Hibernia benefits overestimated: economics prof

“The oil industry success we enjoy today is not what many expected… many people could not believe in the vision of Newfoundland and Labrador as a successful oil producing province.”

Whoever wrote those words for Kathy Dunderdale to read at the re-announcement of the Hibernia South project could hardly know the truth of them.

Nor could the writer likely understand how close to home some of those negative nellies were.

As managing editor of the Telegram in 1992, Bill Callahan believed the project was best scrapped since it represented “large-scale exploitation of non-renewable petroleum resources without adequate or perhaps any return.”

Then there was Peter Fenwick. The former New Democratic Party leader lambasted Hibernia in 1992 as a “give away”:

The money we taxpayers are throwing away on Hibernia is equal to a hundred Sprung greenhouses.  In future, Brian Peckford, Clyde Wells and Rex Gibbons will be vilified by generations of Newfoundlanders for the enormous waste of taxpayers’ money.  Unfortunately we, and the rest of Canada will be stuck with paying for it with our tax dollars.

None, though, could match the pessimism, negativity and sheer crap about Hibernia coming from none other than Wade Locke. 

Yes, that’s right:  Wade Locke,  the same Memorial University economist who is the darling of the current provincial government administration and who was, it should be said, looked on rather favourably by their Tory forefathers in their day too.

As Locke told The Telegram’s Pat Doyle in September 1990, only a few days before Wells, Gibbons, John Crosbie and others signed the final agreements in St. John’s that started the Hibernia project rolling:

"While it may be true that the sun will shine one day, it does not appear that 'have-not' will be no more because of Hiber­nia."

Those words by Wade Locke, an assistant professor of economics at Memorial University, appear to sum up the realistic view now held by experienced observers on the potential benefits of the large offshore project.

But that wasn’t all. 

Locke was extremely pessimistic about the revenue likely to come from the project:

"That is, each dollar of offshore oil revenue going to the provincial trea­sury will result in an increase in the province's ability to spend by two to three cents," Mr. Locke said.

Provincial government estimates suggest the equalization payments would fall by somewhere in the range of 90 to 95 cents.

Mr. Locke said using his calcula­tions, if the project were to generate 13.8 billion In direct revenue for the treasury, for example, after adjust­ing for equalization losses and equali­zation offset grants, the province's net fiscal position would have changed between 176 million and $114 million over the life of the project or an average of $3 million to $4 million in net revenue a year over the 26-year project.

To put that in perspective, Mr. Locke noted the province expects to spend $3.3 billion In the current fiscal year.

“This means that the average net revenue from Hibernia is equivalent to about one tenth of one per cent of the 1990 projected government expen­diture,” said [Locke in] the paper [printed in the Newfoundland Quarterly.]

"Thus, one should not expect that the provincial government will, as a result of Hibernia, have an enhanced ability to improve our road system, education services, health services or any other government services that are of primary concern to the aver­age Newfoundlander."

Yes, when you read stuff like that you just have to chuckle at all the Kreskins who took turns peeing all over the Hibernia project. Heck even Dunderdale and her boss used to refer to it as a massive give-away.  Used to, that is, until they used the deal as the basis for their own negotiations over the extension project.  The old Hibernia deal actually delivers the largest bulk of the cash they claim will come from the extension.  Honesty would prevent Dunderdale and her crowd from doing anything but acknowledging the old deal for its value.

Meanwhile Locke now gets invited to speak in glowing terms about the great offshore oil industry at an event marking the 25th anniversary of the deal on which it is all based:  the 1985 Atlantic Accord.

And that original Hibernia deal they all loved to hate? 

Well, based on the same numbers used by the provincial government and quoted by CBC in the supper-hour news tonight, that 1990 deal will produce more money for the people of Newfoundland and Labrador than Hebron, the White Rose extension and Hibernia South combined.

And it exists today, unlike the Lower Churchill dams or mythical aluminum smelters drawing power from them.

The billions coming from Hibernia will continue for more than another decade to pay for road improvements, education services, health services and any other government services that are of primary concerns to ordinary Newfoundlanders and Labradorians. 

The money from Hibernia has helped wean Newfoundland and Labrador from its financial dependence on hand-outs from Ottawa. The dignity and self-respect that comes from that accomplishment alone was worth the gamble. The only people who seem to lament that fundamental change in the province and its people are those who never did  - deep in their hearts - look forward to the day when the hand-outs stopped. How laughable that some of those people get credit for a change they fought against.

The creation of a new industry and the transformation of a people.

That’s not too bad for a project whose benefits an expert told us were overestimated.

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Hibernia South: the buried news

So the final legal agreements are signed.  Nothing has changed since the announcement of almost exactly the same details in June 2009.

So why the second announcement?

Poll-goosing, of course.

The only twist is that the provincial government is claiming they’ll make more money  - $3.0 billion - now than before.  There’s more money, though, simply because they changed the assumed price of a barrel of oil. 

Now anyone with a brain could tell you that isn’t news, nor is it any more reliable and factual than claiming the amount of money would be double the projection from last year.

CBC is reporting the $3.0 billion as if it was true/real.  VOCM attributed the cash – making their statement doubly false - to the equity stake.

As noted here last year, the bulk of the revenue – no matter what assumed price of oil you use – comes from one place and one place alone:  the 1990 Hibernia deal. You can see that pretty clearly when you look at the supporting documents.

Meanwhile, the two bits of real news in this have been lost.  Settling the transportation dispute will bring the provincial treasury about $120 million in one-time oil cash this year.  That will help with revenues that are still running below forecast.  Oil production in December was 2.0 billion barrels below production in the same time last year.

And in the other bit of real news: no oil from the extension until the third or fourth quarter of 2012.  The offshore board got the development application on 01 February.

Now if that wasn’t enough poll goosing, there’s also the announcement from the provincial government’s oil and gas company that drilling is starting on yet another parcel NALCOR bought on the Great Northern Peninsula.  Real oil companies tend not to make such a huge deal out of every exploration hole they spud.  Political ones do, though, especially when they have to help goose a poll for The Boss.

And on a related bit of poll goosing, former Peckford-era policy advisor Cabot Martin is all smiles as his company continues exploring for oil, too.

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Hibernia South newser

The consortium behind the Hibernia South project is expected to hold a news conference at the Delta Hotel in St. John’s at 11:30 AM, Tuesday, February 16. Sources indicate natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale will take part in the news conference.

No word on the details of the announcement but officials of the provincial government’s oil company are reportedly briefing opposition politicians at 8:45 AM.

The announcement may be about the start of construction.

In completely unrelated news, government pollster Corporate Research Associates is currently in the field.

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CHHC pays off for provincial government

Even without owning it, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador will likely earn more from the federal government’s 8.5% share in Hibernia than it will from its own 10% stake in Hibernia South.

That’s because the Canada Hibernia Holding Corporation (CHHC) pays royalties to the provincial government like any offshore interest holder and with Hibernia in payout, the royalty jumps this year from 5% to the current 30%.

CHHC’s stake covers an 8.5% interest in the remaining oil in Hibernia, including Hibernia South.  The total remaining oil could be as much as  1.2 billion barrels which would work out to the equivalent of about 100 million barrels for CHHC.

NALCOR Energy – the provincial government’s energy corporation  - owns a 10% interest in Hibernia South.  That works out to about 17 million barrels in the approximately 170 million barrels of the extension project in which NALCOR holds an interest.

Assuming an average price $50 per barrel, the NALCOR interest in Hibernia South would generate $850 million in gross revenue over the life of that project, less royalties that might be paid to the provincial government, as well as development and operating costs. The royalty on $850 million would be $255 million, assuming only 30% royalty.

But, using the same price,  the royalty paid by CHHC to the provincial government on the federal stake remaining in Hibernia – including Hibernia South  - would work out to roughly $1.53 billion.  That royalty comes with no deductions.

That’s not a bad return considering the provincial government took virtually no financial risk in Hibernia by acquiring an operating interest.

Between 2000  - the first year royalty payments were made - and 2008, CHHC paid the provincial government a total of $104.8 million according to figures released to Bond Papers by the federal finance department.

Table:  CHHC Hibernia Royalty

Year	Royalty Amount
2008	22,536,000
2007	15,576,000
2006	17,902,000
2005	20,582,000
2004	11,308,000
2003	6,254,000
2002	4,436,000
2001	2,205,000
2000	4,040,000
Total	$104,839,000

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Hibernia clarification clarification

The provincial natural resources department issued a “clarification” today on some figures contained in its news release last week.

Seems they gave incorrect figures for production from the existing Hibernia field.

The original release quoted the Premier himself as saying that:

“The original Hibernia field has produced 670 million barrels to date and the provincial treasury has seen $3.9 billion from that production.”

The exact same phrase turned up in the Premier’s speaking notes for NOIA, by the way.

The “clarified” version is:

The correct figures are approximately 630 million barrels with revenue valued at $1.9 billion.

Both figures are supposed to represent cumulative oil production from first oil in 1997 up to the end of March 2009. The mistake is described as a “transcription error”.

According to the “clarification” – not a correction – this is the only error and “does not affect any other numbers in the news release or any other publications.”

Here’s the real number: up to the end of April, 2009, the Hibernia/Avalon field had produced 636,957, 170 barrels of oil. Hibernia produced a little over 605 million barrels p to the end of April 2009.

That figure was readily available - at the time the release was issued last week - from the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.

Hmmmm.

Makes you wonder though if some of the other numbers might be off just a wee bit.

Like say this one from the same quoted attributed to the Premier:

“We expect a further $13 billion from the remaining main field production…”.

That was based on an assumed price of oil of US$80 a barrel, as the Premier indicated in subsequent interviews.

Okay.

The offshore board gives three estimates of the reserves at Hibernia: proven; prove and probable; and proven, probable and possible. Let’s call them P1, P2 and P3 for simplicity sake. We’ll also knock off the Hibernia South Extension oil since that is apparently included in the totals for Hibernia.

Here’s the way it works out. The figures are in millions of barrels:

	P1	P2	P3
	782	1244	1916
Less production to end Apr 09	636	636	636
Sub-total	46	608	1280
Less Hibernia South Extension*	46	220	220
Total remaining	0	388	1060
Low royalty (30%)		$ 9.312 billion	$25.44 billion
High royalty (42.5%)*	$1.56 billion	$13.192 billion	$36.04 billion

* Note - Approximately 50 million barrels of the extension come from the original Hibernia production license. That corresponds roughly to what remains in Hibernia based on CNLOPB figures and allowing that the provincial figures are a month older than the CNLOPB ones. Since the government news release indicated the 50 million was being produced at the 42.5% royalty, it’s pretty clearly working under the original Hibernia Tier 2 royalty regime.

Here’s where things get a wee bit interesting.

Once you do a little simple math, it’s pretty clear the provincial government news release deliberately chose the least volume of remaining oil when calculating the potential return from Hibernia now that pay-out is achieved. They put that together with the Tier 1 and Tier 2 super-royalty from the original Hibernia agreement (1990/2000) since that is what oil at US$80 a barrel would deliver.

That’s not bad for a project that wasn’t supposed to pay-out - ever - and that Danny Williams and others have trashed as one of the great give-aways of the past.

Even without going a step farther, those figures pretty much demolish the idea that Hibernia was a give-away. Not only will Hibernia deliver in spades from here on out but the royalty regime developed in 1990 and amended in 2000 is the basis for the Hibernia South agreement. There can’t be much higher an endorsement than to have the old deal used as the basis for the new one negotiated by the guy who, supposedly, is fighting relentlessly against any more give-aways.

Incidentally, using the same oil price assumption, the Hibernia South extension would deliver $8.8 billion in royalties (at the high end assumption of 50%). The oil company share would produce $1.7 billion, without accounting for any development, production or decommissioning costs.

Just scan across to those P3 figures, though, and try not to let your eyes pop out. The figure can’t be discounted. In fact, when natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale vetoed the Hibernia South extension plan in January 2007, she cited that high-end reserve estimate in her letter to the offshore board:

That P3 figure would mean that what remains of the original Hibernia deal would yield more in royalty alone than the “White Rose extension, Hebron and Hibernia South” in royalty and “revenue”.

Now there are a few more curious or questionable statements from the speech and news release last week, besides that one about Hibernia production.

For example, in the Premier’s NOIA speech we get this pair of paragraphs that came back-to-back just as they are presented here:

I am also extremely pleased to confirm today that after nearly 12 years of production, the Hibernia project is now in "payout" meaning the province is now receiving a royalty of 30 per cent.

When you consider the agreements reached by our government in terms of oil and gas development I think you will agree that although we had some critics and skeptics along the way, we have delivered for the people and for the industry in this province.

As the release makes plain – if you go back and check the facts - Hibernia in payout delivers 42.5% from the original royalty deal not 30%.

The second paragraph, though, appears to take credit for both Hibernia hitting pay-out and for delivering the massive royalties. Both those are a direct result of a deal negotiated almost 20 years ago.

It all makes you wonder when might we expect some further “clarifications” – they should really be corrections to factual mistakes and misleading claims - from last week’s announcement?

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On confusion and ignorance

From Thursday’s editorial in the Halifax Chronicle-Herald, the newspaper’s editorial crew noted the blow-up at Randy Simms and then penned this:

What’s more, the tentative deal with the consortium of oil companies represents yet another vindication for Mr. Williams’ brand of hardball.

…

By comparison, the Hibernia South expansion is the mother of all sweet deals. Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Petro-Canada have ceded a 10 per cent stake to the province for $30 million. The tentative deal also gives the province a 30 per cent royalty rate, as well as a "super royalty" rate that could climb to 50 per cent on some aspects of the project.

Hmmm.

Guess the confusing government news release served to confuse even the Chronicle-Herald into believing that the bulk of the Hibernia South royalty regime wasn’t actually negotiated in 1990 without that magical “brand of hardball.”

Odd.

Given that the editorialist did note that the Hibernia project hit payout – and hence the royalty regime was running at 30% - they could have actually checked the royalty regime online and discovered something really interesting.

Oh well.

It’s not like anyone writing anything for the Herald would ever get a phone call from a certain Premier a little miffed over something he saw in that newspaper.

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Hibernia Southern Extension MOU Assessment, Part II: Equity and industrial benefits

[Part I  Royalty]

Equity

According to the backgrounder released on Tuesday, the provincial government’s oil company will acquire a 10% interest in only that portion of the extension to be developed through tie-backs. 

That has been described as covering 170 million barrels, however, as with Hebron that figure may become smaller in the final agreement.

The acquisition price is $30 million however the backgrounder provided no estimates the development costs, operating costs or other costs associated with the project.

According to some sources, part of the delay in reaching the memorandum of understanding came from re-unitizing the existing licenses, especially EL 1093.  There are seven interest-holders in that license with four of them having less than 10%.

As with Hebron, details of the acquisition agreement will not be made public.  As with Hebron, information crucial to a thorough assessment of the acquisition and the provincial government’s share will remain hidden from public scrutiny.

Industrial and local benefits

Aside from existing benefits arrangements under the Hibernia development plan and offshore regulatory board regulations, no new or enhanced local benefits are contained in the backgrounder.

The project will be developed using a combination of slant drilling from the existing Hibernia platform (50 million barrels) and sub-sea tie-backs to the platform.  This was not a part of the 2006 application. 

However, planned expansion of the Hibernia GBS appears to have been shelved. This significantly reduces the potential amount of local work available.  The project is smaller than what was suggested last June when the Premier indicated a Hibernia South deal would be in place by the end of 2008. 

"We fully expect Hibernia South to be concluded by the end of this calendar year," Williams told more than 700 people attending the annual offshore conference hosted by the Newfoundland and Labrador Oil and Gas Industries Association (NOIA).

As it turned out, the MOU was signed in mid 2009 and final agreements are not expected until early 2010. That would be three years after the provincial government vetoed the development and two years after the oil companies originally planned to start production.

Local companies already have demonstrated expertise in supply and in fabrication of sub-sea components.  Thus, local companies should be able to secure fabrication and related work on the project.

This is particular interesting since two of the four reasons given for vetoing the development plan in 2007 related to local benefits:

• The province needs more information on what options exist for other modes of development to extract the oil from Hibernia South. This may have implications for overall benefits.
• The lack of a Benefits Plan Amendment. This is a departure from the normal process and the CNLOPB did not require it in the "interest of expediency."

Through the MOU, the provincial government also accepts the offshore board’s position in the voted application with respect to local benefits (affirmative action, research and development and education and training). 

This is significant since these aspects of local benefits were cited as an area of concern for the provincial government  with the board’s approval of the plan.  In a subsequent exchange of correspondence energy minister Kathy Dunderdale accused the offshore board of failing in its responsibilities for local benefits yet it appears the government has ultimately accepted what the companies initially proposed and board approved. 

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Hibernia Southern Extension MOU Assessment, Part I: Royalty - some potential added cash plus a cap

While Danny William’s radio tirade/meltdown is rapidly eclipsing his own good news announcement nationally, there is interest in assessing the details of the Hibernia South Extension memorandum of understanding based on the official news release and news reports on the day of the announcement.

Caveats

As with Hebron, the final agreement may yield some details which were not readily apparent when the MOU was announced.   As well, and as with Hebron, key portions of the deal are likely to be hidden from public view.   With that said, we still have enough information to make some observations about the proposed development deal.  In this first post, we will look at the royalty regime.

General

Overall, this agreement represents a transformation from Williams Mod 1 to Williams Mod 2 in the government’s approach to offshore oil development.

Williams Mod 1 (pre-2o06) was essentially a variation pre-1984 provincial government thinking and emphasised:

• increasing local benefits especially through forced development of refining and downstream production;
• some additional revenue from federal transfers, and
• an undefined “equity” interest which is essentially analogous to the old petroleum corporation.

Williams Mod 2 (post- 2006) places the greatest emphasis on additional government revenue through the most obvious source:  enhanced royalties. This is especially clear in the Simms encounter where the Premier states:

The reason we’re caught up in the oil, it’s not the oil, it’s the black gold that’s out there, it’s not the petroleum, it’s not the oil and gas, it’s the revenue that it brings to us, so that we can deal with problems in the fishery, so that we can take care of the Abitibi workers, so that we can build new hospitals and new long terms care facilities, so that we can build new schools, so that we can lead the country in poverty reduction, and it goes on and on and on. Surely you – presumably – run a municipality. You must know the importance of revenue, and where that revenue comes from – if it comes from business, whatever form of business it is, or if it comes from residential real estate, it goes into your coffers now so you can do all the wonderful things that need to be done. [Emphasis added]

Government-induced infrastructure has been effectively abandoned as evident in both Hebron and Hibernia South and the equity portion has also been capped artificially at 10%.  In Hibernia South, the second GBS or other production facility has been discarded for the most economical production method (slant drilling from the original GBS and tie-backs to the original GBS).

This effectively adopts the philosophy that guided resource development after 1985 and is best seen in the 1990 Hibernia agreement and in the subsequent developments at White Rose and Terra Nova.

As much as Danny Williams may like to complain about those who offer alternative views to his own, this basic approach has been noted before – including in this corner – as an alternative to Williams Mod 1. 

The easiest, most efficient means of enhancing government revenue is through adjustments to the royalty regime.   Revenue is needed to meet the demands for program spending and infrastructure development today. Regular readers of Bond Papers will recognise the refrain.

Hibernia Southern Extension Royalty Regime

The base for the three-part royalty is the existing Hibernia royalty regime as concluded in 1990 and modified in 2000. 

This sets the rate after simple payout (achieved a few months early) at 30% Tier 1 royalty with a further 12.5% Tier 2 royalty triggered by profitability.

This is the royalty rate – 42.5% -  that produces the bulk of the cash.

The royalty regime for the southern extension is cut into three parts.  There is no explanation as to why the rate is structured this way. The backgrounder provided with the news release does not explain the structure clearly.

Part I:    For the 50 million barrels or so that will be drilled directly from the Hibernia gravity base structure, there is the 42.5%  that already exists in the Hibernia royalty regime established in 1990 and modified in 2000.

There is no price trigger for this since the original royalty regime did not tie provincial government revenues to oil prices directly.

Part II:  For the portion of the project that is under the original production License 1001 (PL 1001), the basis is the original Hibernia royalty regime (maximum 42.5%, not tied to price).

In addition there is a further 7.5% royalty when prices for West Texas Intermediate (WTI) are above US$50.  Above WTI at US$70 there is an additional 5%. 

There is a cap on the royalty however: 

Should supplementary royalty payout be achieved under the terms of the original Hibernia contract be achieved, the top rate will be 50 per cent.

It would appear that once the project has triggered the Tier 1 and Tier 2 royalties (42.5%),  only an additional 7.5% is available beyond that irrespective of price. 

Part III:   There is a similar 50% cap in the new areas, i.e. the ones covered by PL 1005 and Exploration License 1093 (EL 1093).  The cap is achieved by reducing the incremental royalty tied to price (WTI at US$50) from 7.5% to 2.5%.

Observations

Overall, this represents a complex arrangement that modifies the existing royalty regime slightly. The complexity may be due in part to the highly diversified interests in the three licenses, especially EL1093.

In many pricing scenarios, then, the maximum available royalty from what is described here as Part II of the regime  would appear to be the same as under the existing Hibernia regime, i.e. 42.5%.

On the face of it, the Part II and Part III royalty structures offer an identical outcome.  Additional information would be needed to explain how the structure works and why it is in place.

The provincial government revenue figure offered in the announcement  - $10 billion – is apparently derived almost entirely by applying the existing Hibernia Royalty Regime to an environment in which oil prices are considerably above the average price that existing during the initial phase of the project.

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Money Update:  Premier Danny Williams told CBC’s David Cochrane today that the estimate of $10 billion of provincial revenue from Hibernia South is based on an estimated average oil price of $83 over the next decade.

There is something suspicious about the government calculation though since Williams claimed on Tuesday that five times as much oil left in Hibernia as in Hibernia South would net the province only slightly less cash than Hibernia proper even though both projects use essentially the same royalty regime:

We expect a further $13 billion from the remaining main field production and this extension adds an estimated $10 billion more in revenue for the province…

Hibernia South memorandum of understanding

There’s a non-binding memorandum of understanding to develop new areas of the Hibernia field with a final agreement expected in early 2010. 

Hibernia South includes 220 million barrels of recoverable oil.  There is an estimated 1.24 billion barrels of proven and probable recoverable oil reserves in the Hibernia project, including the Hibernia South area, and as much as 1.9 billion barrels covering proven, probable and possible reserves.

Proven reserves are 782 million barrels of which 605 million barrels have been produced up to April 30, 2009.

That means there is 640 million barrels of proven and probable reserves to exploit and as much as 1.295 million barrels including possible reserves.

The existing Hibernia project has also hit simple payout, raising provincial royalties under the Hibernia royalty regime to 30%.  That will deliver additional cash to the provincial treasury in the current fiscal year that wasn’t previously accounted for.

The MOU also contains a settlement of a dispute on calculation of transportation costs for the Hibernia project. The understanding adopts the provincial government interpretation retroactive to first oil in 1997. 

According to the news release, this understanding is responsible for the attainment of simple payout.  However, in 2007,  estimates existed that the project would achieve payout in 2009 or 2010 based on production levels and anticipated oil prices at the time unconnected to either project expansion or the transportation cost interpretation dispute.

In the wake of failed talks on the Hebron project in 2006, the Williams administration vetoed a development application for a portion of Hibernia South. That redevelopment plan was resubmitted in 2008, as anticipated by the Canada Hibernia Holding Corporation in 2007.

There were some indications the provincial government planned to seek development of Hibernia South as a new project with a new production platform.  The MOU announced on Tuesday calls for the production methods originally proposed by the operators using the existing Hibernia platform.

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More to follow on MOU announcement including a review of the royalty regime.

The Gospel according to Chip Diller

Newfoundland and Labrador is usually one of the last places to catch a trend.  Doesn't matter if you are talking fashion or, in the latest version, government economic and fiscal policy, it seems to take a while for things to catch on here.

Late on Friday afternoon newly minted finance minister Jerome Kennedy issued a news release trumpeting a credit rating by Standard and Poor's as proof of the provincial government's "fiscal prudence and sound policies". 

Well, maybe catch up is the better word.

There isn't a government left in the developed world that is still pushing the sound fundamentals media line now almost two months after the start of the current global economic crisis.  No government is claiming some sort of credit for being able to weather a storm that, in many minds, is far from over.

Well, no government except the one here.

If you want to understand why everyone else's tune has changed, take a look at the five year trending in crude oil prices. You can find an example in the WTI futures box on the right hand column.  Click on the "5Y" symbol. 

Four years to get up to US$147 a barrel and a mere four months to tumble below US$50.  The steepest declines have come in just the past two months.

The speed of the price collapse should be a clue to analysts that the assumptions used before July to predict that oil would remain at unprecedentedly high prices for the rest of time were faulty.  The security premium, supply concerns and overheated speculation drove prices to the peak last summer but in addition to all that the superheating of the global economy, fueled by loose American regulations pushed things beyond anything that would be considered normal and rational.

In other words, the price of oil has been artificially high for a very long time. Given that markets have a way of correcting themselves at some point, it was really only a matter of time before a correction - a downturn - took the heat out of things.  The only thing that couldn't be foreseen, and that's about the only thing, was how steep a correction was coming and how it might last, but come it would as surely as it has come at every juncture in the past.

Fewer and fewer analysts are holding to the old projections, some of them dating back several months. Some of the more influential sources, such as the International Energy Agency, are forecasting high prices.  However, many are revising their short term projections markedly downward.  Deutsche Bank, among others, is projecting crude at US$40 per barrel by April 2009.  One analyst  - Robin Batchelor - who in May 2008 predicted high oil prices well into the future is now likening the current climate to one 30 years ago:

"On the upside it always overshoots and the same is true on the downside. What I’m looking at is the commodity supply and demand equation; long term there are still supply issues but on the demand side we’re facing downdraft," he points out. "The last time we had a fall of that magnitude was in 1979/80/81."

While Batchelor for one has not abandoned his high price forecasts, he has certainly altered his view dramatically. The reason is simple.  While he and others once assumed ever increasing demand, the current correction may alter the demand side of the price equation that can't be seen right at the moment. If the current downturn lasts well into 2009, as most expect, the IEA, among others, will likely go back and rethink their projections just as they revised their assumptions three years ago when they thought US$50 a barrel was the peak.

Closer to home, though, the hope in the old assumptions remain strong close to home. This week, economist Wade Locke told Memorial University's student newspaper The Muse that:

“The longterm [sic] price forecast is still in the $80- to $90-range for oil and that will not affect Hebron, White Rose Extension, or Hibernia South. Even if [oil] prices were to stay around $60, these projects would likely proceed,” he said.

Locke's comments are a useful segue to an interesting aspect of the local view from the provincial government and its supporters.  Locke certainly falls into that category and the similarity between his comments and those of the finance minister are striking.  With that quote from The Muse in mind, take a look at this one from the release on the credit rating:

"Our economy remains strong and the current economic downturn should not affect development of new oilfields including White Rose Expansion, Hibernia South and Hebron," said Minister Kennedy.

The phrasing is similar, much like the similarity in early October between Locke's and the Premier's references within days of each other to the government being able to meet and exceed its current budget targets even if oil falls to $10 a barrel.

But what's more interesting in these two comments is that neither is completely true and in the wider context of Locke's comments on a bright future based on oil wealth, they constitute a fixation on oil as the source of economic salvation not seen in this province since "1979/80/81."

Let's deal with the projects first.

The White Rose expansion is a relatively modest project.  With its development costs already recovered, oil would almost have to hit prices lower than the historic 1992 price of  US$8  per barrel to make it economically dodgy.

The Hibernia South extension is also not a pricey project measured in terms of the original Hibernia project or Hebron.  However, there is no development application yet and a decision to proceed would certainly be affected by oil prices significantly lower than the current ones.

In all likelihood, the project will go ahead given that the oil companies have at their doorstep a provincial government willing to invest hundreds of millions of very scarce tax dollars in the expansion since that ultimately lowers their cost.  Given they will have recovered their initial costs by the time the new fields come online, their profit position would improve immensely in such a scenario while it would be the junior partner who would see a relatively lower return on investment. Low oil prices - especially below the foolish fixed price trigger of the current government's oil super-royalty regime  - won't affect them as much as it would the new kid in the oil patch.

Hebron is the most costly of three projects and the one most likely to be affected by a long period of low prices. Analysts seem to agree that the current price climate makes investment in high cost ventures like offshore heavy oil, deep water projects and oils sands less attractive.  Hebron's reported financial tipping point  - US$35 per barrel - is well below that of an oil sands project but stop and look at current prices.

There's a reason why the companies insisted on a clause in the Hebron agreement which gave the partners  - and the partners alone - the right to take up to a decade to sanction the project.  Current Hebron timelines are merely works in progress, subject to revision is the financial climate changes.

The upside for Hebron is that the companies managed to secure several significant concessions from the provincial government as hedges against a drop in oil prices. Those concessions make it more likely the project will proceed.

First, they secured the decade to sanction with no penalty for deciding against proceeding. They have time to decide and there is no real cost for delaying if the numbers don't add up.

Second, they won the royalty concession that dropped the pre-payout royalty to a fixed 1% as opposed to the escalating scale of the old royalty regime.  The energy minister herself heralded this as a major feature of the new deal.

Third, they were able to tie the super-royalty to a fixed price below which no extra cash was paid to the provincial treasury.  By the government's own estimate, oil prices averaging US$50 a barrel over the life of the project produced less than half the royalties of a high oil price.  Drop below that magic fixed trigger and the provincial share drops accordingly on top of the front-end royalty concession but from the company standpoint they can guarantee low possible costs across the board.

Fourthly, they secured significant fabrication concessions in the agreement.  Most of the topsides work will be done outside the province anyway based on what appears to be a huge miscalculation by the provincial government's negotiating team. 

On top of that, however, the management arrangement  - including the provincial government as junior partner  - would enable the companies to ship virtually all the topsides work and associated engineering outside the province in order to lower the costs and complete the project on time. If oil prices stayed low enough long enough and construction costs stayed high enough, it may well be worth the companies' while to pay the modest penalties for changes in the work commitments to get the deal done, even if they had to pay the penalties at all.  A renegotiated contract arrangement with the provincial government's energy company and the government that changed the work commitments would likely never be made public under the revisions to the energy corporation act passed last spring.

The companies may well get their projects, but the return to the provincial treasury and the overall impact on the local economy may turn out to be far smaller than originally promised.

The fundamental problem in all this is the fixation on oil projects which has led the provincial government and its supporters to tie government finances to the price of a barrel of oil.  Despite all assurances to the contrary, the next several years may be see provincial government fiscal problems as unprecedented as the surpluses of the past two or three years. Unlike those surpluses, however, the problems won't be figments of an accountant's bookkeeping methods.

Beyond that, prosperity for the province as a whole, in Locke's view, appears to be driven entirely by a couple of oil projects which, it must be noted, have a fixed life span.  Neither Locke nor Kennedy - who echoed Locke's definition of prosperity - have not realized the folly of resting everything on the a very slippery commodity.  

Oddly enough, it fell to Donna Stone, president of the St. John's Board of Trade to sound a very small warning bell against this very situation.  Board of trade presidents are not known to buck the government line so her words stand out.  As Stone told the Rotary Club of St. John's:

“This still gives us some cause for concern, however. Given the volatility of oil prices, the province should look at a long-term plan that will diversify our economy and make us less dependent on this ever-changing commodity,” Stone said.

Stone is absolutely right.  Almost 20 years ago, the provincial government realized exactly that and implemented a broadly-based strategic economic plan to hedge against such dependence.  That plan has been tossed aside in the  past four years.

The consequences may prove to be dire and no amount of assurance that all is well will save us from the them.

Just remember what happened to Chip Diller.

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Hibernia to pay more

From the Wednesday Telegram, a report by Moira Baird on the Hibernia project.

Among the highlights:

- Provincial royalties will go to the 30% level sometime in 2009 or 2010 as the project pays off its development costs and the existing provincial royalty regime shifts accordingly.

- The federal government shares have netted a total of $678 million in the past decade. Dividends in 2006 were $174 million compared to $230 million the previous year. Dividends are expected to decline again in 2007.

- CHHC expects Hibernia Management and Development Corporation to submit another development application for Hibernia South in 2008.

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Energy plan as political plan

Looking at the Globe and Mail story on the Newfoundland and Labrador energy plan, it gets easy to see just how out of touch the Globe is with what's going on outside some very narrow confines.

There isn't anything in the story that qualifies as news.

For example, the provincial government has been saying for some time what local politicos have been figuring, namely that the energy plan will be a key part of the Williams administration's nationalist platform for the fall general election.

The energy plan isn't about economic development any more. It's about politics.

That's the news in the piece, but the Globe seems to have missed it.

The energy plan will be framed as a battle between Newfoundland and Labrador and Big Oil. It will be about hanging tough and looking for what is "reasonable."

Dunderdale merely repeated to the Globe what Danny Williams has already said: Big Oil better come back to the table because once the energy plan is released, the oil companies will have to pay a lot more than they would have a couple of years ago.

It's talking smack and talking tough for domestic political consumption.

But as both Williams and Dunderdale both know already, the oil industry is taking the view expressed by Paul Barnes local manager for the petroleum producers association in the Globe piece. Equity is fine if the provincial government wants to farm in and shoulder the costs - a la Statoil and Norsk Hydro - but anything else is likely to discourage outside investment.

Predictable positions on both sides. It really doesn't matter which one is right. The energy plan is now pure politics. Pure talk.

Take, for example, the Globe referring to the tough document that will demand "at least" a 5% equity position in all future oil and gas projects in the province. By some comparisons, five percent is actually pretty small, and that's likely why the number is being tossed out there: it sounds innocuous.

But, the Globe needs to do its homework.

The real number is likely to be 10%. Word from the oil patch and other places has it that the draft natural gas royalty regime has already been handed back to the provincial government with the polite advice that the government's plans would scare away investment. That's because the 10% equity position would come on top of the considerable share of cash flows the provincial government already receives.

The chart at right shows relative shares of cash flows for the local offshore, as presented by MUN economist Wade Locke in a public presentation last fall.

All things considered, it gets fairly obvious that the Great Battle Against the Foreign Demons of 2007 isn't really the same battle of 25 years ago.

What we are talking about today are fairly fine shifts of cash that look tiny. However, those fine adjustments of cash may tip the very sensitive investment balance against exploration investment in the local oil patch for some period of time.

If the equity demand will be applied to every new development, as the Globe reports, then we may also see impacts on existing significant discoveries. Hebron is already off the table until sometime in the next decade. Hibernia South: ditto.

Small developments like Norsk Hydro's West Bonne Bay would also be affected, especially if the results of Norsk Hydro's exploration program on the field shows oil reserves are much larger than current estimates.

Even White Rose would fall under that sort of requirement. Husky Energy has been working hard to cultivate a strong, positive relationship with the Premier. However, if White Rose turns out to be larger than currently estimated, that is, if there is an opportunity for the province to get more, then that relationship could change dramatically.

Delaying those developments aren't really important as the energy plan morphs into a political document. The government's real issues are bigger and look ahead over longer time spans.

The new energy corporation is likely to become the focus of export energy developments, some of which are tied to oil and gas. It wouldn't be surprising, given the corporation's mandate, to see it take control of the Lower Churchill project which may be generating power before the middle of the next decade. Part of that project will likely be the construction of the transmission infrastructure - sub-sea cabling - that would carry electricity to markets in the United States.

The new energy corp might well be the license holder at the end of the bid for Labrador parcels next year. With some exploration work - potentially carried on by the energy corporation on its own - the natural gas available from the Gudrid, North Bjarni and Bjarni fields could double in size. That gas, as much as eight trillion cubic feet (8 tcf) including the three existing significant discoveries, could be brought ashore and used to generate electricity in a new facility on the coast of Labrador. The power would be sold down the Lower Churchill lines to markets in the United States.

None of that would really be affected by the equity issue.

That bit on the energy corporation is speculative, of course, but it certainly fits with public statements by provincial officials. It also fits the Premier's concern about shipping natural gas directly to market without some form of added local value.

All of these plays or possible plays are well in the future, of course. In the short- to medium- term, the provincial government knows that it will have significant cash flows from existing oil production. There's no risk in the rhetoric. There may not be an economic gain either, even in the longer run, but the energy plan is increasing something other than economic development.

There really isn't any risk for the provincial government in using part of the energy plan for political purposes. Whatever consequences come will come so far in the future as to be irrelevant to any of the politicians currently making decisions or likely to make decisions on these issues over the next decade.

But to give credit where credit is due, the provincial government's posturing on oil and gas - with all the distortions and misrepresentations about revenues to date and who makes what - is a masterful example of framing a discussion in a way that can't be counteracted simply by anyone, political or industrial.

It will produce the political effect desired in October.

As a political plan, the energy document is already working its magic.

As an economic plan?

Well, that remains to be seen.

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Wells to offshore board chair: "He can get stuffed on that."

In a situation that is likely no surprise to anyone, St. John's mayor Andy Wells is in hot water with the chairman of the offshore regulatory board.

CBC News is reporting that Max Ruelokke, chairman and chief executive officer of the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Board complaining about comments made by Wells in a recent oil magazine article. Wells, who is a provincial appointee to the board, reportedly called the board "incompetent" in its recent handling of a development application.

The provincial government vetoed the board's approval claiming a lack of information, even though the provincial government did nothing while the application was in process to obtain the information it claimed it needed.

In January, the board took the unprecedented step of releasing its decision and associated correspondence, although the documents have been removed from the board's website.

"He can get stuffed on that," Wells said.

"He's not going to be telling me how I'm going to respond to any issues that come before this board. I'm not going to stand by and allow some bureaucratic hack to tell me what I can and cannot say on matters of public interest," he said.

Wells was Premier Danny Williams surprise choice in 2005 to head the board, coming as it did despite the fact that the selection process agreed to by both the federal and provincial governments was well under way.

Wells didn't get the job, even after a second process as established under the Atlantic Accord (1985).

Wells has commented publicly on the decision previously.

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From the Throne Speech

A curious claim given that on Hebron there are no talks and the province has yet to sign off on White Rose expansion. Hibernia South is still mired in "talks":

In Newfoundland and Labrador’s offshore oil and gas sector, massive energy opportunities are matched by My Government’s confidence that further activity will soon be occurring at Hibernia South, White Rose and Hebron-Ben Nevis as exploration proceeds in other basins. My Government also launched industry consultations to develop an offshore natural gas royalty regime that will provide clarity to industry. This should facilitate the development of our immense natural gas resource potential in a manner that provides a fair return to industry and the people of this province.

Maybe White Rose will get the nod, giving credence to John Lau's claims of having a great relationship with Danny Williams.

As for Hebron, maybe the truthiness of the statement depends on what ones' definition of "soon" is.