers the feds.
And now their argument has reached one of the lawyers involved.

Maybe people should hear the evidence before they come to conclusions.

And maybe, just maybe, politicians should stop trying to make political platforms out of corpses.

-srbp-

S-92 crash – TSB report – tail rotor, MGB, “run dry”, flotation system

From the Transportation Safety Board report on Thursday:

• Flight data recorder stopped working at approximately 800 feet ASL
• The aircraft was in a controlled, powered-down descent at the time.
• At approximately 500 ft ASL, the tail rotor drive power was lost (Cause unknown).

 

Photo of 491’s tail rotor, showing damaged teeth.

• The tail rotor appears to be directly implicated in the crash, a point previously unknown.  At the time of the crash, there was no apparent loss of power to the main gearbox and it was rotating.  This suggests that it had not seized as would be expected if zero oil state had been attained due to leak and the gearbox had failed entirely.  Without oil, it would seize and stop turning.  Initial reports identified this as the main issue and the whole idea of a run dry capability served as the basis for public comment.  it also appears to be a factor in a lawsuit in the United States, launched Thursday.

Left:  tail rotor take off gear, new

Right:  tail rotor take off gear recovered from  Cougar 491

• The TSB report notes suggest another issue (not the MGB) led to the crash:

“Examination of the MGB indicates that there was no loss of main rotor drive and that the main rotor blades were rotating at the time of the impact. The examination of the MGB also revealed that the tail rotor drive gears had been severely damaged, resulting in a loss of drive, causing it to stop producing thrust. Further examination is being carried out by the TSB Engineering Laboratory to determine the cause and sequence of this loss of tail rotor drive.

The metallurgical examination of the titanium oil filter attachment studs revealed fatigue cracking in the studs as well as evidence of thread damage. A detailed metallurgical examination of the studs, nuts, and filter bowl is under way to identify the origin of the fatigue cracks and to determine the fracture mechanism.” [Emphasis added]

 

• Pilots initiated a main power shut down, immediately  (Time stamps show three seconds), which is standard procedure according to TSB.
• “The helicopter struck the water at approximately 1226 in a slight right-banked, nose-high attitude at an approximate location of 47°26'03" N, 051°56'34.8" W, with moderate speed and a high rate of descent.”
• TSB considers the nose-high attitude consistent with a flared landing approach.  With zero power, the descent would have been spiralling due to loss of the tail rotor.
• The aircraft flotation system did not deploy on impact. “The Sikorsky S-92A flotation system activation switch was found in the armed position after recovery.”
• The investigation revealed an issue with the S-92A flight manual:
• “…there is a perception in some areas of the aviation community that the MGB can be run in a dry state - that is, without lubricating oil - for 30 minutes. FAR 29 does not require run-dry operation of a gearbox to meet the 30-minute”.
• “The Sikorsky S-92A Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) has been reviewed regarding MGB oil pressure loss below 5 pounds per square inch (psi) and the need for pilots to land immediately. An RFM revision has been approved by the FAA and Transport Canada.”
• Other issues are under investigation, as would be expected in an investigation of this type:

“A number of issues regarding survivability such as passenger immersion suit and crew flight suit effectiveness, use of underwater breathing devices, adequacy of survival training, adequacy of general ditching procedures, personal locator beacons, weather/sea state flight limitations, and Sikorsky S-92A flotation system are currently under investigation.”

Offshore board S-92 inquiry release and terms of reference

Issued Monday by the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board:

C-NLOPB Announces Commission of Inquiry Terms of Reference

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board today released the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry into Matters Respecting Helicopter Passenger Safety for Workers in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

On April 16, 2009, the C-NLOPB appointed Hon. Robert Wells Q.C. to head the Commission of Inquiry.

The C-NLOPB has been working to develop the Terms of Reference and put the necessary supports in place for the Commissioner to begin his duties.

The purpose of the Inquiry is to determine what improvements can be made so that the Board can determine that the risks of helicopter transportation of offshore workers is as low as is reasonably practicable in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

The Commissioner’s mandate will be to inquire into, report on and make recommendations in respect of matters relating to the safety of offshore workers in the context of Operators’ accountability for escape, evacuation and rescue procedures while traveling by helicopter over water to installations in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area, in compliance with occupational health and safety principles and best industry practices.

Specifically, the Commissioner shall inquire into, report on and make recommendations in respect of safety plan requirements for Operators and the role that Operators play in ensuring that their safety plans are maintained by helicopter operators; search and rescue obligations of helicopter operators by way of contractual undertakings or legislative or regulatory requirements; and the role of the C-NLOPB and other regulators in ensuring compliance with legislative requirements in respect of worker safety.

Commissioner Wells stated that the process will provide ample opportunity for the public to express their views in respect of practices which will reduce risks of helicopter transportation in the offshore area.

“The public will be able to make written submissions and there will be formal and informal hearings,” said Commissioner Wells. “There will also be a need to consult other offshore safety regulators in other jurisdictions in respect of best practices and obtain the services of independent specialists with expertise in areas relevant to the Inquiry.”

The Commission of Inquiry offices are located at Tara Place, 31 Peet Street, Suite 213, St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, A1B 3W8. It is expected that the offices will be fully functional and staffed in the coming weeks.

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Terms of reference below. Media Contact: Hon. Robert Wells QC. Inquiry Commissioner (709) 753-7000 or (709) 579-0469 e-mail: robertwells@nl.rogers.com or Sean Kelly APR, FCPRS Manager of Public Relations C-NLOPB (709) 778-1219 (709) 689-0713 (cell) e-mail: skelly@cnlopb.nl.ca

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Commissioner’s Terms of Reference for the Inquiry into matter respecting helicopter passenger safety for workers in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area

 

WHEREAS the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C NLOPB) was established by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the Government of Canada as a joint, independent, arms-length regulator of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas resources in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area;

AND WHEREAS the C-NLOPB has a mandate to interpret and apply the provisions of the Atlantic Accord and the Atlantic Accord Implementation Acts to all activities of Operators in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area and to oversee Operator compliance with those statutory provisions;

AND WHEREAS the C-NLOPB is required by legislation, before issuing an authorization for work or activity, to consider the safety of the work or activity by reviewing the system as a whole and its components, including its structures, facilities, equipment, operating procedures and personnel;

AND WHEREAS the C-NLOPB oversees the safety of Offshore Activities by review and approval of an Operator’s plans and implementation to determine that risks have been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable;

AND WHEREAS the crash of Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A flight 491 was a serious accident in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area;

AND WHEREAS pursuant to the Accord Implementation Acts an inquiry into a serious accident is mandatory, and the C-NLOPB has determined that an inquiry into safety matters respecting transport by helicopter to the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area is essential for the C-NLOPB in carrying out its mandate as it relates to overseeing safety in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area;

NOW THEREFORE the C-NLOPB, pursuant to s. 165 of the Federal Accord Act (s. 161 of the Provincial Act), directs that an inquiry be made into safety matters respecting transport by helicopter to the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area the terms of reference of which are set out herein;

1. Establishment of the Inquiry

There is established a commission of inquiry on matters respecting worker safety associated with helicopter transportation in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area that are within the jurisdiction of the C-NLOPB. The Commissioner shall be the Honourable Robert Wells, Q.C.

2. Definitions

In these Terms of Reference,

“Accord Acts” means the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act and the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act;

“Board” means The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board;

“Commissioner” means the individual appointed pursuant to para. 165 of the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act and section 161 of the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act;

“Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area” means the offshore area as defined in the Accord Acts.

“Operator” means a company which has been issued an authorization pursuant to the Accord Acts to conduct work or activity within the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

“Participant” means a person who makes an oral presentation or files a written submission to the Commissioner pursuant to the Rules of Procedure and Practice;

“Rules of Procedure and Practice” means the procedures as may be implemented by the Commissioner;

“Secretariat” means the Commissioner’s support staff.

3. Purpose

The purpose of this Inquiry is to determine what improvements can be made so that the Board can determine that the risks of helicopter transportation of offshore workers is as low as is reasonably practicable in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

4. General Mandate

The Commissioner’s mandate will be to inquire into, report on and make recommendations in respect of matters relating to the safety of offshore workers in the context of Operators’ accountability for escape, evacuation and rescue procedures while traveling by helicopter over water to installations in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area, in compliance with occupational health and safety principles and best industry practices.

5. Specific Mandate

Specifically the Commissioner shall inquire into, report on, and make recommendations in respect of:

(a) safety plan requirements for Operators and the role that Operators play in ensuring that their safety plans, as represented to and approved by the Board are maintained by helicopter operators,

(b) search and rescue obligations of helicopter operators by way of contractual undertakings or legislative or regulatory requirements,

(c) the role of the C-NLOPB and other regulators in ensuring compliance with legislative requirements in respect of worker safety.

6. Limitation

The Commissioner’s mandate does not include an examination of any issues related to the airworthiness of aircraft, training of flight crew, or flight procedures or any other matters which are included in the Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigation into Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A Crash except to the extent specifically described in paragraph 5 hereof.

The Commissioner’s mandate does not include an examination of the provision by the Government of Canada (Department of National Defence) of Search and Rescue facilities for all marine incidents and the location of such facilities within the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador

7. Powers of the Commissioner

Consistent with s. 165(2) of the Federal Accord Act and s. 161 (2) of Provincial Accord Act, the Commissioner shall be vested with the powers conferred by the Inquiries Act, R.S., 1985, c. I-11 and the Public Inquiries Act, 2006, SNL2006 c. P-38.1.

8.  Inquiry Methodology

The Commissioner shall design, make known and enforce rules, practices and procedures for the proper conduct of the Inquiry and where necessary may amend such rules, practices and procedure from time to time.

Phase I – (Parts A and B to be undertaken concurrently)

A. The Commissioner shall solicit the views of the public in respect of practices which will reduce the risks of helicopter transportation in the offshore area.

Mechanisms by which this phase of the inquiry is to be conducted made include:

(i) interviews and surveys,

(ii) calling for written submission, and

(iii) formal or informal hearings as the Commissioner deems appropriate.

B. The Commissioner shall gather information in respect of the specifically identified mandate issues described in paragraph 5 hereof.

Mechanisms by which this phase of the inquiry is to be conducted may include:

(i) research studies,

(ii) consultation with other offshore safety regulators in other jurisdictions in respect of best practices,

(iii) inspections and investigations,

(iv) calling for written submissions, and

(v) informal or formal hearings as the Commissioner deems appropriate.

• Any information gathered by the Commissioner during Phase I of the Inquiry which in his view should be addressed by the C-NLOPB or any other regulatory agency with urgency shall be brought to the attention of the C-NLOPB at a time and in a format the Commissioner deems appropriate. 
• To the extent that it reduces duplication of efforts and facilitates expeditious consideration of issues raised, the Commissioner shall maintain regular and frequent communication with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigation into Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A Crash.

The Commissioner may retain and as needed request the services of independent specialists whose function would be to provide information on and interpret information and issues relevant to the Inquiry. Independent specialists retained by the Commissioner may be requested by the Commissioner to appear before the Commissioner as experts.

The Commissioner shall provide a Report to the Board on completion of Phase I, which Report shall be provided by March 31, 2010 unless an extension should become necessary.

Phase II Upon completion of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigation into Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A Crash, the Commissioner shall undertake a review of the Report therefrom and particularly the findings and shall advise the C-NLOPB:

(a) which findings should result in actions being recommended to be undertaken by C-NLOPB and how they should be implemented,

(b) which findings should result in actions being recommended to be undertaken by other legislative or regulatory agencies.

The Commissioner may retain and as needed request the services of independent specialists whose function would be to provide information on and interpret information and issues relevant to the Inquiry.

Independent specialists retained by the Commissioner may be requested by the Commissioner to appear before the Commissioner as experts.

Participation by Parties with Professional and Commercial Interests

The Commissioner shall provide criteria for Standing for those with professional and commercial interest in helicopter transport to the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

The Commissioner shall also provide procedures by which Standing will be granted.

Parties with Standing shall provide the Commissioner with written submissions outlining the issues within the Inquiry Mandate upon which such parties have an interest. The Commissioner may request from such parties further submissions either by way of written reports or oral presentations.

The Commissioner may provide for sessions in which evidence is presented to the Commissioner and where appropriate may allow for cross-examination of such evidence.

Scheduling

The Commissioner will provide notice of the detailed schedule and announce specific dates, locations and topics respecting the public sessions, if any, of the Inquiry. This notice will be issued a minimum of thirty (30) days prior to the start of the sessions and shall identify the specific issues on which information is being sought. The Commissioner will hold sessions at such locations, within the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, and at such times as the Commissioner deems appropriate.

9. Consultation by Commissioner with the C-NLOPB

The Commissioner, the Secretariat, or both may consult the Board for the purposes of clarifying any matters respecting the Terms of Reference, the Inquiry process and any matters relating to support of the Inquiry.

The Commissioner may consult the Board to provide information in relation to matters within the Inquiry Mandate.

The Commissioner or Secretariat shall not consult the Board for the purpose of discussing any substantive matters respecting purpose of the Inquiry and the recommendations to be made.

Notwithstanding the above provision the Commissioner shall bring to the attention of the Board matters that come to the Commissioners attention during the Inquiry that are of an immediate nature relating to any safety issues within the jurisdiction of the Board.

10. Support for Commissioner

The Board shall provide funding to the Commissioner so as to fulfill the mandate and effectively achieve the objectives of the Inquiry.

The Commissioner shall occupy such space for offices and hearing rooms and employ staff as may be necessary in consultation with the Board and in accordance with Board policy and practices.

The Commissioner may engage professional services (public relations, technology, website) so as to fulfill the mandate and effectively achieve the objectives of the Inquiry.

The Commissioner shall not express any finding or recommendations regarding criminal or civil responsibility of any person, body or organization.

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S-92 Q and A

While it is stamped for internal use only, CBC has posted an internal questions and answers document prepared for use by the oil company officials and Cougar for use at some meetings being organized with offshore workers prior to the resumption of helicopter flights to the three platforms.

The answers are straightforward and leave out information that is still subject to the Transportation Safety Board investigation of the S-92 crash two months ago.

Some answers stand out, though, like this one about gear box warning indications:

Q79. Has there ever been a Gear Box alarm incident before? How was it handled? Was anything different from this incident? Did it happen with the S-92A? (Questions 112, 45, 277)

A. In the entire global fleet of Sikorsky S-92A helicopters, there have been a
total of five incidences related to three types of gear box issues.  Two (including Cougar’s helicopter) related to filter bowl studs, two related to lube oil pump Vespel spline couplings, and one related to overfilling of lube oil. The change from titanium to steel studs as mandated by FAA directive has been completed. The Vespel spline couplings underwent a design improvement that was previously implemented.

or another on the 30 minute run dry issue:

Q81. There has been comments that the gear box should be able to
run dry for thirty minutes, if this is the case why did this not happen?  (Question 240)

A. Sikorsky states that there is no “30-minute run dry” regulatory requirement for civilian certified helicopters. The S-92AA main gearbox is fully certified, without waiver or exception, to the latest Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), including Part 29 through Amendment 47. Sikorsky states that total loss of oil is considered an extremely remote event based on system design. Further,that for all gearbox failure modes that are not deemed as extremely remote, continued safe operation of the S-92A helicopter main gearbox has been demonstrated in excess of three hours running time. In the circumstance of total loss of lubrication, a “Land Immediately” instruction is directed.

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Cuts not growth on air force agenda

Via David Pugliese, the air force is considering options to cut upwards of $123 million from next year’s budget.
Expanding search and rescue helicopter services isn’t an option.

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Offshore board appoints retired Justice Robert Wells to head helicopter crash probe

The following was issued today by the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board:

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) announced today the appointment of the Honourable Robert Wells Q.C. as commissioner of the Public Inquiry into Worker Safety Associated with Helicopter Travel To and From Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities.

Mr. Wells is highly qualified to lead this important inquiry. He retired as Justice of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador, Trial Division in 2008 after 22 years of service.

Mr. Wells also served as President of the Law Society of Newfoundland (1977-1981) and National President of the Canadian Bar Association (1985-1986).

Further details regarding the inquiry, including the Terms of Reference, will be publicly announced in the coming weeks as Mr. Wells takes on his duties as commissioner.

The Board is conducting an inquiry pursuant to the provisions of the Atlantic Accord Acts. The Board is pleased that Mr. Wells has agreed to take on this important inquiry and we look forward to receiving his final report.

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Crass political opportunism continues unabated

The guy admits he knows nothing about the issue.

But that doesn’t stop him from renewing his efforts at trying to take political advantage of a tragedy.

Sadly, he wasn’t alone at the time this started.

Sadder still, he’s now got support from the rest of his political colleagues at Tammany on Gower.

And don’t forget that’s even though he admittedly knows nothing about the subject, and as it almost goes without saying, the rest of his council buddies know even less about the subject.

Of course, it has nothing whatsoever to do with the fact that this is an election year at city hall.

Nothing whatsoever.

And Mile One will make money.

No sh** update:  And lo and behold while that last sentence was written without benefit of having seen the print version of the Telegram, there in all it’s glory was a claim from last night’s council meeting that Mile One had actually made money last year without the benefit of a hockey team.

Of course, what council calls “profit” or “surplus” doesn’t take into account the multi-million dollar subsidy taxpayers funnel into the place. 

Again.

If we took that into account, the place would be certainly hundreds of thousands if not millions in the red.

Again.

And none of this taxpayer funded bullsh** has anything to do with the fact it is an election year.

What’s the phrase for that?

Oh yeah.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

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Offshore board announces inquiry into helicopter crash

A news release from the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board:

The C-NLOPB announced today that in accordance with the provisions of the Atlantic Accord Acts pertaining to ‘Mandatory Inquiries’, the Board shall establish an inquiry into worker safety associated with the recent helicopter incident in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore area.

The inquiry will not examine issues covered by the investigation of the Transportation Safety Board.

While we believe it is important to announce the inquiry at this time, we continue to work on a definition of the mandate, terms of reference, selection of a commissioner for the inquiry, and timeline for inquiry completion.

A further announcement will be made when these details are available.

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Pentagon eyes VH-71 cancellation

As part of re-shaping defence spending, the Pentagon is proposing to scrap a purchase of an EH-101 variant, dubbed the VH-71, to replace the aging Sea Kings used by the Marine One presidential flight.

The 101 beat out Sikorsky’s S-92 in a competition that ended last year.

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Continuing the Cougar S-92 SAR spin: CBC or Cougar?

CBC is running an exclusive interview with Cougar helicopters employees about the search and rescue mission its dedicated SAR helicopter flew the day one of its S-92s crashed.

There’s a paragraph in the middle of the CBC online story that leaps out for attention, given the focus in media coverage on the whole issue of 103 Squadron being on exercise at the time of the incident:

Cougar normally supplies backup to the Canadian Forces for search and rescue operations run out of its base in Gander, in central Newfoundland. But on March 12, the base's Cormorant helicopters were involved in a training exercise in Cape Breton, so Cougar's own rescue team was pressed into service.

“Pressed into service”.

That makes it sound like something was jury-rigged and unprepared, like Cougar didn’t normally do this sort of thing.

As the saying goes, nothing could be further from the truth. Cougar provides dedicated search and rescue service to the offshore oil industry.  It isn’t an accident.  They didn’t throw something together in haste that day.

Well, they shouldn’t have thrown it together because they apparently already knew where 103 Squadron was when CHI91 launched that Thursday morning and therefore knew the flying times involved.

Nothing in the CBC online story explains why it took the Cougar SAR flight so long to launch.

There is plenty of good stuff for Cougar and its people.   It’s a nice piece, the kind any public relations person would be happy to see in this sort of story given the inevitable questions that are already being asked about every aspect of this incident including Cougar’s own SAR response.

But given that the attack on 103 Squadron is largely a media-driven angle, one has to wonder:  is the spin in this piece coming from CBC or Cougar or both?

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