That $10 billion Equalization debt thingy is curious, dontchya think? The Premier and his followers bandy it about like it was fact.
Where did it come from?
Wade Locke. Well, at least one set of assessments done by the Memorial University economist.
Funny thing, though, if you look way back to last June, you'll find a study Locke did for the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council (APEC), along with a buddy of his, Paul Hobson, an economist from Acadia. Hobson, incidentally proposed a totally different approach to the treatment of resource revenues, one that went completely unnoticed in all the fooferah over the past couple of years.
Anyway, Hobson and Locke, point out that all four Atlantic provinces are adversely affected by the new Equalization formula:
Nova Scotia - $159 million increase in revenues for the first two years under the new Equalization program, and reduced revenues in each year thereafter compared with the Fixed Framework: in aggregate, the province receives $1.4 billion less under the new Equalization program than under the Fixed Framework;
New Brunswick - $68 million increase in revenues for the first two years under the new Equalization program, and reduced revenues in each year thereafter compared with the Fixed Framework: in aggregate, the province receives $1.1 billion less under the new Equalization program than under the Fixed Framework;
Prince Edward Island - $7 million increase in revenues for the first two years under the new Equalization program, and reduced revenues in each year thereafter compared with the Fixed Framework: in aggregate, the province receives $196 million less under the new Equalization program than under the Fixed
Framework;
Newfoundland and Labrador - $654 million reduction in revenues for the first two years under the new Equalization program, an increase of $22 million in the third year, and reduced revenues in each year thereafter compared with the Fixed Framework: in aggregate, the province receives $1.4 billion less under the new Equalization program than under the Fixed Framework. It should be noted that Newfoundland and Labrador will no longer be a recipient of Equalization after 2008-2009, under both the Fixed Framework and the new Equalization program. [Emphasis added]
Now this was before the Nova Scotia side deal which also works for Newfoundland and Labrador as well. But notice, in particular, the figure for New Brunswick. You see, the lovely province slightly to the west doesn't get much of its own cash from non-renewable resources. The reduced pot of cash involved in the new Equalization system doesn't work quite as well for them as the old way of doing things.
That's not really the whole story though.
Flip back to Ken Boessenkool's 2001 paper for the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies wherein the whole idea of taking non-renewables out of the Equalization calculation was laid out. At that time, the 10 province standard without non-renewables may have only dropped this province's Equalization transfer by a paltry $3.0 million but new Brunswick would have lost over 10 times as much cash and that's just by changing the way the formula was worked out.
The impact of various ideas for Equalization reform was also presented by the O'Brien expert panel. Go back and take a look at that report again since it includes a very good overview of Equalization and the history of the program.
You see, that's one of the things some locals keep forgetting. The Harper Equalization promise wasn't made to just one province. It was party policy across the country, affecting potentially every province. Some provincial governments like Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador may have thought it was absolutely wonderful. Others? Not quite so enthusiastic.
That's the political situation - painfully and patently obvious at the time of two successive general elections - that makes it seem foolish for any provincial government to have banked on it or even expected it to be politically feasible. No surprise that the federal government went with the expert panel's recommendations and why most provinces have accepted it. The new system isn't perfect, but at least it works. And for provinces like Manitoba and new Brunswick it works considerably better than taking all non-renewable resources out of the formula.
Beyond banking on a completely unrealistic expectation, there's something else in all this some people in Newfoundland and Labrador like to ignore: After 2009, Newfoundland and Labrador won't qualify for Equalization any more under either the new scheme or the old one. As Locke and Hobson note, the provincial government would receive - by their calculation - about $1.4 billion less under the new approach compared to the Fixed Framework.
$1.4 billion.
Where does that figure turn up again?
The Public Accounts, Volume I, note 4 on page 37, released just this week:
The deferred revenue totalling $1,646.2 million consists primarily of $1,458.5 million relating to the Atlantic Accord (2005), which represents the unearned balance of the $2.0 billion advance payment received in 2005-06. In addition, the deferred revenue balance consists of $51.7 million relating to Federal Government funding for various health care initiatives, $44.9 million relating to Federal initiatives in support of post-secondary education, public transit and affordable housing, $16.4 million relating to gas tax initiatives, $62.3 million relating to entities in the education sector, $7.4 million relating to entities in the health sector, and $5.0 million related to other miscellaneous programs. These amounts will be recognized as revenue in the periods in which the revenue recognition criteria have been met. [Emphasis added]
Curious, huh?
It's likely a coincidence, but remember that when the provincial government signed the 2005 transfer deal - it wasn't about offshore oil revenues, by the way - the up front cash was offered and accepted because both the federal and provincial governments knew that, at least for Newfoundland and Labrador, it offered more cash than would be obtained before the province went off Equalization if the thing was just run on a year-to-year basis.
At the time the deal was signed, both public and government estimates were that Newfoundland and Labrador's provincial government fiscal capacity would put it off the top-up scheme called Equalization such that the second eight year phase was unlikely to be realized. As the premier noted at the time the transfer deal was signed, the whole thing came down to a discussion of the cash - the quantum, as he put it - and by simply adjusting the assumed average price of oil, the up front cash went from $1.4 billion from October to $2.0 billion in January 2005.
Poof, the deal was done. Never mind that the principles laid out in the January deal were actually inferior in some respects to the October offer. It was the up front cash that counted.
All of this should be a reminder that provincial governments across the country all look at the federal government as a source of cash. There's nothing new in this at all. The pretexts vary, but the demand is still the same. Danny Williams is looking for $10 billion or so based on what he calls a broken promise. Dalton McGuinty has a figure double that and earlier this month he went looking to Ottawa looking for another $350 million. Just this week, the arch-provincialist party the Bloc Quebecois put $15 billion of demands on the table as its price for supporting Stephen Harper's Conservatives. Saskatchewan is looking for cash, too.
Just to give a real sense of just how much the $10 billion - for example - is merely a pretext for the usual game of federal-provincial relations, look back at the letters Danny Williams sent to Stephen Harper through December and into January. The 'ask', to use Danny Williams sales talk, is the federal shares in Hibernia, which he appears to want for free. Harper doesn't dismiss the subject out of hand, as some local media erroneously reported. rather he clearly leaves the door open to discussion on a purchase price.
But the question that goes begging is why Danny Williams would be prepared to trade off an old demand of his demands in settlement of supposedly new and humiliating grievance of The Broken Promise. If The Broken Promise was both as new and as grievous as the rhetoric would suggest then it could only be genuinely settled with some new compensation.
Not so. And the willingness to trade off - to say yes to less - isn't really a constructive effort to settle an account. Take a look at what else would supposedly settle the grievance and you see a raft of things the provincial government has been seeking for some time or something else that's cropped up lately.
What we have here is old-fashioned federal-provincial relations but reduced to a highly dysfunctional set of confrontations. As noted here before, the entire thing, at least in Newfoundland and Labrador's case, is now structured in a way to frustrate the sort of political discussions that have worked on small and large projects in the past.
But that's not just a function of Danny Williams' style, although his partisans will be quick to leap forward and spew the Blackberry Talking Point du jour. Even in the most intense period of the "Fair Deal" crusade, federal-provincial relations still managed to function. Back room chats, informal exchanges and formal proposals flew back and forth between Ottawa and St. John's. There was a resolution to the major impasse, but there were also other issues that were addressed. Take the offshore board thing as a case in point. The federal and provincial governments engaged in all sorts of discussion out of public view in an effort to resolve the issue. Read the decision in Ruelokke v Newfoundland and Labrador; the evidence is there.
Like the old saying, it takes two to tango and in the current dysfunction in federal-provincial relations it takes two to tangle. The resolution to the problem may well come in the next federal election but it won't because of any ABC campaign by any one politician. You see, just looking at Newfoundland and Labrador, one can see that historically the province tends to vote anything but Conservative, whether we mean the current version of the party or the old Progressive Conservative crowd. There are some compelling reasons in front of the voting public that are likely to reinforce that tendency next time not just locally but across the country.
The old game of "Gimme me your lunch money" won't vanish. That's too entrenched in the federal-provincial system. But there is a possibility that the next federal government will take a different view of how the system should operate, one that restores the sort of political accommodation and compromise that has made Canadian federalism as successful as it has been.
And locally, when the provincial government gets a sense that things are different, well, maybe it will start focusing on those "other things to talk about" everyone has raised lately in the cell phone story. They'll start talking about fiscal responsibility and about the policies needed to sustain the province's new-found status as a major economic engine for the country.
Bullying for lunch money - looking for handouts to pay the bills - is the domain of the insecure and weak. It's time we moved on to something else. Heaven knows the province as a whole is long since past that sort of stuff even if some politicians and their supporters still have an entire forest of chips on their shoulders.
-srbp-
[h/t to Dulse and Fog for the APEC link]
