Yesterday was an inadvertent day off blogging in the middle of the week.
Between work and work and well, work there was no way to get anything posted. On top of everything else, I got a call yesterday to do a national CBC Radio commentary. That was an interesting experience: fast turn-around and then a late evening in the studio to put it to bed.
Maureen Anonsen (who produces the commentaries from across the country from here) was a relentless editor and a demanding producer, showing her years of experience both in what she changed and how she rewrote stuff, not to mention the finesse with which she coaxed a decent "read" out of me.
She had to stay later to file the damn thing. Heaven knows when she got out of the office.
In the meantime, I have been working quietly on a fisheries piece that should hopefully raise a few eyebrows. It will propose a new fishery with recommendations on management and economic organization.
You won't be able to fold it out and snap it into place; the thing will need to be discussed.
With any luck though, there will be enough in it to capture people's attention and make them go: "You know that just might work."
and once again, trust me, I am NOT holding my breath.
The goal is to get that piece posted on Monday morning. After that, we'll just take the posts as they come.
The real political division in society is between authoritarians and libertarians.
12 August 2005
Thistle sleep walks through local crisis
If this VOCM report is accurate, then one can only conclude that Anna Thistle does not have a single clue as to the issues involved in the current discussions between Abitibi Consolidated and the provincial government.
Thistle's instance on trying to force ACI to keep everything operating is sheer nonsense and shows that while she represents a paper-making district, she is in desperate need of a crash course in current global paper-making issues.
Ok. I'll cut Thistle some slack. She is the provincial member for the district AND she doesn't have to make the hard decisions because she sits in Opposition.
Opps, let's uncut it: she used to be a cabinet minister and said the same things when she sat around the table on the 11th floor of the Confed Building.
Thistle's instance on trying to force ACI to keep everything operating is sheer nonsense and shows that while she represents a paper-making district, she is in desperate need of a crash course in current global paper-making issues.
Ok. I'll cut Thistle some slack. She is the provincial member for the district AND she doesn't have to make the hard decisions because she sits in Opposition.
Opps, let's uncut it: she used to be a cabinet minister and said the same things when she sat around the table on the 11th floor of the Confed Building.
10 August 2005
Cooking up numbers
St. John's lawyer Averill (A.J.) Baker owns quite a reputation among some readers of the weekly newspapers in the province, thanks in largest part to her bi-weekly column.
She's especially popular among the proponents of the Damn-Fool fishery, the crowd that talk about a supposedly God- given right to keep jigging a fish regardless of how few fish there are to jig. This is the same crowd that pass around Baker's columns and then call Randy or Bill or Lynda pointing to Baker as proof of what they have been fighting all along. That's all that Baker does, by the by: she tells a certain group of people what they want to hear.
In the past week, A.J.'s column claimed that foreigners can take 5, 900 tonnes of cod while the locals here in Newfoundland and Labrador can't get a single fish. That's what she wrote.
Then the Department of Fisheries and Oceans [DFO] took issue with what she printed, and for the past few days, the call-in crowd have been lambasting DFO and standing behind their favourite writer.
People are sticking behind Baker since she has nothing to gain from her claims.
Fair enough.
They are attacking DFO for spreading false information.
That's not fair enough. In fact it is almost laughable since Baker got her information from the same place the Bond Papers did: DFO and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization [NAFO].
The difference between DFO and Baker is that what DFO has put on the table are not the total possible by-catches of cod, which definitely total 5, 900 tonnes. DFO has been talking about actual landings and those are far less than the maximums allowed. DFO has been drawing a more accurate picture of what is actually happening to cod stocks, as best as anyone can figure it out.
The obvious value of this is that when you look back to the late 1980s and early 1990s you could see the looming cod collapse not from the total allowable catches set by John Crosbie but from the actual landings which declined steadily year after year. If the goal is really to bring back the cod as a commercial fish stock, we should be very cautious about fishing the stock at all.
The major problem with Baker's column is that she is fueling just the opposite political pressure. It isn't the first time Baker has disregarded the important details. She has a track record in her column of publishing things that are only sort of vaguely accurate. She sometimes gives bits of information rather than the whole schmeer. In other instances, she gives ludicrous interpretations, such as claiming that Canada breached its obligation to disclose relevant facts during the Terms of Union negotiations when it failed to tell the Newfoundlanders about something that wouldn't occur for another 30 years and that wasn't even thought of when the Terms of Union were signed.
Yeah. She did that: hang the Canadians for not being clairvoyant.
Anyway, aside from the stuff that DFO has already challenged, they should have made much more of information DFO provided to the Bond Papers in answer to a simple set of questions.
They should have pointed to the fact that Newfoundland and Labrador fishing interests landed 15, 000 tonnes of cod last year.
Baker claimed we couldn't catch a single fish.
But let her have the 5, 900 tonnes of cod for the foreigners. It is still half of what the locals caught themselves.
Just remember, though, that the total biomass of cod is estimated at a mere 170, 000 tonnes.
That means the total cod catch last year was more than 12% of the total amount of fish the very best guess claims is out there.
Take that tack and you completely refocus the discussion to what is best to help restore cod stocks.
That's what the talk should be about.
And almost best of all, everything else would then be seen for what it is:
cooking up numbers.
She's especially popular among the proponents of the Damn-Fool fishery, the crowd that talk about a supposedly God- given right to keep jigging a fish regardless of how few fish there are to jig. This is the same crowd that pass around Baker's columns and then call Randy or Bill or Lynda pointing to Baker as proof of what they have been fighting all along. That's all that Baker does, by the by: she tells a certain group of people what they want to hear.
In the past week, A.J.'s column claimed that foreigners can take 5, 900 tonnes of cod while the locals here in Newfoundland and Labrador can't get a single fish. That's what she wrote.
Then the Department of Fisheries and Oceans [DFO] took issue with what she printed, and for the past few days, the call-in crowd have been lambasting DFO and standing behind their favourite writer.
People are sticking behind Baker since she has nothing to gain from her claims.
Fair enough.
They are attacking DFO for spreading false information.
That's not fair enough. In fact it is almost laughable since Baker got her information from the same place the Bond Papers did: DFO and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization [NAFO].
The difference between DFO and Baker is that what DFO has put on the table are not the total possible by-catches of cod, which definitely total 5, 900 tonnes. DFO has been talking about actual landings and those are far less than the maximums allowed. DFO has been drawing a more accurate picture of what is actually happening to cod stocks, as best as anyone can figure it out.
The obvious value of this is that when you look back to the late 1980s and early 1990s you could see the looming cod collapse not from the total allowable catches set by John Crosbie but from the actual landings which declined steadily year after year. If the goal is really to bring back the cod as a commercial fish stock, we should be very cautious about fishing the stock at all.
The major problem with Baker's column is that she is fueling just the opposite political pressure. It isn't the first time Baker has disregarded the important details. She has a track record in her column of publishing things that are only sort of vaguely accurate. She sometimes gives bits of information rather than the whole schmeer. In other instances, she gives ludicrous interpretations, such as claiming that Canada breached its obligation to disclose relevant facts during the Terms of Union negotiations when it failed to tell the Newfoundlanders about something that wouldn't occur for another 30 years and that wasn't even thought of when the Terms of Union were signed.
Yeah. She did that: hang the Canadians for not being clairvoyant.
Anyway, aside from the stuff that DFO has already challenged, they should have made much more of information DFO provided to the Bond Papers in answer to a simple set of questions.
They should have pointed to the fact that Newfoundland and Labrador fishing interests landed 15, 000 tonnes of cod last year.
Baker claimed we couldn't catch a single fish.
But let her have the 5, 900 tonnes of cod for the foreigners. It is still half of what the locals caught themselves.
Just remember, though, that the total biomass of cod is estimated at a mere 170, 000 tonnes.
That means the total cod catch last year was more than 12% of the total amount of fish the very best guess claims is out there.
Take that tack and you completely refocus the discussion to what is best to help restore cod stocks.
That's what the talk should be about.
And almost best of all, everything else would then be seen for what it is:
cooking up numbers.
09 August 2005
The Danny Legacy Option for the Lower Churchill
As noted in the Bond Papers on Friday, the Premier held a news conference on Monday to update the province on the process to develop the Lower Churchill.
The government news release listed three comprehensive proposals to build the Gull Island and Muskrat Falls generating stations plus associated transmission facilities. These will now move to the second phase of the process, namely a feasibility study.
The three proposals are:
1. The Hydro Quebec/Ontario Energy Financing Company/SNC Lavalin proposal. One of the few proposals made public, this joint venture contained an option in which the joint venture would lease the Gull Island and Muskrat Falls sites for 50 years and a second in which Ontario and Hydro-Quebec would negotiate an agreement under which Ontario would purchase energy and Newfoundland and Labrador would finance construction.
This was widely held as being the likely strong proposal. The partners have extensive experience in the energy business, more than enough experience in the construction of large hydro-electric projects and the ability to raise all the capital needed to build the project.
This project also included construction of improved transmission capacity between Ontario and Quebec.
The guaranteed, long-term purchase of power by both Ontario and Quebec would make it easy for the province to raise any capital to build the project under the second option.
Construction would begin in late 2006 with first power transmitted by 2011.
2. TransCanada Corporation. Nothing is known publicly of this proposal. The company operates several hydroelectric and other generating systems in the central part of the continent. The largest is a little more than 18% of the Lower Churchill's combined generating capacity.
Call this one a long shot.
3. Tshiaskueshish Group. This is a consortium comprising Macquarie North America, Ltd., Innu Development Limited Partnership, Peter Kiewit Sons Co. and Innu Kiewit Constructors.
Again, nothing is known about this proposal. The companies have considerable experience in large construction projects. Beyond that, there is nothing available publicly.
Given the the Innu component of this proposal and the stated need in the original call for proposals for aboriginal involvement, this might be a proposal that had a leg-up as a result. The Innu Kiewit website is a little out of date since it notes that Voisey's Bay construction has been delayed.
Then there is the stealth option, one that Premier Danny Williams included on his own.
That's the one which would see the provincial government and Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro build the whole Lower Churchill project by themselves. For want of a better name call it the PWG Caribou Company proposal.
There are several reasons the Premier is likely to give when this option is selected.
1. The PWG Caribou Company meets all the proposal call requirements:
- It cuts out the middle man thereby maximizing the cash return to the provincial government and Hydro.
- It allows the government to deal with the Innu land claim directly, as it would have to do anyway.
- It gives the provincial government total control over the local benefits.
2. The province can afford it. The proposal call listed the estimated cost of the project as being CDN$3.3 billion. With the $2.0 billion from the federal government, the province can almost pay off the whole thing by itself. Borrowing would be limited and with the right power purchase agreement, the remaining capital can be raised at reasonable costs. The various financing options allow the provincial government to find novel ways of finding money for the project.
3. We would develop our resources for ourselves. The Pink, White and Green Caribou Company is the ultimate expression of the "local power" wave the Premier created with his offshore revenue deal. The strongest argument he will offer for doing it ourselves is that we will have total control over everything and that every aspect of the project possible will be done locally.
Just remember that the whole thing hinges on the power purchase agreement or having steady markets in which to sell the power.
As for the rest of it, expect the province will do exactly as the Premier said today: Give first priority to the PWG Caribou option.
I'd expect he has already decided what to do with the offshore cash. He keeps telling us but no one wants to accept it. The rest of the process is all for show, or at least serves only to give the Premier the chance to pick over the very best ideas from a whole bunch of other proposals so he can then do the whole thing himself.
It's Danny Legacy Option.
I can hear the speech now:
"It is our water. It is our falls. It will be developed for our benefit. By our engineers and our architects and run by our Hydro company and our government with our oil revenue."
There's an old black-and-white film from the Upper Churchill the Premier can use to help get the speaking notes together.
It's the one we will see announced very shortly, with construction well underway by the time the Premier seeks re-election.
The government news release listed three comprehensive proposals to build the Gull Island and Muskrat Falls generating stations plus associated transmission facilities. These will now move to the second phase of the process, namely a feasibility study.
The three proposals are:
1. The Hydro Quebec/Ontario Energy Financing Company/SNC Lavalin proposal. One of the few proposals made public, this joint venture contained an option in which the joint venture would lease the Gull Island and Muskrat Falls sites for 50 years and a second in which Ontario and Hydro-Quebec would negotiate an agreement under which Ontario would purchase energy and Newfoundland and Labrador would finance construction.
This was widely held as being the likely strong proposal. The partners have extensive experience in the energy business, more than enough experience in the construction of large hydro-electric projects and the ability to raise all the capital needed to build the project.
This project also included construction of improved transmission capacity between Ontario and Quebec.
The guaranteed, long-term purchase of power by both Ontario and Quebec would make it easy for the province to raise any capital to build the project under the second option.
Construction would begin in late 2006 with first power transmitted by 2011.
2. TransCanada Corporation. Nothing is known publicly of this proposal. The company operates several hydroelectric and other generating systems in the central part of the continent. The largest is a little more than 18% of the Lower Churchill's combined generating capacity.
Call this one a long shot.
3. Tshiaskueshish Group. This is a consortium comprising Macquarie North America, Ltd., Innu Development Limited Partnership, Peter Kiewit Sons Co. and Innu Kiewit Constructors.
Again, nothing is known about this proposal. The companies have considerable experience in large construction projects. Beyond that, there is nothing available publicly.
Given the the Innu component of this proposal and the stated need in the original call for proposals for aboriginal involvement, this might be a proposal that had a leg-up as a result. The Innu Kiewit website is a little out of date since it notes that Voisey's Bay construction has been delayed.
Then there is the stealth option, one that Premier Danny Williams included on his own.
That's the one which would see the provincial government and Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro build the whole Lower Churchill project by themselves. For want of a better name call it the PWG Caribou Company proposal.
There are several reasons the Premier is likely to give when this option is selected.
1. The PWG Caribou Company meets all the proposal call requirements:
- It cuts out the middle man thereby maximizing the cash return to the provincial government and Hydro.
- It allows the government to deal with the Innu land claim directly, as it would have to do anyway.
- It gives the provincial government total control over the local benefits.
2. The province can afford it. The proposal call listed the estimated cost of the project as being CDN$3.3 billion. With the $2.0 billion from the federal government, the province can almost pay off the whole thing by itself. Borrowing would be limited and with the right power purchase agreement, the remaining capital can be raised at reasonable costs. The various financing options allow the provincial government to find novel ways of finding money for the project.
3. We would develop our resources for ourselves. The Pink, White and Green Caribou Company is the ultimate expression of the "local power" wave the Premier created with his offshore revenue deal. The strongest argument he will offer for doing it ourselves is that we will have total control over everything and that every aspect of the project possible will be done locally.
Just remember that the whole thing hinges on the power purchase agreement or having steady markets in which to sell the power.
As for the rest of it, expect the province will do exactly as the Premier said today: Give first priority to the PWG Caribou option.
I'd expect he has already decided what to do with the offshore cash. He keeps telling us but no one wants to accept it. The rest of the process is all for show, or at least serves only to give the Premier the chance to pick over the very best ideas from a whole bunch of other proposals so he can then do the whole thing himself.
It's Danny Legacy Option.
I can hear the speech now:
"It is our water. It is our falls. It will be developed for our benefit. By our engineers and our architects and run by our Hydro company and our government with our oil revenue."
There's an old black-and-white film from the Upper Churchill the Premier can use to help get the speaking notes together.
It's the one we will see announced very shortly, with construction well underway by the time the Premier seeks re-election.
08 August 2005
15, 000 tonnes of cod for local fishers: Baker column lost in sea of facts
Refuting claims by local lawyer and newspaper columnist Averrill (A.J.) Baker, Newfoundland and Labrador fishing interests landed almost 15, 000 metric tonnes of cod in the waters around the province in 2004, according to information obtained by The Sir Robert Bond Papers from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans [DFO].
This included a directed cod fishery and by-catch of cod incidental to fishing for other species.
According to Baker, "[a]ll those foreign countries will legally be allowed to catch 5,900 tons of cod this summer - that's 12 million pounds of cod. Meanwhile, Newfoundlanders are not allowed to catch a single cod - even to eat - in those same fishing zones from that same cod stock."
In 2004, by-catch of cod by foreign vessels in Zones 3M and 3NO, all fishing outside Canada's 200 mile exclusive economic zone [EEZ] , amounted to 477 tonnes, far less than the 5, 900 tonnes estimated by Baker in her recent column. Additionally, Canadian vessels landed 430 tonnes of cod by-catch in those zones, but within the 200 mile EEZ.
Estimated by-catch of cod by foreign vessels in 2J3KL in 2003 was a mere 23 metric tonnes.
Baker's column contained numerous factual errors, according to information from DFO. The column claimed that "225t of cod will be caught by Russia as a bycatch for their hake quota". According to DFO, no Russian vessels are fishing hake in the NAFO regulatory area in 2005, despite having a quota. The Russians have no contracted any other fishing for that quota so there will be no by-catch of cod.
According to DFO, "Norway does not have a redfish or turbot quota. Iceland does not have a redfish or turbot quota. Cuba and Korea do not have vessels fishing redfish or turbot in the NAFO regulatory area [NRA]; nor do they charter their allocations. Therefore, there is no allowable by-catch for these countries on these fisheries."
As well, "European countries do not have a redfish quota in 3N as the 3LN redfish stock is under moratoria, so there is no directed fishery for this stock, " according to DFO. As a result, there is no allowable by-catch of cod.
The claim by Baker that American fishing interests will land 100 tonnes of cod by-catch is also suspect. The Americans prosecute a swordfish and tuna fishery outside the 200 mile EEZ and do not fish for groundfish. As such, there should be virtually no cod-by-catch.
NAFO quota tables and maps of the regulatory area may be found at the organization's website.
This included a directed cod fishery and by-catch of cod incidental to fishing for other species.
According to Baker, "[a]ll those foreign countries will legally be allowed to catch 5,900 tons of cod this summer - that's 12 million pounds of cod. Meanwhile, Newfoundlanders are not allowed to catch a single cod - even to eat - in those same fishing zones from that same cod stock."
In 2004, by-catch of cod by foreign vessels in Zones 3M and 3NO, all fishing outside Canada's 200 mile exclusive economic zone [EEZ] , amounted to 477 tonnes, far less than the 5, 900 tonnes estimated by Baker in her recent column. Additionally, Canadian vessels landed 430 tonnes of cod by-catch in those zones, but within the 200 mile EEZ.
Estimated by-catch of cod by foreign vessels in 2J3KL in 2003 was a mere 23 metric tonnes.
Baker's column contained numerous factual errors, according to information from DFO. The column claimed that "225t of cod will be caught by Russia as a bycatch for their hake quota". According to DFO, no Russian vessels are fishing hake in the NAFO regulatory area in 2005, despite having a quota. The Russians have no contracted any other fishing for that quota so there will be no by-catch of cod.
According to DFO, "Norway does not have a redfish or turbot quota. Iceland does not have a redfish or turbot quota. Cuba and Korea do not have vessels fishing redfish or turbot in the NAFO regulatory area [NRA]; nor do they charter their allocations. Therefore, there is no allowable by-catch for these countries on these fisheries."
As well, "European countries do not have a redfish quota in 3N as the 3LN redfish stock is under moratoria, so there is no directed fishery for this stock, " according to DFO. As a result, there is no allowable by-catch of cod.
The claim by Baker that American fishing interests will land 100 tonnes of cod by-catch is also suspect. The Americans prosecute a swordfish and tuna fishery outside the 200 mile EEZ and do not fish for groundfish. As such, there should be virtually no cod-by-catch.
NAFO quota tables and maps of the regulatory area may be found at the organization's website.
06 August 2005
Government newser on Monday?
Some rumours swirling that government is planning a news conference on Monday to talk about the Lower Churchill.
Good way to get the heat of Ed Byrne when the paper machine breaks-down on Monday with Abitibi.
Good way to get the heat of Ed Byrne when the paper machine breaks-down on Monday with Abitibi.
05 August 2005
Friday? Must be Abitibi day [Update]
Here's a simple question natural resources minister Ed Byrne might answer:
Given:
Government is claiming Abitibi Consolidated wants to build a new 60 megawatt hydroelectric project to power the company's Stephenville operation. After construction of the project, Abitibi would own 75% of the project and the province (through Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro) would own 25%, even though Hydro had funded the whole thing.
Here's the way the government news release put it:
" * Abitibi and Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro would enter into a partnership to develop two projects on the Exploits River -– Red Indian Falls and Badger Chute, adding in excess of 60 MW of new power into the system;
* Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, with the province'’s backing, would raise all the capital -– upwards of $300 million -– and finance the projects;
* The Abitibi-Hydro partnership would enter into a 30-year power purchase agreement to sell all the electricity output to Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, and hence Hydro'’s customers;
* This “partnership” would have to provide upwards of $14 million annually to Abitibi, with no return to Hydro;
* Additionally, Abitibi requested $7 million a year for the five-year period leading up to the in-service of the two hydro developments;
* In total, a level of support of approximately $455 million;
* Furthermore, at the end of the 30-year agreement, Hydro would only own 25 per cent of the projects, while Abitibi would own 75 per cent, despite the fact that Hydro and its customers have covered the full cost of the development of the projects and the subsidies -– in other words, Hydro and its customers paid for the projects and assumed all the risks;
* And, just as important, Abitibi would not give government any commitment on the impact a power purchase agreement would have on its future operations in Stephenville and Grand Falls-Windsor.
Question:
Is that what Abitibi Consolidated actually proposed?
[Update: Chris O'Neill-Yates put the question to Ed Byrne on The Morning Show this morning. She asked if Abitibi ever offered to reimburse the province for the Hydro project.
Ed said no, they didn't.
Now, everyone remember that. Remember his simple reply: "No."
Just for the record, here is the exchange between Kel Parsons and Ed Byrne in the House of Assembly's resource committee May 20, 2004.
Note the parts I have highlighted.
"MR. PARSONS: Minister, on the Lower Churchill issue, have there been any discussions ongoing in recent months concerning the Lower Churchill or possibilities of doing something with the Lower Churchill?
MR. E. BYRNE: No, there have not been any in recent months. What we have essentially done is, as you are aware being part of the former government, out of the Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro there were x number of dollars set aside to deal with the negotiations that were ongoing that date back to 1998, and then the most recent developments or discussions. Since that time we have basically just continued to assess the viability of the project and options associated with it. There have been no discussions on the development of that project, only inside government."
This was the day BEFORE Minister Byrne signed a then-secret memorandum of understanding with Sino-Energy, a group with which he had apparently been discussing the Lower Churchill with since January 2004.
Mr. Byrne has been known to have memory lapses before. Pretty big ones, apparently. Big enough to slide a hydro project through.
My next step is to go back and double check with my sources on what they understood had been the Abitibi proposal.
This might get much more interesting.]
Given:
Government is claiming Abitibi Consolidated wants to build a new 60 megawatt hydroelectric project to power the company's Stephenville operation. After construction of the project, Abitibi would own 75% of the project and the province (through Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro) would own 25%, even though Hydro had funded the whole thing.
Here's the way the government news release put it:
" * Abitibi and Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro would enter into a partnership to develop two projects on the Exploits River -– Red Indian Falls and Badger Chute, adding in excess of 60 MW of new power into the system;
* Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, with the province'’s backing, would raise all the capital -– upwards of $300 million -– and finance the projects;
* The Abitibi-Hydro partnership would enter into a 30-year power purchase agreement to sell all the electricity output to Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, and hence Hydro'’s customers;
* This “partnership” would have to provide upwards of $14 million annually to Abitibi, with no return to Hydro;
* Additionally, Abitibi requested $7 million a year for the five-year period leading up to the in-service of the two hydro developments;
* In total, a level of support of approximately $455 million;
* Furthermore, at the end of the 30-year agreement, Hydro would only own 25 per cent of the projects, while Abitibi would own 75 per cent, despite the fact that Hydro and its customers have covered the full cost of the development of the projects and the subsidies -– in other words, Hydro and its customers paid for the projects and assumed all the risks;
* And, just as important, Abitibi would not give government any commitment on the impact a power purchase agreement would have on its future operations in Stephenville and Grand Falls-Windsor.
Question:
Is that what Abitibi Consolidated actually proposed?
[Update: Chris O'Neill-Yates put the question to Ed Byrne on The Morning Show this morning. She asked if Abitibi ever offered to reimburse the province for the Hydro project.
Ed said no, they didn't.
Now, everyone remember that. Remember his simple reply: "No."
Just for the record, here is the exchange between Kel Parsons and Ed Byrne in the House of Assembly's resource committee May 20, 2004.
Note the parts I have highlighted.
"MR. PARSONS: Minister, on the Lower Churchill issue, have there been any discussions ongoing in recent months concerning the Lower Churchill or possibilities of doing something with the Lower Churchill?
MR. E. BYRNE: No, there have not been any in recent months. What we have essentially done is, as you are aware being part of the former government, out of the Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro there were x number of dollars set aside to deal with the negotiations that were ongoing that date back to 1998, and then the most recent developments or discussions. Since that time we have basically just continued to assess the viability of the project and options associated with it. There have been no discussions on the development of that project, only inside government."
This was the day BEFORE Minister Byrne signed a then-secret memorandum of understanding with Sino-Energy, a group with which he had apparently been discussing the Lower Churchill with since January 2004.
Mr. Byrne has been known to have memory lapses before. Pretty big ones, apparently. Big enough to slide a hydro project through.
My next step is to go back and double check with my sources on what they understood had been the Abitibi proposal.
This might get much more interesting.]
04 August 2005
Damn-fool fishery - some facts [Second Revision]
In the relentless nonsense about the Damn-Fool Fishery, there is a story Jim Morgan has been pushing that there was suddenly a by-catch quota for cod introduced on the northeast coast.
Well, having learned through long experience that Morgan is seldom right about anything, I called the Department of Fisheries and Oceans [DFO] in St. John's and gathered the following factual information for your reference.
1. Cod By-catch: In fisheries management zones 2J3KL, fishermen with groundfish licenses are permitted a total by-catch of cod equaling 2, 000 pounds for the year. That's it. This policy has been in place for some time. It wasn't suddenly introduced in the past week or two.
When the blackback fishery was recently announced, fishermen were reminded that they could only catch cod to a maximum of 2, 000 pounds for all groundfish species fished for the year.
Jim Morgan was completely, utterly, totally and unmistakably WRONG when he claimed this was a new policy.
For fixed gear fishermen in 2J3KL last year (calendar 2004), the average total by-catch was a mere 500 pounds. That's only 25% of the maximum.
[Update: DFO corrected my figures in an e-mail received yesterday. The 500 figure should have been 500 tonnes total, not 500 pounds per fisherman. Apparently there were about 700 fixed-gear fishermen in the 2J3KL fishery which works out to an average of about 1428 pounds cod by-catch per fisherman. That's 71% of the total allowable by-catch, not the 25% previously reported.]
And there are supposedly lots of fish out there, bearing in mind that in Newfoundland, fish is a synonym for cod. Every other species of swimming thing is known by its name.
Only cod are fish.
[Update comment: The revised figure of 71% by-catch is significant, but it is still a long way from demonstrating that there is a large amount of cod out there or, in the case of Mr. Morgan's claims, it still doesn't make the by-catch a cod-fishery by another name.]
2. Total Recreational Fishery Licenses Sold (2001-2004)
These figures will tell you something.
In 2001, DFO introduced the license and tags system for the recreational cod fishery. The fishery covered all zones and was open from July until September. They sold 91, 000 licenses, each with 30 tags.
The next year, the fishery was in all zones and lasted for six weeks. They sold about 50, 000 licenses with 15 tags.
In the past two years, the recreational fishery took place in 3Ps only. About 9, 100 licenses were sold each year each with 15 tags.
For all the claims that there is a huge demand for a "cod for the table", and with the ease of travel in the province these days, only 10% of the crowd who took part in the recreational fishery in 2001 participated in 2004.
3. Recreational Fishery Landings
2J3KL
2001 - 1896 tonnes
2002 - 670 tonnes
2003 - No fishery
2004 - No fishery
3Ps
2001 - 456 tonnes
2002 - No figures
2003 - 152 tonnes
2004 - 156 tonnes.
Before anyone starts taking these numbers an arguing there could easily be a recreational fishery on the northeast coast, go back and look at the actual by-catch landings last year. It was only 500 pounds per license. If there were that many fish out there, that number should be pretty close to the maximum, wouldn't you think?
[Update: If I work the math correctly, here's what the cod landings look like in 3Ps in the recreational fishery last year.
There are about 150 tonnes of fish, give or take which works out to roughly 300, 000 pounds of cod. There were 136, 500 tags. If we allow that all those tags were used, then the average fish size was a little over two pounds. My math could be faulty, but that seems to be an awfully small fish. Even if only half the available tags were used, it still gives us a four pound cod. I have caught salmon bigger than that.
Most of the cod I saw in television coverage of the rec fishery this past weekend were small to the eye, so those calculations seem to be about right on. If proponents of the recreational fishery are catching small fish, I'd venture that we are not actually seeing healthy cod stocks by any measure.
Bear in mind that the best estimates by scientists are that the total biomass of northern cod is only about 170, 000 tonnes, including the stocks of so-called bay fish. Those who think those numbers are small haven't offered any estimates, let alone serious estimates, of how much fish they think might be out there. There shouldn't be a commercial fishery until the stocks are much healthier, like maybe 10 times the current estimated biomass. I don't think the best scientific estimates are that far off.
Perhaps if Jim Morgan and A.J. Baker offered some facts to back up their arguments, it would be easier to take them seriously. Until then, I'd just as soon we accepted that jigging a meal of cod that many of us used to enjoy as a privilege is something we cannot enjoy today.
I never want my grandchildren to be able to see a cod stuffed and mounted in a museum, the only way my children can see a Great Auk. I'd sooner give up my chance to have a feed I jigged myself so my children and grandchildren might one day see cod as I knew them not so long ago and as my grandfathers and great-grandfathers knew them.
If He gave me anything at all in this world, God gave me a responsibility to shepherd the resources of the Earth.
If only proponents of the damn-fool fishery talked more of their God-given responsibilities, rather than their supposedly God-given rights.
If only.]
[Update II: Express columnist and St. John's lawyer A.J. Baker's column this week comments on the offshore, foreign cod catch allocations within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone. Here's a link to the column as printed in The Southern Gazette, one of The Express' sister publications.
Ms. Baker lists all the cod by-catches available to countries with historic fishing rights offshore Newfoundland and Labrador and currently assigned through the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).
She notes: "All those foreign countries will legally be allowed to catch 5,900 tons of cod this summer -– that'’s 12 million pounds of cod.
Meanwhile, Newfoundlanders are not allowed to catch a single cod -– even to eat -– in those same fishing zones from that same cod stock."
First, Ms. Baker is flat-out WRONG when she claims that Newfoundland and Labrador fishing interests cannot catch a single cod.
As reported previously on The Sir Robert Bond Papers, Newfoundland and Labrador fishing interests can catch cod incidental to the licensed fishery, exactly as foreign interests are allowed to do. Newfoundlanders and Labradorians can legally get a feed of cod for the table, even in 2J3KL, even if they can't jig the rounders themselves.
Second, since I do not have figures right now we don't know for sure how many Newfoundland and Labrador-based fishing interests can catch cod legally in the 2J3KL zone. My bet is the figures are quite a bit higher than the 700 tonnes those fixed-gear guys are allowed to take.
My next step is to contact DFO again and get some additional factual information to counteract the distortions and misrepresentations by Ms. Baker and others.
The point to this entire enterprise is simple: the proponents of the Damn-Fool Fishery and those, like Ms. Baker, who continually slag the federal government and foreigners are doing so on the basis of something other than facts.
If we don't base our resource management decisions on facts, we stand a much higher chance of making a grave error when it comes to fisheries management than if we just thought about things for a minute and didn't get carried away with whatever we heard from someone who heard it from someone who told us something we wanted to believe.
Given our sad history of fisheries mismanagement, I'd sooner err on the side of caution than take the word of people who seem to be plucking stuff out of thin air, or worse still, only giving selected bits of information.]
Well, having learned through long experience that Morgan is seldom right about anything, I called the Department of Fisheries and Oceans [DFO] in St. John's and gathered the following factual information for your reference.
1. Cod By-catch: In fisheries management zones 2J3KL, fishermen with groundfish licenses are permitted a total by-catch of cod equaling 2, 000 pounds for the year. That's it. This policy has been in place for some time. It wasn't suddenly introduced in the past week or two.
When the blackback fishery was recently announced, fishermen were reminded that they could only catch cod to a maximum of 2, 000 pounds for all groundfish species fished for the year.
Jim Morgan was completely, utterly, totally and unmistakably WRONG when he claimed this was a new policy.
For fixed gear fishermen in 2J3KL last year (calendar 2004), the average total by-catch was a mere 500 pounds. That's only 25% of the maximum.
[Update: DFO corrected my figures in an e-mail received yesterday. The 500 figure should have been 500 tonnes total, not 500 pounds per fisherman. Apparently there were about 700 fixed-gear fishermen in the 2J3KL fishery which works out to an average of about 1428 pounds cod by-catch per fisherman. That's 71% of the total allowable by-catch, not the 25% previously reported.]
And there are supposedly lots of fish out there, bearing in mind that in Newfoundland, fish is a synonym for cod. Every other species of swimming thing is known by its name.
Only cod are fish.
[Update comment: The revised figure of 71% by-catch is significant, but it is still a long way from demonstrating that there is a large amount of cod out there or, in the case of Mr. Morgan's claims, it still doesn't make the by-catch a cod-fishery by another name.]
2. Total Recreational Fishery Licenses Sold (2001-2004)
These figures will tell you something.
In 2001, DFO introduced the license and tags system for the recreational cod fishery. The fishery covered all zones and was open from July until September. They sold 91, 000 licenses, each with 30 tags.
The next year, the fishery was in all zones and lasted for six weeks. They sold about 50, 000 licenses with 15 tags.
In the past two years, the recreational fishery took place in 3Ps only. About 9, 100 licenses were sold each year each with 15 tags.
For all the claims that there is a huge demand for a "cod for the table", and with the ease of travel in the province these days, only 10% of the crowd who took part in the recreational fishery in 2001 participated in 2004.
3. Recreational Fishery Landings
2J3KL
2001 - 1896 tonnes
2002 - 670 tonnes
2003 - No fishery
2004 - No fishery
3Ps
2001 - 456 tonnes
2002 - No figures
2003 - 152 tonnes
2004 - 156 tonnes.
Before anyone starts taking these numbers an arguing there could easily be a recreational fishery on the northeast coast, go back and look at the actual by-catch landings last year. It was only 500 pounds per license. If there were that many fish out there, that number should be pretty close to the maximum, wouldn't you think?
[Update: If I work the math correctly, here's what the cod landings look like in 3Ps in the recreational fishery last year.
There are about 150 tonnes of fish, give or take which works out to roughly 300, 000 pounds of cod. There were 136, 500 tags. If we allow that all those tags were used, then the average fish size was a little over two pounds. My math could be faulty, but that seems to be an awfully small fish. Even if only half the available tags were used, it still gives us a four pound cod. I have caught salmon bigger than that.
Most of the cod I saw in television coverage of the rec fishery this past weekend were small to the eye, so those calculations seem to be about right on. If proponents of the recreational fishery are catching small fish, I'd venture that we are not actually seeing healthy cod stocks by any measure.
Bear in mind that the best estimates by scientists are that the total biomass of northern cod is only about 170, 000 tonnes, including the stocks of so-called bay fish. Those who think those numbers are small haven't offered any estimates, let alone serious estimates, of how much fish they think might be out there. There shouldn't be a commercial fishery until the stocks are much healthier, like maybe 10 times the current estimated biomass. I don't think the best scientific estimates are that far off.
Perhaps if Jim Morgan and A.J. Baker offered some facts to back up their arguments, it would be easier to take them seriously. Until then, I'd just as soon we accepted that jigging a meal of cod that many of us used to enjoy as a privilege is something we cannot enjoy today.
I never want my grandchildren to be able to see a cod stuffed and mounted in a museum, the only way my children can see a Great Auk. I'd sooner give up my chance to have a feed I jigged myself so my children and grandchildren might one day see cod as I knew them not so long ago and as my grandfathers and great-grandfathers knew them.
If He gave me anything at all in this world, God gave me a responsibility to shepherd the resources of the Earth.
If only proponents of the damn-fool fishery talked more of their God-given responsibilities, rather than their supposedly God-given rights.
If only.]
[Update II: Express columnist and St. John's lawyer A.J. Baker's column this week comments on the offshore, foreign cod catch allocations within the 200 mile exclusive economic zone. Here's a link to the column as printed in The Southern Gazette, one of The Express' sister publications.
Ms. Baker lists all the cod by-catches available to countries with historic fishing rights offshore Newfoundland and Labrador and currently assigned through the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).
She notes: "All those foreign countries will legally be allowed to catch 5,900 tons of cod this summer -– that'’s 12 million pounds of cod.
Meanwhile, Newfoundlanders are not allowed to catch a single cod -– even to eat -– in those same fishing zones from that same cod stock."
First, Ms. Baker is flat-out WRONG when she claims that Newfoundland and Labrador fishing interests cannot catch a single cod.
As reported previously on The Sir Robert Bond Papers, Newfoundland and Labrador fishing interests can catch cod incidental to the licensed fishery, exactly as foreign interests are allowed to do. Newfoundlanders and Labradorians can legally get a feed of cod for the table, even in 2J3KL, even if they can't jig the rounders themselves.
Second, since I do not have figures right now we don't know for sure how many Newfoundland and Labrador-based fishing interests can catch cod legally in the 2J3KL zone. My bet is the figures are quite a bit higher than the 700 tonnes those fixed-gear guys are allowed to take.
My next step is to contact DFO again and get some additional factual information to counteract the distortions and misrepresentations by Ms. Baker and others.
The point to this entire enterprise is simple: the proponents of the Damn-Fool Fishery and those, like Ms. Baker, who continually slag the federal government and foreigners are doing so on the basis of something other than facts.
If we don't base our resource management decisions on facts, we stand a much higher chance of making a grave error when it comes to fisheries management than if we just thought about things for a minute and didn't get carried away with whatever we heard from someone who heard it from someone who told us something we wanted to believe.
Given our sad history of fisheries mismanagement, I'd sooner err on the side of caution than take the word of people who seem to be plucking stuff out of thin air, or worse still, only giving selected bits of information.]
03 August 2005
Up the Pond!
With any luck and a good weather forecast, Wednesday marks the annual St. John's Regatta.
The boat races held on Quidi Vidi [pronounced kiddy viddy] Lake are the oldest continuous sporting event in North America. The earliest record of organized, regulated boat races dates from 1826, but there is evidence of boat races being organized on an ad hoc basis as early as 1818.
Your humble e-scribe will be off to the races for an enjoyable summer day.
In the meantime, for those of you not from these parts, here is the link to the official website of the Royal St. John's Regatta.
Here's another site with an extensive collection of photographs. That one is maintained by Industry Canada.
The title of this post is a popular local name for the tune "Banks of Newfoundland", which is traditionally played at the start and finish of each race. In 1914, soldiers of the first contingent of what became the Royal Newfoundland Regiment camped near Quidi Vidi before sailing to England. They chose "The Banks" as their regimental march.
Given the possibility a google search will turn up a bunch of other tunes with the same name, here's a link to a RAM file of the march being played by the band of the First Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment. Here's the link to the page where that tune is located. Anyone wanting a copy of the compact disc can send me an e-mail. I'll make arrangements to get one.
The boat races held on Quidi Vidi [pronounced kiddy viddy] Lake are the oldest continuous sporting event in North America. The earliest record of organized, regulated boat races dates from 1826, but there is evidence of boat races being organized on an ad hoc basis as early as 1818.
Your humble e-scribe will be off to the races for an enjoyable summer day.
In the meantime, for those of you not from these parts, here is the link to the official website of the Royal St. John's Regatta.
Here's another site with an extensive collection of photographs. That one is maintained by Industry Canada.
The title of this post is a popular local name for the tune "Banks of Newfoundland", which is traditionally played at the start and finish of each race. In 1914, soldiers of the first contingent of what became the Royal Newfoundland Regiment camped near Quidi Vidi before sailing to England. They chose "The Banks" as their regimental march.
Given the possibility a google search will turn up a bunch of other tunes with the same name, here's a link to a RAM file of the march being played by the band of the First Battalion, The Royal Newfoundland Regiment. Here's the link to the page where that tune is located. Anyone wanting a copy of the compact disc can send me an e-mail. I'll make arrangements to get one.
02 August 2005
Local lobster miracle
Out of New Brunswick comes a story about some lobster re-stocking program that worked very well.
That's all fine, but there is always the little known lobster management project at Eastport.
For a minimal effort, wild stocks are being well-managed and infractions have dropped to next to nothing.
It's worth checking out for a model that should be spreading to other areas of the province and other species.
That's all fine, but there is always the little known lobster management project at Eastport.
For a minimal effort, wild stocks are being well-managed and infractions have dropped to next to nothing.
It's worth checking out for a model that should be spreading to other areas of the province and other species.
01 August 2005
What the heck is public relations?
In 1999, I headed up the public affairs section of the Department of National Defence task force in Newfoundland and Labrador that would co-ordinate any military assistance to the provincial government in the event of problems caused by the supposed Y2K flaw in some computer programs.
We planned and trained nationally, regionally and finally at the provincial level. The provincial exercise took place on a weekend in the fall of 1999. All key staff members spent the weekend running an operations centre exactly as we would if needed.
The daily routine began with the commander's daily briefing, usually at seven o'clock in the morning. All department heads gave a summary of the previous day's activities, forecast what was coming and highlighted any issues that might need the commander's personal attention.
After each such briefing, known informally as morning prayers, the department heads grabbed usually grabbed a quick breakfast before beginning their shift. That first morning, a couple of my colleagues separately took me to one side to ask a simple question: "Is that what you do?"
"Yes", I replied, at first not quite sure what was coming next. I had given the commander an overview of attitudes in the key audiences we would be dealing with: the federal and provincial governments, views of key politicians at both levels of government, the news media and specific reports, the public in affected areas, and internally among soldiers. Only after ensuring The Boss was thoroughly familiar with the situation did I give him what literally amounted to a 30 second discussion of my section's planned activities.
He didn't need more. In all the years I had worked for this individual, he had only wanted to focus on issues that might require his attention; he trusted the staff he had picked to run the show. The Boss wanted the lay of the land and any key ideas he'd need to put across. He wanted to have a good feel for specific people he would be dealing with. Everything else was ours to handle as department heads in co-operation with each other and with decision makers inside and outside our organization.
My whole briefing had taken only about 10 minutes.
As I looked at my colleagues, I slowly started to understand their question and their expressions of discovery. One of them, a professional with considerable experience throughout the Canadian Forces and the department including tours overseas on major operations, said he had never seen a briefing like it before from a public affairs officer.
He was used to public affairs (public relations) being all about dealing with news media. There were a certain number of media calls. We handled this many interviews. There is a news conference at such and such a time. The other stuff - the analysis - was a revelation to him.
His revelation was less a revelation to me as a reminder.
Most people don't understand what public relations is all about. They think it is just about dealing with news media. They think of it as publicity. They think it is linked to marketing.
It is all of that and more.
Public relations is the management function that plans, co-ordinates and executes communications efforts with people who are interested in what an organization is doing, in order to gain and maintain their support.
That'’s a definition I work with but there are others.
The Canadian Public Relations Society defines public relations as "the management function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the policies and procedures of an individual or organization with the public interest, and plans and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance."
A lengthier definition holds that public relations "is the distinctive management function which:
- helps establish and maintain mutual lines of communication understanding, acceptance and co-operation between an organization and its publics;
- involves the management of problems and issues;
- defines and emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the public interest;
- helps management to keep abreast of and to serve the public interest effectively, serving as an early warning system to help anticipate trends; and,
- uses research and sound, ethical communications as its practical tools."
Take either definition and you have a good idea of what a public relations professional does.
One could say that a public relations practitioner helps decide who says what to whom, where, when, why and how.
If you take a close look at those definitions a few simple ideas leap out.
First, communication is a two-way street. It involves sending a message and receiving one.
Second, public relations often involves change in some way. Sometimes an organization has to communicate about change, like closing a business. Sometimes, the change comes as feedback from disgruntled employees or voters.
Third, public relations connects an organization with the public interest. That isn't just the interest of the public as a politician or public servant might look at it. Sometimes it is public interest in the sense of the greater good, but public interest may mean the benefit of a particular group.
Interests may clash if there is more than one group, but the effective management of communication is supposed to help resolve those sorts of conflicts. Public relations involves establishing and maintaining "mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance and co-operation."
Look at these definitions of public relations and it seems like a late-night infomercial. That might not be as odd as it seems: public relations is about relationship management.
Next time, we'll look at some simple ideas that underpin effective public relations:
Reputation and credibility.
We planned and trained nationally, regionally and finally at the provincial level. The provincial exercise took place on a weekend in the fall of 1999. All key staff members spent the weekend running an operations centre exactly as we would if needed.
The daily routine began with the commander's daily briefing, usually at seven o'clock in the morning. All department heads gave a summary of the previous day's activities, forecast what was coming and highlighted any issues that might need the commander's personal attention.
After each such briefing, known informally as morning prayers, the department heads grabbed usually grabbed a quick breakfast before beginning their shift. That first morning, a couple of my colleagues separately took me to one side to ask a simple question: "Is that what you do?"
"Yes", I replied, at first not quite sure what was coming next. I had given the commander an overview of attitudes in the key audiences we would be dealing with: the federal and provincial governments, views of key politicians at both levels of government, the news media and specific reports, the public in affected areas, and internally among soldiers. Only after ensuring The Boss was thoroughly familiar with the situation did I give him what literally amounted to a 30 second discussion of my section's planned activities.
He didn't need more. In all the years I had worked for this individual, he had only wanted to focus on issues that might require his attention; he trusted the staff he had picked to run the show. The Boss wanted the lay of the land and any key ideas he'd need to put across. He wanted to have a good feel for specific people he would be dealing with. Everything else was ours to handle as department heads in co-operation with each other and with decision makers inside and outside our organization.
My whole briefing had taken only about 10 minutes.
As I looked at my colleagues, I slowly started to understand their question and their expressions of discovery. One of them, a professional with considerable experience throughout the Canadian Forces and the department including tours overseas on major operations, said he had never seen a briefing like it before from a public affairs officer.
He was used to public affairs (public relations) being all about dealing with news media. There were a certain number of media calls. We handled this many interviews. There is a news conference at such and such a time. The other stuff - the analysis - was a revelation to him.
His revelation was less a revelation to me as a reminder.
Most people don't understand what public relations is all about. They think it is just about dealing with news media. They think of it as publicity. They think it is linked to marketing.
It is all of that and more.
Public relations is the management function that plans, co-ordinates and executes communications efforts with people who are interested in what an organization is doing, in order to gain and maintain their support.
That'’s a definition I work with but there are others.
The Canadian Public Relations Society defines public relations as "the management function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the policies and procedures of an individual or organization with the public interest, and plans and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance."
A lengthier definition holds that public relations "is the distinctive management function which:
- helps establish and maintain mutual lines of communication understanding, acceptance and co-operation between an organization and its publics;
- involves the management of problems and issues;
- defines and emphasizes the responsibility of management to serve the public interest;
- helps management to keep abreast of and to serve the public interest effectively, serving as an early warning system to help anticipate trends; and,
- uses research and sound, ethical communications as its practical tools."
Take either definition and you have a good idea of what a public relations professional does.
One could say that a public relations practitioner helps decide who says what to whom, where, when, why and how.
If you take a close look at those definitions a few simple ideas leap out.
First, communication is a two-way street. It involves sending a message and receiving one.
Second, public relations often involves change in some way. Sometimes an organization has to communicate about change, like closing a business. Sometimes, the change comes as feedback from disgruntled employees or voters.
Third, public relations connects an organization with the public interest. That isn't just the interest of the public as a politician or public servant might look at it. Sometimes it is public interest in the sense of the greater good, but public interest may mean the benefit of a particular group.
Interests may clash if there is more than one group, but the effective management of communication is supposed to help resolve those sorts of conflicts. Public relations involves establishing and maintaining "mutual lines of communication, understanding, acceptance and co-operation."
Look at these definitions of public relations and it seems like a late-night infomercial. That might not be as odd as it seems: public relations is about relationship management.
Next time, we'll look at some simple ideas that underpin effective public relations:
Reputation and credibility.
29 July 2005
Goose Bay base saved by Liberals!
Bill Graham to start hot war with Denmark.
Facetious? Maybe. I've always said the easiest way to save Goose Bay in a way that would satisfy the local citizens/ committee (i.e. we won't lift a finger to do anything; Ottawa save us.) is to start a war or get us into one.
Well, the only thing out there on the northeast frontier is the Arctic part of a little country called Denmark.
So stop your bitching, Graham Letto.
Facetious? Maybe. I've always said the easiest way to save Goose Bay in a way that would satisfy the local citizens/ committee (i.e. we won't lift a finger to do anything; Ottawa save us.) is to start a war or get us into one.
Well, the only thing out there on the northeast frontier is the Arctic part of a little country called Denmark.
So stop your bitching, Graham Letto.
Abitibi: forest and trees
International wood products company Abitibi Consolidated has given notice it intends to close its Stephenville operation and shut down one of its two paper making machines at the company's Grand Falls mill.
The provincial government reacted angrily to the announcement.
In a news release the provincial government discussed details of a proposal to supply electricity to the plants, a proposal that both Premier Danny Williams and natural resources minister Ed Byrne dismissed as being unjustifiable to the people of Newfoundland and Labrador.
The nub of the problem for Abitibi appears to be power costs and power supply. Newsprint manufacturing globally goes through ups and downs. North American operations are increasingly challenged by competition from plants in the developing world and China where operating costs are considerably lower.
The $300 million hydroelectrical proposal called for two new generators producing 60 megawatts. In addition to that development being paid for entirely by the Crown corporation Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, Abitibi reportedly asked for a discount on power costs amounting to upwards of $14 million per year for a total of 30 years.
The provincial government's tally of the cost is $455 million representing the costs of the subsidy, plus the increased costs to electricity users to pay for the $300 million capital construction program.
While Premier Williams is threatening to revoke Abitibi's timber rights in the event the company carries out the plan to shut down a machine at Grand Falls, this is the hollowest of hollow threats. First, revoking the timber rights as laid out in Bill 27 would effectively close the Grand Falls mill. It is difficult to imagine a government deliberating shutting down a major economic engine in the province's economy under any circumstances. The threat contained in Bill 27, passed under the Grimes administration was nonsense when it was first uttered and it remains a nonsense.
Second, taking that action would leave the province liable to being sued by Abitibi for unfairly and arbitrarily penalizing the company for taking what are essentially normal operating decisions.
The government's goal here is clearly to keep the two mills operating. The company, meanwhile, is concerned to keep them operating as well, but at reduced costs.
A closer examination of the electricity scheme and public comments by government ministers suggests that the only major issue separating the two parties is the issue of who will own the hydro plants at the end of the 30 year agreement.
This is interesting on two counts. First, the issue is relatively small. Abitibi need have no interest in owning generating capacity if it does not own the mills the plants would service. If it does not have the capital to build its own generators, then its share of the new projects could be as simple.
Second, despite the protests to the contrary, it is only logical to conclude from comments by Minister Byrne and his colleagues that government would be willing to finance a new generation scheme and subsidize Abitibi's power. The costs, described as exorbitant, would therefore not be so burdensome after all.
Perhaps this becomes more clear if one looks closely at the cash involved and the options available.
The government's estimated cost of the project is $300 million. This represents the highest of three estimates of the cost for building two new hydroelectric projects. In the ordinary course, the hydro corporation would borrow the money and then pay for it through increased electricity rates. This is what Minister Byrne noted when he talked of a four percent rate increase for consumers and a two percent increase in rates for business.
Yet, the provincial government just received $2.0 billion in cash from Ottawa. Amortized over 30 years, the capital cost of the construction project is a mere $10 million. That works out to be far less than one year's interest on the offshore cash in one instance or, a paltry sum even if taken out of the offshore cash.
Bear in mind that the provincial government and its supporters maintain that the offshore deal is worth in excess of $10 billion.
Consider, as well, that the $300 million represents the high-end estimate. Were Hydro to contract the work to the private sector, then it might actually be brought in at a lower cost.
Government could easily gift the money to Hydro and not be out of pocket for much, if anything. In exchange for this one-time capital construction, the government secures the jobs in two communities, guarantees that the mills have secure power in the event Abitibi wishes to sell off its operations, and in the worst case has low cost power to supply businesses and consumers in the province if the paper mills shut. If no money is borrowed, there is no interest to be paid on the loans and hence no real need to raise electricity costs to end users. Cheap power attracts business.
Beyond that, the provincial government can also simply sell the power to Abitibi at a nominal rate. This amounts to an indirect subsidy to Abitibi - no cash actually changes hands - and reflects a variation on the sort of financial incentives companies often receive in order to set up a business here.
For those concerned about the long-term, it is simply a matter of inserting a clause that obliges both parties to renegotiate the price of electricity on a regular basis. This allows the province to increase electricity rates should the world-wide newsprint markets rebound. And it precludes Abitibi from subsidizing its global operations with savings in Newfoundland and Labrador.
As much as we may all decry such subsidies, the actual amount here is relatively modest on an annual basis. Even the government's own worst case estimate is that the subsidy amounts to $14 million per year. The total of $455 million is based on the deal operating for 30 years. If Abitibi closes it mill or mills before that the deal could cost much less.
Put that up against the 772 jobs at Abitibi in Stephenville and Grand Falls and the others in the two communities that depend on the mills. Put the annual cost of $14 million in subsidy against the 408, 000 metric tonnes of newsprint the mills produced in 2004 at a market value of about $225 million. Then think about the corporate and other taxes the company pays to the province.
All things considered, it is possible the provincial government is not as angry at Abitibi as it might seem. Abitibi may be pushing back at a government which was already playing hard ball at the negotiating table. Read between the lines of government's news release, add in a few other considerations and you get the sense the provincial government will be putting some new cash into Abitibi through reduced power rates.
The offshore cash can produce a lasting benefit if it is used properly. Is there a better use than securing over 700 jobs in the best case and in the worst case having low-cost power readily available for a new enterprise?
The provincial government reacted angrily to the announcement.
In a news release the provincial government discussed details of a proposal to supply electricity to the plants, a proposal that both Premier Danny Williams and natural resources minister Ed Byrne dismissed as being unjustifiable to the people of Newfoundland and Labrador.
The nub of the problem for Abitibi appears to be power costs and power supply. Newsprint manufacturing globally goes through ups and downs. North American operations are increasingly challenged by competition from plants in the developing world and China where operating costs are considerably lower.
The $300 million hydroelectrical proposal called for two new generators producing 60 megawatts. In addition to that development being paid for entirely by the Crown corporation Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, Abitibi reportedly asked for a discount on power costs amounting to upwards of $14 million per year for a total of 30 years.
The provincial government's tally of the cost is $455 million representing the costs of the subsidy, plus the increased costs to electricity users to pay for the $300 million capital construction program.
While Premier Williams is threatening to revoke Abitibi's timber rights in the event the company carries out the plan to shut down a machine at Grand Falls, this is the hollowest of hollow threats. First, revoking the timber rights as laid out in Bill 27 would effectively close the Grand Falls mill. It is difficult to imagine a government deliberating shutting down a major economic engine in the province's economy under any circumstances. The threat contained in Bill 27, passed under the Grimes administration was nonsense when it was first uttered and it remains a nonsense.
Second, taking that action would leave the province liable to being sued by Abitibi for unfairly and arbitrarily penalizing the company for taking what are essentially normal operating decisions.
The government's goal here is clearly to keep the two mills operating. The company, meanwhile, is concerned to keep them operating as well, but at reduced costs.
A closer examination of the electricity scheme and public comments by government ministers suggests that the only major issue separating the two parties is the issue of who will own the hydro plants at the end of the 30 year agreement.
This is interesting on two counts. First, the issue is relatively small. Abitibi need have no interest in owning generating capacity if it does not own the mills the plants would service. If it does not have the capital to build its own generators, then its share of the new projects could be as simple.
Second, despite the protests to the contrary, it is only logical to conclude from comments by Minister Byrne and his colleagues that government would be willing to finance a new generation scheme and subsidize Abitibi's power. The costs, described as exorbitant, would therefore not be so burdensome after all.
Perhaps this becomes more clear if one looks closely at the cash involved and the options available.
The government's estimated cost of the project is $300 million. This represents the highest of three estimates of the cost for building two new hydroelectric projects. In the ordinary course, the hydro corporation would borrow the money and then pay for it through increased electricity rates. This is what Minister Byrne noted when he talked of a four percent rate increase for consumers and a two percent increase in rates for business.
Yet, the provincial government just received $2.0 billion in cash from Ottawa. Amortized over 30 years, the capital cost of the construction project is a mere $10 million. That works out to be far less than one year's interest on the offshore cash in one instance or, a paltry sum even if taken out of the offshore cash.
Bear in mind that the provincial government and its supporters maintain that the offshore deal is worth in excess of $10 billion.
Consider, as well, that the $300 million represents the high-end estimate. Were Hydro to contract the work to the private sector, then it might actually be brought in at a lower cost.
Government could easily gift the money to Hydro and not be out of pocket for much, if anything. In exchange for this one-time capital construction, the government secures the jobs in two communities, guarantees that the mills have secure power in the event Abitibi wishes to sell off its operations, and in the worst case has low cost power to supply businesses and consumers in the province if the paper mills shut. If no money is borrowed, there is no interest to be paid on the loans and hence no real need to raise electricity costs to end users. Cheap power attracts business.
Beyond that, the provincial government can also simply sell the power to Abitibi at a nominal rate. This amounts to an indirect subsidy to Abitibi - no cash actually changes hands - and reflects a variation on the sort of financial incentives companies often receive in order to set up a business here.
For those concerned about the long-term, it is simply a matter of inserting a clause that obliges both parties to renegotiate the price of electricity on a regular basis. This allows the province to increase electricity rates should the world-wide newsprint markets rebound. And it precludes Abitibi from subsidizing its global operations with savings in Newfoundland and Labrador.
As much as we may all decry such subsidies, the actual amount here is relatively modest on an annual basis. Even the government's own worst case estimate is that the subsidy amounts to $14 million per year. The total of $455 million is based on the deal operating for 30 years. If Abitibi closes it mill or mills before that the deal could cost much less.
Put that up against the 772 jobs at Abitibi in Stephenville and Grand Falls and the others in the two communities that depend on the mills. Put the annual cost of $14 million in subsidy against the 408, 000 metric tonnes of newsprint the mills produced in 2004 at a market value of about $225 million. Then think about the corporate and other taxes the company pays to the province.
All things considered, it is possible the provincial government is not as angry at Abitibi as it might seem. Abitibi may be pushing back at a government which was already playing hard ball at the negotiating table. Read between the lines of government's news release, add in a few other considerations and you get the sense the provincial government will be putting some new cash into Abitibi through reduced power rates.
The offshore cash can produce a lasting benefit if it is used properly. Is there a better use than securing over 700 jobs in the best case and in the worst case having low-cost power readily available for a new enterprise?
28 July 2005
Westcott's take on the Damn-Fool Fishery
Our respective reasons may be different, but Express columnist Craig Westcott and I are in complete agreement that the food fishery is a damn-fool idea.
Westcott has covered fish issues for years. He knows what he is talking about.
He rightly points out that guys like Jigger Jim Morgan, the former provincial fisheries minister known for his acquaintance with illegal fishing, can rant and rave all they like. Their arrest for illegally taking a codfish is much less than the poor inshore fisherman who gets to lose his entire livelihood from jigging.
Here's the link to Craig's column, which hopefully will stay around for a while.
Here's my backlink to a post on fisheries matters in which I first used the phrase damn-fool fishery.
Westcott has covered fish issues for years. He knows what he is talking about.
He rightly points out that guys like Jigger Jim Morgan, the former provincial fisheries minister known for his acquaintance with illegal fishing, can rant and rave all they like. Their arrest for illegally taking a codfish is much less than the poor inshore fisherman who gets to lose his entire livelihood from jigging.
Here's the link to Craig's column, which hopefully will stay around for a while.
Here's my backlink to a post on fisheries matters in which I first used the phrase damn-fool fishery.
The Rooms' Renouf: resistance is futile
From the vacuous space known as The Rooms comes this suitable news release issued on Wednesday by board chairperson Dr. Priscilla Renouf. In its title, the release purports to have the chairperson respond " to statements made by former director [of the art gallery] and clarifies information regarding governance structure of The Rooms".
The former art gallery director made a number of accusations in a news conference he held on Tuesday. He was suddenly fired a few weeks ago, apparently because he objected to the plans to move some of his staff previously involved in efforts like outreach and shift them to other parts of the corporation, like marketing.
He also criticized Renouf and the board of directors who approved demolishing the well-established brand Art Gallery of Newfoundland and Labrador (AGNL) in favour of the pasty-sounding Provincial Art Gallery Division.
Incidentally, the name was changed since the gallery is headed by a director and in government a director can only head a division. Of course, the pedants of government could not merely consider the ranks and titles as being for administrative purposes. The word "division" must be in the title and the separate identity of the gallery assimilated within the parent cube.
In public relations, a response release normally makes some effort to rebut accusations if any have been made. After all, public relations is about communicating with people to gain and maintain support. It's about managing relationships and focuses on things like reputation and credibility instead of the highly transitory notion of image. One actually tries to say something meaningful, to explain what has occurred and give the reasons for it.
In this case, Renouf actually proves the accusations are right: The Rooms is in danger of becoming a gigantic black hole into which our history, culture and heritage is being sucked. There is the pointless repetition by Renouf of the corporation's mandate and the assurance that the board will work to achieve it. There is the matter-of-fact reference to the PAG without even a suggestion that giving a reason for the name change might be in order.
Apparently, we on the outside are not worthy of her efforts. She simply assumes that since the name is changed, we must all accept it. So it is written. So let it be done.
Other than that, the rest of the release is a collection of comments so devoid of any meaning that neither Orwell nor Kafka could have written a better parody of the soul-chilling banality of government.
The release concludes with this arrogant assessment: "The divisions of The Rooms - the provincial archives, art gallery and museum – will continue to enjoy unprecedented support from a broad public as we continue to reach out with a variety of dynamic public and educational programs."
I'd suggest Renouf get some public relations advice but I know I'd be wasting my breath.
The former art gallery director made a number of accusations in a news conference he held on Tuesday. He was suddenly fired a few weeks ago, apparently because he objected to the plans to move some of his staff previously involved in efforts like outreach and shift them to other parts of the corporation, like marketing.
He also criticized Renouf and the board of directors who approved demolishing the well-established brand Art Gallery of Newfoundland and Labrador (AGNL) in favour of the pasty-sounding Provincial Art Gallery Division.
Incidentally, the name was changed since the gallery is headed by a director and in government a director can only head a division. Of course, the pedants of government could not merely consider the ranks and titles as being for administrative purposes. The word "division" must be in the title and the separate identity of the gallery assimilated within the parent cube.
In public relations, a response release normally makes some effort to rebut accusations if any have been made. After all, public relations is about communicating with people to gain and maintain support. It's about managing relationships and focuses on things like reputation and credibility instead of the highly transitory notion of image. One actually tries to say something meaningful, to explain what has occurred and give the reasons for it.
In this case, Renouf actually proves the accusations are right: The Rooms is in danger of becoming a gigantic black hole into which our history, culture and heritage is being sucked. There is the pointless repetition by Renouf of the corporation's mandate and the assurance that the board will work to achieve it. There is the matter-of-fact reference to the PAG without even a suggestion that giving a reason for the name change might be in order.
Apparently, we on the outside are not worthy of her efforts. She simply assumes that since the name is changed, we must all accept it. So it is written. So let it be done.
Other than that, the rest of the release is a collection of comments so devoid of any meaning that neither Orwell nor Kafka could have written a better parody of the soul-chilling banality of government.
The release concludes with this arrogant assessment: "The divisions of The Rooms - the provincial archives, art gallery and museum – will continue to enjoy unprecedented support from a broad public as we continue to reach out with a variety of dynamic public and educational programs."
I'd suggest Renouf get some public relations advice but I know I'd be wasting my breath.
27 July 2005
Another offshore board opening for Wells
Sometimes when you go looking for information, you actually find something really curious.
As part of an interview your humble e-scribe did on Tuesday with CBC television, I made the point that if the Premier wanted Andy Wells on the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, the easiest way to do it was to put Andy on one of the provincial seats.
Under the Atlantic Accord (1985), the board is made up of seven appointments, three from each of the federal and provincial governments and the chair who is appointed jointly by Ottawa and St. John's.
Here are the current Board members with their appointment noted in round brackets.
Chair: Vacant (Joint)
Member: Herb Clarke (Government of Canada)
Member: Lorne Spracklin (Government of Canada)
Member: Hal Stanley [former chair and chief executive officer] (Government of Canada)
Member: Joan Whelan (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador)
Member: Fred Way (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador)
Member: Vacant (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador)
Notice that last vacancy.
It's been open for a while and certainly since the Premier decided to call Paul Martin and float the idea of putting Andy Wells on the offshore board as chair and chief executive officer.
The question remains: why Andy as chair?
The premier says it part of fighting for greater benefits and that the existing candidates were too close to the oil industry.
Ok.
Well even if we allow for a minute that all of that was true, why does Andy have to sit in the chair and CEO job?
Andy Wells served very effectively as an excrement agitator when the Peckford administration appointed him as consumer representative to the public utilities board.
It seems logical to just put Andy into the empty provincial slot - which the feds can't veto - and let Andy be Andy. The Prem still gets to negotiate greater benefits, if he can, and the offshore board just carries on as the regulatory body it should be, headed by the excellent person selected by the eminently fair and open process that was already in place.
The answer to this question may never be known.
But since it is highly unlikely that Andy Wells could ever beat out the slate of highly qualified candidates already in the selection stream for the Big Job at the offshore board, Andy might just go off to sit in the empty provincial slot anyway, if the Premier feels like it.
It's a part-time job, so Andy could continue as Mayor. The Premier gets to have his boy stirring up the offshore board in a way only Andy could do.
Of course, if Wells does get the top job at the offshore board, will his view of The Narrows be blocked by the new eight story condo block being built on the site diagonally opposite from the board's offices?
As part of an interview your humble e-scribe did on Tuesday with CBC television, I made the point that if the Premier wanted Andy Wells on the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, the easiest way to do it was to put Andy on one of the provincial seats.
Under the Atlantic Accord (1985), the board is made up of seven appointments, three from each of the federal and provincial governments and the chair who is appointed jointly by Ottawa and St. John's.
Here are the current Board members with their appointment noted in round brackets.
Chair: Vacant (Joint)
Member: Herb Clarke (Government of Canada)
Member: Lorne Spracklin (Government of Canada)
Member: Hal Stanley [former chair and chief executive officer] (Government of Canada)
Member: Joan Whelan (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador)
Member: Fred Way (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador)
Member: Vacant (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador)
Notice that last vacancy.
It's been open for a while and certainly since the Premier decided to call Paul Martin and float the idea of putting Andy Wells on the offshore board as chair and chief executive officer.
The question remains: why Andy as chair?
The premier says it part of fighting for greater benefits and that the existing candidates were too close to the oil industry.
Ok.
Well even if we allow for a minute that all of that was true, why does Andy have to sit in the chair and CEO job?
Andy Wells served very effectively as an excrement agitator when the Peckford administration appointed him as consumer representative to the public utilities board.
It seems logical to just put Andy into the empty provincial slot - which the feds can't veto - and let Andy be Andy. The Prem still gets to negotiate greater benefits, if he can, and the offshore board just carries on as the regulatory body it should be, headed by the excellent person selected by the eminently fair and open process that was already in place.
The answer to this question may never be known.
But since it is highly unlikely that Andy Wells could ever beat out the slate of highly qualified candidates already in the selection stream for the Big Job at the offshore board, Andy might just go off to sit in the empty provincial slot anyway, if the Premier feels like it.
It's a part-time job, so Andy could continue as Mayor. The Premier gets to have his boy stirring up the offshore board in a way only Andy could do.
Of course, if Wells does get the top job at the offshore board, will his view of The Narrows be blocked by the new eight story condo block being built on the site diagonally opposite from the board's offices?
The offshore board and benefits plans
Follow this link and you'll wind up at the federal implementation act for the Atlantic Accord. The provincial one is largely the same, but the federal one is actually easier to read and doesn't have a bunch of annoying shorthand in the official text, like using "1st" for first.
The Implementation Act
Scroll down to Section 45 and you'll find the bit that the powers held by the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board related to benefits plans. The language is pretty simple and plain.
Notice that under Section 45 (5), the board has to consult with both energy ministers to ensure the benefits plan submitted by a proponent meets the requirements of the federal and provincial implementation acts. What that means, in simple terms, is that there is no way for a development to proceed if one or both of the governments doesn't like the benefits plan.
Notice as well, though, that the act doesn't say that a fixed percentage of work has to come here, a set number of jobs have to be here or that any particular amount of work need actually be carried out in the province.
If you look closely at Section 45 (3)(d), local companies need only be given first consideration and then only if their goods and services and competitive in terms of fair market price, quality and delivery.
In Practice
In practice, benefits plans have been reviewed by the province and the federal government, even if in general terms, well before the entire development applications ever hits the offshore board. A smart operator would want to make sure that the development plan is a smooth as possible so they will invest energy before submitting the plan to make sure it meets the governments' requirements.
That's why it was the Premier and his energy minister of the time who were involved in the discussions with the Terra Nova about the possible transfer of engineering and procurement jobs to Newfoundland and Labrador. It wasn't the offshore board.
That's why it was Premier Williams who stated the province's terms for local benefits on the Hebron project.
The Implementation Act
Scroll down to Section 45 and you'll find the bit that the powers held by the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board related to benefits plans. The language is pretty simple and plain.
Notice that under Section 45 (5), the board has to consult with both energy ministers to ensure the benefits plan submitted by a proponent meets the requirements of the federal and provincial implementation acts. What that means, in simple terms, is that there is no way for a development to proceed if one or both of the governments doesn't like the benefits plan.
Notice as well, though, that the act doesn't say that a fixed percentage of work has to come here, a set number of jobs have to be here or that any particular amount of work need actually be carried out in the province.
If you look closely at Section 45 (3)(d), local companies need only be given first consideration and then only if their goods and services and competitive in terms of fair market price, quality and delivery.
In Practice
In practice, benefits plans have been reviewed by the province and the federal government, even if in general terms, well before the entire development applications ever hits the offshore board. A smart operator would want to make sure that the development plan is a smooth as possible so they will invest energy before submitting the plan to make sure it meets the governments' requirements.
That's why it was the Premier and his energy minister of the time who were involved in the discussions with the Terra Nova about the possible transfer of engineering and procurement jobs to Newfoundland and Labrador. It wasn't the offshore board.
That's why it was Premier Williams who stated the province's terms for local benefits on the Hebron project.
26 July 2005
Peter and Loyola missed the real security threats
Any visitor to St. John's knows that what Peter Mackay, DDS, is hopping over in this story from the CTV website is just a low barrier to keep vehicles from parking on the wharf, not a major barrier for threats.
There are several open gaps that allow vehicles to be driven right up to ships so they can unload cargo, people, food and fuel.
If Peter had anything serious observations to offer on port security, he'd have tried getting access to a major wharf complex, like Vancouver, Montreal or his own fave city, Halifax. The reason he didn't try anything like that is because:
a. his tight buns would be sitting in a local lock-up; and,
b. as a result, the photo-op wouldn't have been as...how do you say... appropriate for the point Peter was trying to make.
Of course, what Mackay is doing is called a stunt and it's what you do when you don't have anything of substance to say.
The thing is, Peter, your hopping over that little barrier (you could have walked around) doesn't reflect lax security; it reflects the low threat in St. John's as well as the obvious point that it is virtually impossible to "secure" the harbour apron without effectively closing down the harbour itself and half the downtown.
Heck, I'd go a step farther: pretty much anything on the south side of Water Street would have to be demolished including historic sites, major office complexes, and the building housing Provincial Court among others.
The buildings that remain would be facing a 10 foot-high concrete wall topped with razor wire and patrolled regularly by armed security guards and Alsatians. Kiss the downtown restaurants goodbye. As well, you'd have to figure out some way of blocking anyone with a view of the harbour since it would be easy to lob a rocket-propelled grenade from the upper floors of the TD Building or even the government's own office complex down onto the dockside.
You'd also have to expropriate the homes of people living at the Battery, and people living farther up Signal Hill. Forget ever seeing most of the Southside Hills or Fort Amherst again. All of that would have to be fenced and monitored so that terrorists could get in or out easily.
In another part of the TV report that sadly didn't make it to the web story was the bit where Peter and Loyola Hearn, the pretend member of St. John's South Mount Pearl, talk about the danger posed by the containers from around the world sitting at the Oceanex terminal.
Hey!
Guys!
Over here!
Reality Check: those containers had to pass through Montreal and/or Halifax before they go to the local terminal. That's where the big security issue is for containerized traffic. Go check out their security. Containers don't come to St. John's directly from unsecure foreign ports.
There are other security issues at St. John's Harbour Peter and Loyola could have talked about. But since Peter was too busy issuing nonsense releases like this one (Picture that Culkin kid from Home Alone when you see that Pete was "shocked") and Loyola knows squat about the riding he supposedly represents, neither of these guys bothered to address some real local public security issues.
Oh, and if you want to know about some real strategic targets in St. John's, some places that might just be likely security issues, I can point them out to any reporter who wants to take the tour with me.
The only condition is that you cannot broadcast where they are. After all, the Internet is a major source of intelligence for the bad guys.
The harbour isn't one of the sites.
And Peter Mackay, the supposed Connie security guru should know better than to identify St. John's as a weak spot in Canada's security system on the news media and the Internet.
If CSIS granted you a clearance, they should take it back.
Bonehead.
There are several open gaps that allow vehicles to be driven right up to ships so they can unload cargo, people, food and fuel.
If Peter had anything serious observations to offer on port security, he'd have tried getting access to a major wharf complex, like Vancouver, Montreal or his own fave city, Halifax. The reason he didn't try anything like that is because:
a. his tight buns would be sitting in a local lock-up; and,
b. as a result, the photo-op wouldn't have been as...how do you say... appropriate for the point Peter was trying to make.
Of course, what Mackay is doing is called a stunt and it's what you do when you don't have anything of substance to say.
The thing is, Peter, your hopping over that little barrier (you could have walked around) doesn't reflect lax security; it reflects the low threat in St. John's as well as the obvious point that it is virtually impossible to "secure" the harbour apron without effectively closing down the harbour itself and half the downtown.
Heck, I'd go a step farther: pretty much anything on the south side of Water Street would have to be demolished including historic sites, major office complexes, and the building housing Provincial Court among others.
The buildings that remain would be facing a 10 foot-high concrete wall topped with razor wire and patrolled regularly by armed security guards and Alsatians. Kiss the downtown restaurants goodbye. As well, you'd have to figure out some way of blocking anyone with a view of the harbour since it would be easy to lob a rocket-propelled grenade from the upper floors of the TD Building or even the government's own office complex down onto the dockside.
You'd also have to expropriate the homes of people living at the Battery, and people living farther up Signal Hill. Forget ever seeing most of the Southside Hills or Fort Amherst again. All of that would have to be fenced and monitored so that terrorists could get in or out easily.
In another part of the TV report that sadly didn't make it to the web story was the bit where Peter and Loyola Hearn, the pretend member of St. John's South Mount Pearl, talk about the danger posed by the containers from around the world sitting at the Oceanex terminal.
Hey!
Guys!
Over here!
Reality Check: those containers had to pass through Montreal and/or Halifax before they go to the local terminal. That's where the big security issue is for containerized traffic. Go check out their security. Containers don't come to St. John's directly from unsecure foreign ports.
There are other security issues at St. John's Harbour Peter and Loyola could have talked about. But since Peter was too busy issuing nonsense releases like this one (Picture that Culkin kid from Home Alone when you see that Pete was "shocked") and Loyola knows squat about the riding he supposedly represents, neither of these guys bothered to address some real local public security issues.
Oh, and if you want to know about some real strategic targets in St. John's, some places that might just be likely security issues, I can point them out to any reporter who wants to take the tour with me.
The only condition is that you cannot broadcast where they are. After all, the Internet is a major source of intelligence for the bad guys.
The harbour isn't one of the sites.
And Peter Mackay, the supposed Connie security guru should know better than to identify St. John's as a weak spot in Canada's security system on the news media and the Internet.
If CSIS granted you a clearance, they should take it back.
Bonehead.
Public relations people take note
CBC journalist and blogger John Gushue recently offered a link to Contentious, a blog by Amy Gahran.
This post challenged people to think of a world without what Amy calls press releases.
With any luck and a modest level of effort, I can apply some of Amy's other advice about blogging and make my stuff sharper and more effective.
Old dogs can learn new tricks.
This post challenged people to think of a world without what Amy calls press releases.
With any luck and a modest level of effort, I can apply some of Amy's other advice about blogging and make my stuff sharper and more effective.
Old dogs can learn new tricks.
His Excellency Paul Soles
Ok.
To be honest I got this idea from one of the Liblogs but it was just such a flash of inspiration, I thought I'd make it your morning chuckle.
The serious stuff, like lampooning Loyola Hearn and Peter Mackay, DDS, will have to wait a bit.
Her Excellency the Governor General will soon be departing Rideau Hall.
The hunt is on for a replacement.
My pick is Paul Soles. Here's a link with a picture so you can see Paul has that Einstein thing going on.
Like Clarkson, Soles used to host Take 30, an afternoon chat show on the CEEB. At one point, Paul and Adrienne were co-hosts but she got the flick in favour of someone else.
Unlike Clarkson who became a bit of a social gadfly and pseudo-diplomat, Soles actually worked for a living.
He is an actor and since the 1950s has earned his living in everything from the old Wayne and Shuster Show (maybe it was funny in 1954 on the second go 'round) to Rocket Robin Hood and Spider-Man to This is the law. He also appeared in some other stuff, like moudly plays by some long-dead English guy. I think his name was Shakespeare.
Paul Soles.
Canadian Icon.
My nominee for Governor General.
To be honest I got this idea from one of the Liblogs but it was just such a flash of inspiration, I thought I'd make it your morning chuckle.
The serious stuff, like lampooning Loyola Hearn and Peter Mackay, DDS, will have to wait a bit.
Her Excellency the Governor General will soon be departing Rideau Hall.
The hunt is on for a replacement.
My pick is Paul Soles. Here's a link with a picture so you can see Paul has that Einstein thing going on.
Like Clarkson, Soles used to host Take 30, an afternoon chat show on the CEEB. At one point, Paul and Adrienne were co-hosts but she got the flick in favour of someone else.
Unlike Clarkson who became a bit of a social gadfly and pseudo-diplomat, Soles actually worked for a living.
He is an actor and since the 1950s has earned his living in everything from the old Wayne and Shuster Show (maybe it was funny in 1954 on the second go 'round) to Rocket Robin Hood and Spider-Man to This is the law. He also appeared in some other stuff, like moudly plays by some long-dead English guy. I think his name was Shakespeare.
Paul Soles.
Canadian Icon.
My nominee for Governor General.
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