White Rose field may get GBS

According to the Telegram, the White Rose partners are looking at using a concrete gravity base structure or GBS.

The concrete well-head unit would support a drilling rig.  Oil from the wellhead would be pumped to the existing SeaRose floating production, storage and offloading vessel and from there to tankers to take it to market.

“We’re looking at a whole range of different concepts,” said Paul McCloskey, Husky’s East Coast vice-president

“One of the opportunities that we are considering is the installation of a very skinny GBS.

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North Amethyst pumps first oil

A few things to note about the news that the White Rose extension field – called North Amethyst – pumped its first oil this week;

1. It took only four years to go from discovery to production. reducing the time from discovery to production is huge for the future of the offshore industry.
2. Tiebacks.  Expect to see more of them as Terra Nova dries out, for example.  Floating platforms are the most cost-effective way to exploit the numerous small fields that have already been discovered offshore. The gang at Terra Nova and eventually at White Rose can just float their hulls around, hook up to underwater pipes and pump the crude cheaply, efficiently and in a way that should be as environmentally sound as oil production can be.
3. An established royalty regime is a key part of promoting development.  That’s what worked for this deal and helped speed up development. Thankfully, while the 2007 energy plan called for a complete overall of the royalty regime, the generic regime is still in place.  Given the rate the current crowd do things, we wouldn’t see a royalty regime to replace the current one for decades.  As it is, the existing, pre-2003 royalty regimes – not the Old Man’s tweaks – are producing the lion’s share of offshore cash these days.

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Husky updates White Rose oil information information

Husky Energy announced on Monday an update to its drilling program related to the White Rose production project.

According to Husky North Amethyst E-17 (inside the area of production license 1007) drilled in 2008 has shown an estimated 60 million barrels of petroleum in place.  A further assessment of results from exploration well E-09 (within the area of production license 1006) the discovery “contains an estimate of discovered PIIP  [petroleum initially in place0 of 100 to 250 million barrels (best estimate of 170 million barrels) of light crude oil.”

That isn’t what the cbc.ca/nl online story says, by the way.

In any event, you can see both wells marked on this close-up of a map produced by the offshore regulatory board.

 

Now it is interesting to note that the legend for this map shows something rather odd when you match it up with the news release.

According to the legend – and if your humble e-scribbler is interpreting this correctly - North Amethyst E-17 is marked as an abandoned well using a symbol that appears to represent a dry hole. 

E-09 is marked as an abandoned well with oil and gas showing.

Plus, these two wells appear to be part of different structures:  North Amethyst and Hibernia Formation.

That’s something for your humble e-scribbler to follow up on with the offshore board for clarification. 

If you look at the release again, though, it doesn’t actually appear to add any new information to what has been announced previously. 

In early 2008, North Amethyst was said to hold about 70 million barrels of proven, probably and possible reserves.  That was based on delineation from 2006.

Now that isn’t the specific result from well E-17;  that was the result for the entire North Amethyst structure that is part of the satellite development. E-17 is actually quite far north of the glory hole for North Amethyst. 

This announcement on November 23 appears to deal with the structure E-09 explored  - if you read the release a certain way - back in the 1980s.  This announcement on Monday just reassesses old data.

So does the announcement on 23 November show  more oil or is it the same oil as before just described differently?  Good question.

It might be instructive to look at the fine print at the bottom of the release:

Discovered petroleum initially-in-place is that quantity of petroleum that is estimated, as of a given date, to be contained in known accumulations prior to production. The recoverable portion of discovered petroleum initially-in-place includes production, reserves and contingent resources; the remainder is unrecoverable. A recovery project cannot be defined for these volumes of discovered petroleum initially-in-place at this time. There is no certainty that it will be commercially viable to produce any portion of the resources.

Now this doesn’t mean the White Rose project and the extensions are not occurring.  Rather, there might just be some confusion in media reports about what this announcement means.

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Danny Williams and the Philosopher’s Stone: Control and Resources

“Securing equity means having greater leverage to control our own destiny.”

“The principle of making our own way and taking control of our resources is the right one.”

Two quotes from the Speech from the Throne,

House of Assembly, March 2008

_______________________________________________________________

Control is a key principle in Danny William’s political philosophy.

Control of the province’s natural resources is a core point in most of his administration’s public statements on oil, natural gas and electricity.

The word occurs twice in his recent letter to Shawn Graham about the proposal to sell NB Power to Hydro Quebec. There’s the reference to “New Brunswickers who no longer control their energy destiny.” Then there’s the contrast: “ But we took control of our own destiny and Nalcor Energy is now a crown jewel in our province’s energy assets.”

Williams also raised the concern about control of transmission routes supposedly resting in the hands of Hydro Quebec and of the control of rates resulting from the sale of NB Power.

Energy and control go together, as Williams made clear when he announced in 2006 that the provincial government would “go-it-alone” on the Lower Churchill. he made the following comments in the House of Assembly on May 8, 2006:

“...but the big message here is that we are masters of our own destiny, that Newfoundlanders and Labradorians are in control of this project for the benefit of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians."

- "By taking the lead we are in full control of the project, unlike the circumstance with the last government; that project, basically, was going to be controlled by Quebec. It would have been marketed, it would have been financed, the transmission would have been done by Quebec. The control of the project, the project management, would have been done by Quebec. As well, if there had been an overrun on the project, the last Lower Churchill project that was proposed by the Grimes government, in fact, we could have lost the project; because, if there had been an overrun, we would not have been in a position to be able to finance it….”

But control is not just a principle behind energy initiatives. Being “masters of our own destiny” is the same idea in other words and it crops up repeatedly in Danny Williams’ speeches and comments as an idea central to government policy.

Control is a principle of the administration’s policy. It is a guiding rule, an essential quality, or the basis for action.

Control in the Energy Plan

The relationship between resource control and equity is established clearly in the Conservative party’s 2003 election platform.

The section on resource development puts it this way:

The power to control development of offshore oil and gas is of little value unless the Province has the know-how to deal with technical issues and field assessments equivalent to the expertise of the major oil companies, and sufficient ownership in production licences to influence development decisions.

• A Progressive Conservative government will either restructure Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro as an energy company, or create a new Energy corporation, with a mandate to retain equity in the Province's oil and gas resources. This will be done on a go-forward basis.

The relationship is mapped out more plainly in the 2007 energy plan released in time for the 2007 election campaign. So important is control that it is the second principle guiding the plan, after sustainability:

Our Principles

1. Sustainability

…

2. Control

We will exercise appropriate control over the development of our resources to ensure they are managed and used in the best interest of the people of Newfoundland and Labrador. We will assume an ownership interest in the development of our energy resources where it fits our strategic long-term objectives.

The idea is repeated again in what, by now, is a familiar formulation in a discussion of energy resource management (p.13):

We will take more control than in the past over the development of these resources and the benefits they generate.

Having identified the importance of control and the connection to management, management, the plan then re-affirms that equity stakes in energy projects are the first lever used “to ensure sound and effective management and to maximize benefits over the long term.” (p.18)

Control and equity stakes are thus intimately connected in the Conservative philosophy.

The 2003 campaign platform identified the key role to be played by a new energy corporation in holding the equity stakes and thereby serving as the means by which the provincial government would exercise the sought-after control of energy resources.

As well, the energy corporation has other key control responsibilities set out in the energy plan:

- “If the Provincial Government [sic] lifts the moratorium [on small hydro projects], it will institute a policy that the Energy Corporation will control and coordinate the development of small hydro projects that meet economic thresholds and are viable for an isolated island system.”

- “One of our goals is to maximize our benefits from resource developments. We believe this means the Energy Corporation should control the development of all small hydro developments for the benefit of all electricity users and determine whether to do this alone or with private sector partners.”

- “To maximize these benefits [from wind power], the Provincial Government believes the Energy Corporation should control the development of all wind projects and determine when to develop alone or with private sector partners.”

- “Due to the strategic importance of generation and transmission to the future of Newfoundland and Labrador, the province, through NLH [Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro], will retain ownership and control of its existing transmission and generation assets”

To anyone familiar with the Williams administration, none of this will be new. in fact, it will be so familiar that one might wonder the point of such an extensive recitation of the relationship between the principle of control and the idea of equity stakes in Danny Williams’ philosophy.

That will become clear in the second instalment of this series.

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Offshore royalty audits “Behind, big time”: Dunderdale

In July 2006 when Danny Williams accused ExxonMobil of denying the provincial government access to the books for the Hibernia project there was a lot more to the story either than what he said or than just his fit of pique at the failure of talks to develop Hebron.

Williams put it in another context altogether at the time, claiming the company had reneged on a commitment to “audit process to validate statements by the company that the Hibernia project was not meeting the owners’ expectations.”

As it turns out, the reality – revealed almost three years later by the province’s auditor general in his annual report for 2007 (year ending 31 March 2008) -  is that the provincial government was and is behind in its own audits of offshore oils project reports:

… At October 2008 [sic], there were 87 annual royalty and eligible project cost submissions made by project
owners for which the Department has not started any audit work. No royalty or eligible project cost audits have been conducted on the Terra Nova or White Rose projects since production started in 2002 and 2005 respectively.

On top of that the department’s audit manual was approved in 2000 but hasn’t been updated in the intervening seven years.

The auditor general also revealed that the department had quietly dropped its 2006 demand for access to the Hibernia books claiming they could adequately assess the issues without the company’s documents.

Each of the 15 companies operating offshore are required to file monthly and yearly operating reports with the provincial government.  They must also file an audited financial report annually on project costs.  All these are used to calculate royalties paid to the provincial government’s royalties and benefits division of the natural resources department.

The majority of the outstanding audits, shown in the chart at left taken from the auditor general’s report,  are for the period after 2003.

In early 2006  - the year Williams made his accusations against ExxonMobil and the year before the one audited by Noseworthy – then natural resources minister Ed Byrne told a House of Assembly committee that his department was experiencing staff problems in the division of his department responsible for the royalty and cost audits. 

MR. E. BYRNE: Difficult not only to attract, difficult to maintain. A lot of this, too, is part and parcel of the energy policy review that is ongoing and the dedicated resources we put to that. Within the Department of Natural Resources, the energy division is most challenged, more than any other division within the department, on not only recruiting but maintaining.

We had senior petroleum auditors who left for double the salary. We recently had an ADM who took a job in Calgary. I do not know what his salary was or what he was offered. He was making a competitive salary here, but it was a significant offer. Those are issues that the deputy and government struggle with everyday. Anyway, that is part and parcel of the change in direction there.

Within the local oil patch the migration of senior, experienced public servants to the private sector caused a great deal of chatter.

The problem hasn’t gone away.  Last May, natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale told the House of Assembly’s Resources Committee that there had been a number of vacancies in the audit division and that the department was hiring outside contractors to take up the slack. She said the audits were “Behind, big time.”

The department’s deputy minister  - Chris Kieley - told the committee:

For those three projects [Hibernia, Terra Nova and White Rose], and with the increased activity, every year we are doing audits but, because of the turnover in staff, because of the resources that were assigned to that particular piece in previous years, the audits were behind; so, this past year and the year before we have made a particular effort to get those audits up to date and we have used outside assistance through auditing firms to help us do some of those audits. So, we have a combination now of outside accounting firms helping us get the audits up to date and we have our own staff working on the audits as well. We are working on a number of different audits now with all our projects at this point.

Kieley also insisted in May that

“[w]e are within the timelines prescribed by legislation (inaudible) the Hibernia royalty contract, but we are behind and we are putting extra effort into this whole piece to get caught up. When I say behind, we have not lost any ability to audit these. What we are saying is that we would like to get them up to a closer time frame.”

Auditor General John Noseworthy noted in his report that the Hibernia audits completed had revealed $8.66 million owed to the provincial government.  In her testimony to the resource committee, natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale insisted, however,  that “there has been nothing earth-shattering that we have come across to this point.”  The completed audits done in May 2008 are almost identical to the ones listed as finished by the auditor general in his report.

Noseworthy also noted that the department had committed to completing all outstanding audits by 2010. At the same time, though noted that even the 2008 schedule was off, largely due to staffing problems within the natural resources department.

In 2008, the work plan was amended to move 2400 hours of work scheduled for White Rose to 2009 as a result of audit work done for Hebron.  As of October 2008 – half way through the fiscal year - an external contract for an auditor had not be let for 2008.

The 2008 audit plan was based on 1400 hours for four staff positions supposed to be filled by the start of the fiscal year.  By October 2008, one position was still vacant.  Another was filled in July and only two of the original four planned were in place in April 2008. Associate deputy minister Pierre Tobin gave the resource committee a different version at the committee hearings in May.  Rather than disclose that two audit positions were vacant, he left the committee with the impression the division was “almost fully staffed”:

That would be, in the past year, a number of auditors, but those positions have since been filled for the most part. There would also have been a couple of development officers and a couple of economists. We are almost fully staffed, particularly in the royalty audit section. We are down one person out of upwards to a dozen, I guess; we are doing really well there. [Emphasis added]

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The Gospel according to Chip Diller

Newfoundland and Labrador is usually one of the last places to catch a trend.  Doesn't matter if you are talking fashion or, in the latest version, government economic and fiscal policy, it seems to take a while for things to catch on here.

Late on Friday afternoon newly minted finance minister Jerome Kennedy issued a news release trumpeting a credit rating by Standard and Poor's as proof of the provincial government's "fiscal prudence and sound policies". 

Well, maybe catch up is the better word.

There isn't a government left in the developed world that is still pushing the sound fundamentals media line now almost two months after the start of the current global economic crisis.  No government is claiming some sort of credit for being able to weather a storm that, in many minds, is far from over.

Well, no government except the one here.

If you want to understand why everyone else's tune has changed, take a look at the five year trending in crude oil prices. You can find an example in the WTI futures box on the right hand column.  Click on the "5Y" symbol. 

Four years to get up to US$147 a barrel and a mere four months to tumble below US$50.  The steepest declines have come in just the past two months.

The speed of the price collapse should be a clue to analysts that the assumptions used before July to predict that oil would remain at unprecedentedly high prices for the rest of time were faulty.  The security premium, supply concerns and overheated speculation drove prices to the peak last summer but in addition to all that the superheating of the global economy, fueled by loose American regulations pushed things beyond anything that would be considered normal and rational.

In other words, the price of oil has been artificially high for a very long time. Given that markets have a way of correcting themselves at some point, it was really only a matter of time before a correction - a downturn - took the heat out of things.  The only thing that couldn't be foreseen, and that's about the only thing, was how steep a correction was coming and how it might last, but come it would as surely as it has come at every juncture in the past.

Fewer and fewer analysts are holding to the old projections, some of them dating back several months. Some of the more influential sources, such as the International Energy Agency, are forecasting high prices.  However, many are revising their short term projections markedly downward.  Deutsche Bank, among others, is projecting crude at US$40 per barrel by April 2009.  One analyst  - Robin Batchelor - who in May 2008 predicted high oil prices well into the future is now likening the current climate to one 30 years ago:

"On the upside it always overshoots and the same is true on the downside. What I’m looking at is the commodity supply and demand equation; long term there are still supply issues but on the demand side we’re facing downdraft," he points out. "The last time we had a fall of that magnitude was in 1979/80/81."

While Batchelor for one has not abandoned his high price forecasts, he has certainly altered his view dramatically. The reason is simple.  While he and others once assumed ever increasing demand, the current correction may alter the demand side of the price equation that can't be seen right at the moment. If the current downturn lasts well into 2009, as most expect, the IEA, among others, will likely go back and rethink their projections just as they revised their assumptions three years ago when they thought US$50 a barrel was the peak.

Closer to home, though, the hope in the old assumptions remain strong close to home. This week, economist Wade Locke told Memorial University's student newspaper The Muse that:

“The longterm [sic] price forecast is still in the $80- to $90-range for oil and that will not affect Hebron, White Rose Extension, or Hibernia South. Even if [oil] prices were to stay around $60, these projects would likely proceed,” he said.

Locke's comments are a useful segue to an interesting aspect of the local view from the provincial government and its supporters.  Locke certainly falls into that category and the similarity between his comments and those of the finance minister are striking.  With that quote from The Muse in mind, take a look at this one from the release on the credit rating:

"Our economy remains strong and the current economic downturn should not affect development of new oilfields including White Rose Expansion, Hibernia South and Hebron," said Minister Kennedy.

The phrasing is similar, much like the similarity in early October between Locke's and the Premier's references within days of each other to the government being able to meet and exceed its current budget targets even if oil falls to $10 a barrel.

But what's more interesting in these two comments is that neither is completely true and in the wider context of Locke's comments on a bright future based on oil wealth, they constitute a fixation on oil as the source of economic salvation not seen in this province since "1979/80/81."

Let's deal with the projects first.

The White Rose expansion is a relatively modest project.  With its development costs already recovered, oil would almost have to hit prices lower than the historic 1992 price of  US$8  per barrel to make it economically dodgy.

The Hibernia South extension is also not a pricey project measured in terms of the original Hibernia project or Hebron.  However, there is no development application yet and a decision to proceed would certainly be affected by oil prices significantly lower than the current ones.

In all likelihood, the project will go ahead given that the oil companies have at their doorstep a provincial government willing to invest hundreds of millions of very scarce tax dollars in the expansion since that ultimately lowers their cost.  Given they will have recovered their initial costs by the time the new fields come online, their profit position would improve immensely in such a scenario while it would be the junior partner who would see a relatively lower return on investment. Low oil prices - especially below the foolish fixed price trigger of the current government's oil super-royalty regime  - won't affect them as much as it would the new kid in the oil patch.

Hebron is the most costly of three projects and the one most likely to be affected by a long period of low prices. Analysts seem to agree that the current price climate makes investment in high cost ventures like offshore heavy oil, deep water projects and oils sands less attractive.  Hebron's reported financial tipping point  - US$35 per barrel - is well below that of an oil sands project but stop and look at current prices.

There's a reason why the companies insisted on a clause in the Hebron agreement which gave the partners  - and the partners alone - the right to take up to a decade to sanction the project.  Current Hebron timelines are merely works in progress, subject to revision is the financial climate changes.

The upside for Hebron is that the companies managed to secure several significant concessions from the provincial government as hedges against a drop in oil prices. Those concessions make it more likely the project will proceed.

First, they secured the decade to sanction with no penalty for deciding against proceeding. They have time to decide and there is no real cost for delaying if the numbers don't add up.

Second, they won the royalty concession that dropped the pre-payout royalty to a fixed 1% as opposed to the escalating scale of the old royalty regime.  The energy minister herself heralded this as a major feature of the new deal.

Third, they were able to tie the super-royalty to a fixed price below which no extra cash was paid to the provincial treasury.  By the government's own estimate, oil prices averaging US$50 a barrel over the life of the project produced less than half the royalties of a high oil price.  Drop below that magic fixed trigger and the provincial share drops accordingly on top of the front-end royalty concession but from the company standpoint they can guarantee low possible costs across the board.

Fourthly, they secured significant fabrication concessions in the agreement.  Most of the topsides work will be done outside the province anyway based on what appears to be a huge miscalculation by the provincial government's negotiating team. 

On top of that, however, the management arrangement  - including the provincial government as junior partner  - would enable the companies to ship virtually all the topsides work and associated engineering outside the province in order to lower the costs and complete the project on time. If oil prices stayed low enough long enough and construction costs stayed high enough, it may well be worth the companies' while to pay the modest penalties for changes in the work commitments to get the deal done, even if they had to pay the penalties at all.  A renegotiated contract arrangement with the provincial government's energy company and the government that changed the work commitments would likely never be made public under the revisions to the energy corporation act passed last spring.

The companies may well get their projects, but the return to the provincial treasury and the overall impact on the local economy may turn out to be far smaller than originally promised.

The fundamental problem in all this is the fixation on oil projects which has led the provincial government and its supporters to tie government finances to the price of a barrel of oil.  Despite all assurances to the contrary, the next several years may be see provincial government fiscal problems as unprecedented as the surpluses of the past two or three years. Unlike those surpluses, however, the problems won't be figments of an accountant's bookkeeping methods.

Beyond that, prosperity for the province as a whole, in Locke's view, appears to be driven entirely by a couple of oil projects which, it must be noted, have a fixed life span.  Neither Locke nor Kennedy - who echoed Locke's definition of prosperity - have not realized the folly of resting everything on the a very slippery commodity.  

Oddly enough, it fell to Donna Stone, president of the St. John's Board of Trade to sound a very small warning bell against this very situation.  Board of trade presidents are not known to buck the government line so her words stand out.  As Stone told the Rotary Club of St. John's:

“This still gives us some cause for concern, however. Given the volatility of oil prices, the province should look at a long-term plan that will diversify our economy and make us less dependent on this ever-changing commodity,” Stone said.

Stone is absolutely right.  Almost 20 years ago, the provincial government realized exactly that and implemented a broadly-based strategic economic plan to hedge against such dependence.  That plan has been tossed aside in the  past four years.

The consequences may prove to be dire and no amount of assurance that all is well will save us from the them.

Just remember what happened to Chip Diller.

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White Rose observations

The provincial government and the White Rose partners revealed some further detail of the White Rose expansion project on Monday.

Some observations/questions:

1. The bulk of the financial return to the provincial treasury is from the old generic royalty regime established in 1996.

2. There is no real discussion of the "equity ownership" and what it means.

With the exception of a few general references, there is no discussion at all of what is entailed in the "equity". There is no discussion of acquisition costs or other liabilities associated with it, nor is there any discussion of what - if any - management rights accrue to the energy corporation our of this stake.

There is a reference to a processing fee on "its", i.e. the energy corporation's, oil but no indication of what that means in general terms.

3. What is the "processing fee" for?

Under the agreement, the province’s energy corporation will pay a ‘processing fee’ of $3.50 a barrel on its oil.

This is essentially a fee to ensure processing capacity on the Sea Rose FPSO.

The floating production, storage and offloading vessel for the project has the capacity to handle production from the field at the approved rates. It can store and process at established rates. There is no obvious reason for the provincial government to pay a set fee per barrel to ensure capacity exists.

If this fee is one applied to all operators, then this is an operating cost, not a cost related to acquisition of an equity interest, it has been presented.

If it is an operating cost, it certainly isn't clear if the fee represents the total energy corporation share of operations or if it is a specific amount related to a certain aspect of operations. A "processing fee" of this type is sometimes applied on leased FPSOs where the vessel owner is actually reimbursed a lease rate and an additional amount for processing from the company renting the platform.

The fee may be related to a process of "deeming" what part of production belongs to the provincial government, even though the production is co-mingled with the total production. That appears to be the case, given the implication of the next sentence in the backgrounder: "To get the crude to market, there are a number of marketing arrangements already in place with existing facilities, and the province’s energy corporation will be able to tap into those."

Essentially, the energy corporation would receive the value of a quantity of oil less operating, capital and any other costs rather than receive a specific quantity of oil that it could then take to a refinery and market directly. The quantity of oil would be "deemed" or established based on a set of accounting rules.

There's nothing unusual or necessarily problematic about such an arrangement; it would just mean that the energy corporation could not necessarily load up a series of tankers and move the crude to a refinery of its choice.

So what is the fee really all about and what other fees and charges are being applied to the energy corporation?

3. There is no indication publicly of what the energy corporation will pay as part of ongoing operations expenditure or what share it will bear, if any, of phase-out or emergency response costs.

4. Will energy corp pay its portion of the provincial oil royalty on its assets? How will that be handled?

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Brave talk, but still meaningless blather

Natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale signed off on another extension to the White Rose oil field on Friday. Husky energy, the main partner in the project can now develop 24 million barrels of recoverable oil at a cost of $595 million.

Good news, considering there was much speculation that the provincial government would try and squeeze cash out of the lucrative development. White Rose's light, sweet crude is easier and cheaper to develop than Hebron.

Turns out the province is just going to settle on talking about possibly, theoretically maybe getting some extra cash or local benefits.

Don't bet on it.

If the financial discussions are not a specific condition of the development application amendment approval, there's pretty much Sweet Fanny Adams that Dunderdale can do. She says some brave bluster words, but consider Dunderdale to be full of so much hot air.

As Dunderdale told the Telegram:

"The proponents have chosen to proceed with this development, even though the fiscal and other terms haven’t been finalized.

"What we will have to ensure, as we continue our discussions around these satellite field developments, is that the province receives a fair return."

Right off the bat, "fair return" is the sort of meaningless phrase that Danny Williams and his minister's like to throw around. They never say what it means, which means that it can be anything they want it to.

Dunderdale and her boss add nary a nickle to the existing development over and above the lucrative generic royalty regime established in 1996? That's a "fair return".

The company agrees to do "whatever work is possible" here in the province, but with no obligation to do any fixed percentage or amount?

That's a "fair return" as well.

Vague words.

No possible way of defining it and measuring it.

Therefore, success or failure are impossible to determine.

It's the opposite of accountable.

In fact vague language like "fair return" is deliberately designed to promote unaccountability.

Second of all, no oil company in its right mind would develop a field - even an extension of one in development - unless it knew the costs of development were settled or could be predicted reasonably well. The idea Husky is going to figure out later what to pay the provincial government is simply ludicrous.

But it's an election season so the provincial government has to give it's goosed version of the facts. To reinforce what will quickly become the Hebron myth, Dunderdale is obliged to say the province is looking for all the things it won at Hebron.

Only difference is, at Hebron they held up approval to negotiate first.

On White Rose, Dunderdale and her boss don't have quite the same leverage.

They signed it away, up front.

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From the Throne Speech

A curious claim given that on Hebron there are no talks and the province has yet to sign off on White Rose expansion. Hibernia South is still mired in "talks":

In Newfoundland and Labrador’s offshore oil and gas sector, massive energy opportunities are matched by My Government’s confidence that further activity will soon be occurring at Hibernia South, White Rose and Hebron-Ben Nevis as exploration proceeds in other basins. My Government also launched industry consultations to develop an offshore natural gas royalty regime that will provide clarity to industry. This should facilitate the development of our immense natural gas resource potential in a manner that provides a fair return to industry and the people of this province.

Maybe White Rose will get the nod, giving credence to John Lau's claims of having a great relationship with Danny Williams.

As for Hebron, maybe the truthiness of the statement depends on what ones' definition of "soon" is.

White Rose production increase approved

The provincial government has approved a production increase for the White Rose oil field, taking annual maximum production from 36.5 million barrels up to 50 million barrels.

The production increase will likely mean the project will achieve payout sooner. As a result provincial royalties will increase to 30% per barrel once payout is achieved.

According to the Globe and Mail, this production increase request was submitted at the same time as a proposal to bring additional oil on stream. That proposal hasn't been approved yet.

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