All around in circles 2 #nlpoli

December 17 is an auspicious day in Muskrat Falls history.

That was the date in 2012 when Kathy Dunderdale stood in front of a group of cheering supporters of the ludicrous megaproject and proclaimed that the government had formally approved its construction.

“It all begins here!” she shouted to the overjoyed throng. ““It all begins now!”

It didn’t start there of course.

Kathy had stood with Danny Williams two years earlier - 18 November to be precise - and announced a deal to build Muskrat Falls, the project the media hailed as the fulfillment of a dream to build the Lower Churchill and break the stranglehold Quebec had over our province.

That was a lie, to be sure. 

But still the reporters parroted Williams’ and Dunderdale’s lines just as they had 18 months before that - in April 2009 - when Williams said a deal to sell Churchill Falls electricity to Emera through Quebec had broken the stranglehold.

Arguably, though, Muskrat Falls started in May 2006 when Williams announced the province would go it alone to build the Lower Churchill.

The Clerk of the Executive Council at the time emailed the finance deputy minister and asked if anyone had checked with the deputy to see if the province could afford it.  He got no reply.

In April 2010, when a gaggle of politicians, bureaucrats, and Nalcor thugs decided to go ahead with Muskrat Falls first, they figured the local ratepayers and taxpayers would foot the entire bill out of their electricity rates.

By November 2010, when Williams announced the crowning achievement of his career, the cost of the project had grown to the point that the impact on electricity prices would make people unhappy.  SRBP pointed out at the time the price would double from what it then was. 

And so the Muskrateers started to figure ways to lower the sticker shock – mitigate the initial rates.

Every single Premier since Danny Williams has promised to mitigate the project’s impact on rates.

On December 17, 2020, eight years to the day after Dunderdale whooped it up, Premier Andrew Furey became the latest one to promise rate mitigation.

Policy Pixelation #nlpoli

The members of the House of Assembly voted unanimously at the end of October to set up a committee to decide how to give everyone in the province a cheque each month from government.

The motion started out with a few reasons why the members thought it was a good idea:  people across Canada didn’t all have the same income, people were getting such a cheque already from the federal government to cope with COVID, some people – no one indicated who they were – thought this was a good idea, and when people had more money they were generally better off.

When it came time to explain those things in greater detail, Jordan Brown, the New Democrat member who led the debate didn’t give a single bit of extra detail that showed he and his staff had done any research on it at all.

He just made flat, generic statements, including:

“There are a lot of geographical differences in regions throughout this country, too.”

“we do have very unique geographical challenges, we have a unique population. We have a lot of unique needs that make this province what it is.”

“A lot of the research that we've come across was actually Canadian research, Canadian led. As Canadians, we should be proud that we are actually looking at these things within our own country. We have a lot of the research and legwork already done here.”

“Just my observation of this province, we're a very societal province. We're very adapt. We're very caring. We seem to be a province that cares so deeply about everybody in it.

He mentioned five groups that signed a letter in favour of what they called a “basic income.”  Brown also added that a “Tory senator wrote a book on why we should do this as a country.” 

No details.  No evidence.  No specific information.

And most tellingly of all, not a single description of just what this universal basic income might look like.

Come by Chance and the Politics of Inertia #nlpoli

Is *this* the real El Dorado?

More than six months after they shut it down, the company that owns the Come by Chance oil refinery wants to sell it.

 And they want provincial taxpayers to pay.

According to Saltwire, “Glen Nolan, president of the United Steel Workers Local 9316 union, said that in recent conference calls officials of the province’s energy department indicated Silverpeak had floated” the idea that the provincial government would pay to keep the plant in hot idle mode.  

Between 150 and 175 workers have been laid off from the facility since February.  Another 60 or so are working to keep the plant ready to run.   

A deal with Irving – reported by Canadian Press and others as a done deal in late May – came apart for reasons that aren’t clear.

So while they are trying to sell the refinery Silverpeak wants the provincial government to pay to keep the refinery idled in a state where it could get back into production very quickly.  The alternative will be to mothball the refinery and lay off the remaining workers at the refinery.

The only company interested in buying the refinery – Origin International – doesn’t want to run it as a refinery.  But that hasn’t stopped the provincial government from talking it up and for representatives of the union at Come by Chance from being excited at the prospect.

It’s hard to imagine the provincial government won’t put up the cash.

Innu Nation suing provincial government not HQ over Churchill Falls #nlpoli

 

Laws suits get filed in court.

Political claims for cash launch with a news conference, a website, and a deceptive news release that misidentifies the target of the action.

The Innu Nation statement of claim  filed in Newfoundland and Labrador  Tuesday is against the Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation as the first defendant in its claim for $4 billion in damages.  The provincial government owns 65% of CF(L)Co and Hydro-Quebec owns a minority interest (35%).

There’s no reason to sue HQ since it is a minor partner in the company that runs Churchill Falls and manages the reservoir built in the 1960s on land claim by Innu in Quebec and Labrador.  Whatever liability HQ might have would be through CF(L)Co.

Otherwise, Hydro-Quebec is just a customer for the power.  And if Innu Nation wanted to include the customers of the power, then it would have sued every single customer of CF(L)Co since 1971, which would include companies and towns in Labrador, Ontario, and the United States. 

There are lots of little clues in the claim that this is a political move, not a legal one.

Policy confusion does no one any good #nlpoli

Last week, the Liberal governments in Ottawa and St. John’s unleashed a bold new innovation in political announcements.

Fridays used to be the day when governments buried announcements, they didn’t want anyone to notice.  They’d take out the trash, as the day came to be known, by slipping out a news release without any fanfare.

Not anymore.

A gigantic news conference featuring both the Premier and the provincial representative in the federal cabinet unleashed a pair of significant announcements.

Problem was there wasn’t enough detail for many people to make sense of it all.

Hence, the new concept:

For-Fuck-Sake Friday.

Because it left observers shouting, “For Fuck Sake!” in either bewilderment or exasperation as they tried to figure out what was going on.

Well, fear not, faithful readers.

As we have done for the past decade and a half, SRBP will blow away all the clouds of confusion furrowing brows across Newfoundland and Labrador and tell you what it all means.

No duff.

No guff.

Cleaning up the mess of Muskrat Falls #nlpoli

There are a couple of points in his 1,000 page report where commissioner Richard LeBlanc refers to politicians and other officials of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador as being naive in their dealings with Nalcor officials about Muskrat Falls. He says Ed Martin took advantage of the politicians and bureaucrats.

It is arguably one place and perhaps the only place where LeBlanc is wrong in his description of Muskrat Falls and how it came to be.

Muskrat Falls was, from the outset a political project, initiated and then relentlessly pursued by a group of politicians for their own reasons.  Their leader, Danny Williams, selected Ed Martin to work with him on the Nalcor project, chiefly to build something on the Lower Churchill as Williams’ legacy.

Martin told LeBlanc that he had one job – to build the project – and that was all of it. But Martin did the job for Williams.  Along the way Williams recruited to his circle senior bureaucrats who also actively collaborated in the project for their own reasons.  It was this circle that met in April 2010 at The Rooms and decided to plunge ahead with the redefined project now known as Muskrat Falls.

They were not naïve.  They were not duped.  They did not care.  They had one goal. They worked together to achieve it from the time Williams launched the venture in 2006 until thd last of them resigned in 2016.

Muskrat Falls was the bastard child of ego and ambition, nothing more.  All the other ideas associated with it, such as retribution for the 1969 power contract, were never anything more than lies – rationalisations to gain support for the project.  The cabal from The Rooms deceived the public and they deceived themselves.

They wanted it built and nothing would stop them.

No change in the weather? No change in we. #nlpoli

The problem we have is not a lack of options and opportunities to sort out the government finances ourselves.  The problem facing Newfoundland and Labrador is that the leading people of the province, not just the politicians but all the leading people,  don't have the stomach for making the kinds of decisions needed. They don't even want to talk about sensible things. They talk about foolishness like Equalization or fight against imaginary "austerity" instead.

SRBP, "Sovereignty",  January 2017

Lately, Alberta economist Jack Mintz likes to remind Canadians that Alberta is pissed off with the federal government.  The Alberta government is running massive deficits but Mintz thinks Ottawa is to blame, not, you know, the provincial politicians who actually made the decision to spend more provincial tax money than the provincial government takes in.

Mintz turned up in the Toronto Star and CBC Radio last week pushing Ottawa to bail out  Newfoundland and Labrador.  He’s hooked up with a shadowy new outfit calling itself the Schroeder Institute that also launched itself last week with a campaign to get Ottawa to funnel money to Newfoundland - as Schroeder’s Twitter feed keeps calling it – to stave off financial catastrophe in the province.

Then local musician and business owner Bob Hallett took 2,000 words on CBC’s local website to deliver the same message:  Newfoundland’s financial mess is Ottawa’s responsibility to clean up.

That’s a wonderful sentiment sure to get lots of support from people in Newfoundland and Labrador who are worried about their future.  Sadly for those people, Schroeder, Mintz, and Hallett rely on a string of old fairy tales that have been long debunked – not to mention stuff that is just wrong – to make their case. They also are a reminder that wisps of air and pixie dust are a piss-poor foundation for successful policy against very real problems.   That is, after all, how Newfoundland *and* Labrador got into its current mess in the first place.

Restoring Power: The Section 92A Option #nlpoli

One of the potentially most valuable revenue sources would be a new tax on electricity production that could yield upwards of $450 million a year. The bulk of the tax would be paid by Emera and Hydro-Quebec, both of which currently profit from free or near-free electricity through two patently unfair agreements. 

The basic problem of the Lower Churchill was always how to pay for it. 

Everyone who tried to build it before wanted people outside the province to use the electricity and pay for the whole project, with the profit flowing to the people of Newfoundland and Labrador.  When they couldn't get that to work, they simply didn't pursue the project. 

The politicians and bureaucrats behind what became Muskrat Falls were smarter.  They decided in a meeting at The Rooms in April 2010 they would force the people of Newfoundland and Labrador to pay for the entire project through their electricity rates, even though they would use very little of it. The benefits would flow outside Newfoundland and Labrador. 

The Dwight Ball-Ches Crosbie rate mitigation scheme is still about having Newfoundlanders and Labradorians alone pay for Muskrat Falls with others reaping the benefit.  On top of that, the Ball-Crosbie approach includes money that doesn’t exist.  Their scheme also doesn’t address other problems with Muskrat Falls that are as troublesome as the problem of the government’s proposed scheme to have only one small group of people bear the whole cost.  So, it won't work.

Quebec appeals court decision on Churchill Falls contract no win for Newfoundland and Labrador #nlpoli

Media reports, political comments, and pundit opinions are wrong about the decision last week by the Quebec Court of Appeal in a case about the renewal clause of the 1969 Power Contract between Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation and Hydro-Quebec.

The Court decision leaves Hydro-Quebec with virtually all of the electricity produced from Churchill Falls and, most importantly, operational control of water flows on the river.  This will have an adverse impact on Muskrat Falls. As a result, CF(L)Co is likely to appeal the decision.

__________________________________________________

The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled last week that Hydro Quebec retained operational control of electricity production at Churchill Falls. It made a minor change to an earlier decision by the Quebec Superior Court in a decision from 2016.

That’s why Hydro-Quebec issued a statement that it was satisfied with the outcome of the decision.

In other words, English-language media reports and political commentary got it wrong when they claimed “Quebec's top court rules for N.L. in Churchill Falls dispute with Hydro-Québec” (Canadian Press) or “A Victory For NL In Long-Standing Legal Battle With Hydro-Quebec On Upper Churchill” (VOCM).

The English-language reports focused on the idea that Hydro-Quebec could only buy electricity from Churchill Falls up to a maximum each month under the terms of an automatic renewal to the 1969 power contract between Hydro-Quebec and Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation.  VOCM went a step further in the mistake department my making it sound like both Hydro-Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro could sell electricity from Churchills Falls. 

The clue that something was amiss in the English-language coverage is the statement from Nalcor that said the Quebec Court of Appeal “had ruled substantially in favour” of CF(L)Co on the question of Continuous Energy.

Here’s why.

The 2005 and 2019 Federal-Provincial Agreements #nlpoli

The Atlantic Accord functions in Newfoundland and Labrador politics in two ways.  There is the agreement between the Government of Canada and the provincial government that established the joint management framework for the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore. At the same time, there is the political prop and the associated mythology that has, in largest measure, replaced the actual agreement in both the popular and political/bureaucratic understanding of it.

Neither the 2005 nor 2019 federal-provincial agreements commonly referred to as the Atlantic Accord or revised Atlantic Accord had anything to do with development and management of the oil and gas resources offshore Newfoundland and Labrador. Neither changed the 1985 agreement directly or indirectly.

The widely-held belief is completely different. The popular misconception comes from the fact that in both cases, the premiers faced with financial difficulties linked their demands for money from Ottawa to the Atlantic Accord. In both cases, the issues were about something else.  In 2005, the discussion was actually about Equalization. It 2019, the final agreement was about financial assistance for the provincial government about its own financial difficulties and to deal with the troubled Muskrat Falls project.   

Gaslighting a society #nlpoli

Saturday morning and Facebook delivered a video clip of Peter Mansbridge accepting a lifetime achievement award.

After the obligatory thanks to everyone, Mansbridge delivers a scripted couple of minutes about journalism in the age of fake news and alternate facts.

"Journalism is under threat," Mansbridge warned, "in a way we haven't witnessed before."

"The very principle that we stand for is under attack."

"Truth is under attack."

Finding truth and presenting truth is important, according to Mansbridge.

Challenging power and those who wield it is important for "power unchallenged too often becomes power abused."

The PUB, Exemptions, and Muskrat Falls #nlpoli #cdnpoli

Here’s some background on the issue of Muskrat Falls and Public Utilities Board exemptions. 

At the end you should know what an exemption is all about, how the exemptions – there are more than one – came about – and what that means for now and in the future as far as electricity rates go.  We’ll deal with mitigation in another brief post next week.

The information here is based on material in the public record plus additional research and information accumulated over 30 years working on public policy issues in the province. That includes the 15 years of SRBP, much of which wound up being about the Lower Churchill project.

Let’s start with what an exemption is.

TDIH: "Quebec paper reports Lower Churchill agreement" #nlpoli #cdnpoli

Two decades ago, there was talk of a deal to develop not one, not two, but three dams in Labrador.

The story broke in a Quebec newspaper,  Le soleil,  on February 19 and the next day the Telegram did a front pager written by business editor Chris Flanagan.

"The big bonus for Newfoundland from a deal to develop the Lower Churchill is not simply cheaper electricity and a transmission line from Quebec,"  Flanagan wrote, "but an opportunity to send natural gas-generated power the other way, says a Quebec journalist with high level sources in both provinces."

"The Newfoundland government has done studies examining the potential of bringing ashore natural gas from Hibernia and other sites on the Grand Banks, using it to produce electricity and selling it on the North American grid, said Michel Vastel, a veteran political correspondent and business writer with the Quebec newspaper, Le Soleil."

Vastel told The Telegram his sources were in both provinces and that the provincial government in Newfoundland and Labrador had studies supporting development of offshore natural gas. 

"In his 'briefings,' from high-level sources, Vastel said reports have estimated Newfoundland's average rate will increase 30 per cent over the next 20 years -- an increase that won't happen if the Lower Churchill goes ahead."

The idea had its critics.  "Stan Marshall, the president and CEO of Fortis Inc., which owns Newfoundland Power, has said a transmission line to St. John's makes no economic sense.

Here are some key details of the deal that never was:

• "...Newfoundland will receive approximately 800 megawatts, Labrador 200 and Quebec 2,100 from the Lower Churchill. Construction of the project will create 12,000 person-years of employment and power is expected to be on the grid by 2007."
• "The Lower Churchill hydroelectric project consists of Gull Island, with a generating capacity of 2,264 megawatts, Muskrat Falls, at 824 megawatts and Upper Lobstick, at 160 megawatts for a total of 3,238 megawatts. The cost of the project, including transmission lines, is estimated at $12 billion."

In the talks actually announced in early March 1998,  the two provinces set aside $20 million to study Muskrat Falls and focused instead on expanding Churchill Falls and building Gull Island.

20 years later we got one tiny dam and big transmission line for that.

The Telegram included a cost of the transmission line from Labrador:  "According to several news reports, the Churchill-to-St. John's transmission line -- including an underwater component across the Straits -- would cost about $2 billion, and is to be financed by Ottawa."

"The federal government's major benefit would come from reduction in greenhouse gas emissions that will go a long way to helping Canada reach emission targets established at the 1997 Convention on Climate Change in Kyoto, Japan."

-srbp-

Don't blame me (-dia) #nlpoli

Now that Muskrat Falls is officially a boondoggle,  all sorts of people are rushing forward to criticise it.

Others are also rushing forward to ensure we all know that they were on the side of the angels back in the day and so, as Brian Jones pleads this weekend in the Telegram, we shouldn’t “blame the media for Muskrat Falls.”

For the past year and a half,  Brian tells us,  people whom he calls “trolls” have been writing and calling him to ask why the local media did not reveal all the details about Muskrat Falls as the thing was unfolding.

“I always point out a basic fact,”  Brian says,  that “ the Newfoundland media, not just The Telegram, have covered every aspect of Muskrat Falls since at least 2010.”

Wonderful if it was a fact, but no.

Not a fact.

Multiple Interlocking Rationalizations #nlpoli #cdnpoli

In announcing an inquiry into some aspects of Muskrat Falls on Monday, the Premier muddled up some numbers that suggest the confusion at the heart of Monday’s big news.  He said that the inquiry will explain how a project that was originally supposed to cost $5.0 billion at the wound up costing $13 billion or more.

Then he announced the terms of reference for an inquiry that focused on the pro forma exercise called “sanction” that happened when the project was supposed to cost $6.2 billion.  The $5.0 billion figure is from November 2010.  That’s when many of the crucial decisions took place but, as far as the terms of reference go, its outside the bounds of the inquiry.

Justice Richard LeBlanc also won’t look at the political decisions behind the project, the relationship between Nalcor and the Premier’s Office, the governance of the corporation, or any of the other major elements of what became Muskrat Falls. All of those aspects would explain the political foundation of the project the Premier mentioned in his news conference but none of them are covered by the inquiry terms.  Instead, the inquiry will focus on the internal management decisions at Nalcor after 2012.

The specific subjects of the inquiry are listed in Section 4, which contains four sub-sections labeled a through d. Let’s run through each of them.

Energy Demand and Sanction

Section 4 (a) directs the commissioner to inquire into “the consideration by Nalcor of options to address the electricity needs of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Island interconnected system customers that informed Nalcor’s decision to recommend that the government sanction the Muskrat Falls Project. 

One supporter of the project famously said there were “multiple, interlocking business cases” for it.  What Nalcor, the government and its supporters actually offered multiple, interchangeable rationalizations.

In November 2010,  the key argument for the project was breaking the stranglehold Quebec supposedly held on electricity development in Labrador.  The project would ship power to markets through Nova Scotia.  The mention of Muskrat as the least-cost source of electricity for the island is found in paragraph nine of what is essentially a 10-paragraph news release plus a list of highlights.

Right off the bat, Nalcor didn’t present the alternatives at the time of project sanction, which is the starting point for the inquiry.  That happened in 2010, although it didn’t really because there is no evidence Nalcor ever examined alternatives to Muskrat Falls. The only mention of alternatives has been to the isolated island scenario, which means Nalcor never evaluated all options anyway.

In 2006 Nalcor did evaluate alternatives to the whole Lower Churchill project but that was for a different concept:  the LCP was supposed to be about power for export only, with local needs as a secondary consideration.  That’s an important detail because another key aspect of the 2010 announcement was that this was the original LCP, but with the tiny dam built first.

There’s also no order in council in which the provincial government approved a proposal from Nalcor.  There’s only OC2012-130 that lets Nalcor use Crown land:

 Under the authority of section 7(2)(a) of the Lands Act, the Lieutenant Governor in Council is pleased to authorize the Minister of Environment and Conservation to issue a licence to occupy Crown land to Nalcor Energy for an area not to exceed 4.3 hectares within the fifteen metre shoreline reservation at Muskrat Falls, Newfoundland and Labrador, for the purpose of hydroelectric generation, subject to the terms and conditions normally applicable to the issuance of such licences.

It’s dated December 4, 2012, well before the infamous filibuster and the actual formal ceremony announcing “sanction.”

This section will also not touch on the decision to double electricity rates and the rationale for paying for the project, all of which was political and all of which was decided in 2010.

Key Points to Retain:

•  Without an amendment, the inquiry can’t look at decisions taken prior to December 2012 since the terms specifically identify Nalcor’s proposal for sanction as the focus. That happened in December 2012.  
•  here’s no indication Nalcor presented any project justifications in 2012.
• There’s also no order-in-council in which cabinet “sanctioned” Muskrat Falls.  It isn’t clear, therefore, what the commissioner will be doing to meet the first term of the inquiry.
• The inquiry won’t look at the political decision to force domestic users to pay 100% of the cost plus profit (doubling rates), which was taken in 2010, not 2012.

 Cost over-runs

Section 4 (b)  is about “why there are significant differences between the estimated costs of the Muskrat Falls Project at the time of sanction and the costs by Nalcor during project execution, to the time of the inquiry.”

Key Points to Retain

•   This will be the guts of the inquiry.
•    It will be technical. 
•    None of it is political.

  

Hello, 1998

Section 4 (c)  is about “whether the determination that the Muskrat Falls Project should be exempt from oversight by the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities was justified and reasonable and what was the effect of this exemption, if any, on the development, costs and operation of the Muskrat Falls Project.”

This one is weird, as if the person who wrote the term had no idea what end was up.  The decision to exempt the LCP from the public utilities board was taken in 1998 because the project was entirely for export.  The PUB was entirely about domestic rates.  In the original scheme there’d have been almost no cost to pass on to consumers.

In 2010, cabinet did not have to decide anything about exemption since it was done long before it took office.

So given the amount of time the Premier spent blaming the former Conservative government for the mess he and his colleagues have cleaned up (not really – ed.),  giving the inquiry the power to call Brian Tobin to the stand is just nutty.

Key Point to Recall

•   The exemption order predates the Conservatives return to power in 2003.

Oversight Committee Mania

Section 4 (d) is about “whether the government was fully informed and was made aware of any risks or problems anticipated with the Muskrat Falls Project, so that the government had sufficient and accurate information upon which to appropriately decide to sanction the project and whether the government employed appropriate measures to oversee the project particularly as it relates to the matters set out in paragraphs (a) to (c), focusing on governance arrangements and decision-making processes associated with the project.”

The adequacy of governance structures is a political question  - or one about internal government operations - but this term is written to focus on what Nalcor told people in government at the time of sanction in 2012.  In effect the wording precludes any discussion of the long-standing relationships involved in decision-making by and about Nalcor and focuses on whether or not Nalcor told government enough.

Since it doesn’t look like the key decision for government was in 2012,  this one might wind up being a lot more fun than informative.  A clever lawyer – like Jerome!  - should have a field day with this bit. As well, since the term is written to focus on what Nalcor did,  the fact the government made a certain decision gives the politicians an automatic excuse, if they want to take it. 

That’s really part of the problem with the whole inquiry terms of reference.  It is structured on the assumption Nalcor brought this forward in the same way it pursued Cat Arm or one of the other projects.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  This one has been primarily about politics since 2003 and arguably as far back as 1998.  

With a faulty set of assumptions underpinning it, this circumscribed inquiry can’t possibly find any meaningful answers to how we got into this mess in the first place.

That last sentence is the big take-away.

-srbp-

SRBP has followed the Lower Churchill project more closely than anyone outside government.  There are both short posts and detailed ones covering the entire thing since 2003 up to 2017.  There’s a tab at the top linking to some of the posts and others are easily accessible by using the search function.

 Feel free to use it and if you want to pose a question on something you may have missed you can find me @edhollett on Twitter or at ed_hollett@hotmail.com

When a change is not a change: the NDP and Muskrat Falls #nlpoli #cdnpoli

One newsroom.

Two different interpretations of  federal NDP leader Jagmeet Sing's position on Muskrat Falls.

In Sarah Smellie's online story,  Singh had a few concerns and is "not comfortable" with the project.

But he didn't outright condemn the project. 

 "Right now I'm concerned … I'm concerned about those two pieces and I want to make sure that those are addressed. I'm not comfortable with a project that doesn't have those things addressed."

Yet,  in the story that went to air,  the provincial NDP were opposed to the project, as provincial leader Lorraine Michael had always been according to the voice-over.

New Democrats bobbed their heads up and down approvingly because that is the story they want us to believe.  It is the story they fervently believe in their own hearts:  Lorraine Michael and the NDP have always opposed Muskrat Falls.

The problem is that the story isn't true.

The Quebec Demon #nlpoli #cdnpoli

The fancy word for it is revanchism.

People who study words and language call it a borrowed word, meaning that we use it in English but got it from the French word.  In this case, it is the French word for revenge.

People familiar with history are most likely to associate the word revanchism with the struggle between France and Germany that lasted from 1870 until 1945.  The Prussians defeated the French in 1870 and took two territories – Alsace and Lorraine – that many in France wanted back. 

Desire for revenge for regain of the lost territories was an important aspect of French policy against Germany at Versailles in 1919.  The tension between the two countries lasted until, after another world war,  Germany was simply destroyed as a single country and France got the territories back.

Muskrat, risk, and memory #nlpoli

There's a great column in Saturday's Telegram by Pam Frampton that anyone concerned about Muskrat Falls should read.  It's the latest in a string of columns that Pam's been writing about the troubled megadebt project and events in 2013 around the time that the major contractor on the project produced a memorandum about huge risks that needed attention.

In the very first sentence,  Pam mentions a book she's apparently just been reading.  It's called Megaprojects and risk.  It's written by three Scandinavian scientists who studied huge construction projects to try and find out why they tend to go wildly over-budget. They found that the folks behind gigantic projects over-estimate the benefits and underestimate the costs.

Note the date of Pam's column.

2017.

Feehan, electricity prices, and the bigger problem. #nlpoli

Jim Feehan's proposal to change the way we price electricity in the province got some media attention -over the past 24 hours.

Feehan believes that we should set the base price of electricity in this province on the best export price rather than the current proposal to have electricity from Muskrat Falls sold in this province for a price wildly more than that.  Under Feehan's scheme,  the money to pay for Muskrat Falls would come from a reduced profit for Nalcor and hence a reduced divided for the taxpayers. As well, there'd probably have to be an additional tax created to cover off the rest of the costs.

As we noted here in a recent post, Feehan's suggestion doesn't represent any change from what is actually going to happen anyway. He just wants to present it to consumers in a different way.  That's not a bad idea since it is inherently more transparent.  You can see what is what.  Unfortunately, Feehan's idea misses entirely the core problem, which is the electricity policy inherent in Muskrat Falls in the first place.

Actions and Words (2016) #nlpoli

The provincial cabinet has known since January - at least - that the powerhouse at Muskrat Falls is only 15% completed despite a huge payout to the contractor.

That's what Nalcor reported to the committee of provincial bureaucrats named by the Conservatives to get a report from Nalcor every now and again.  They can't do anything else except receive the reports and pass them on to cabinet.  They still do it under the Liberals.

The company hired by cabinet to conduct yetanother review of information supplied by Nalcor that government already had included a little table of progress on major components at Muskrat Falls.  The powerhouse is a major component.

But it isn't on EY's table, shown at right and released earlier this month.  It's lumped in with "spillway" and shows it is supposedly almost 40% complete.

There's a lot of difference between 15 and 40.