Showing posts with label Hydro Quebec. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hydro Quebec. Show all posts

31 May 2010

Lower Churchill cost estimates skyrocket

Touted in 2004/05 at under $4 billion, Premier Danny Williams referred to the Lower Churchill in the House of Assembly on Monday as a “a $6 billion to $12 billion project.”

Williams insisted though in other comments in the legislature that from “a perspective of the cost, I can tell you that this particular project is the lowest cost, the cheapest hydro-electric project in all of North America.”

In another response he repeated the claim:

Mr. Speaker, I just said it before and I will say it again. This is the lowest cost hydro-electric project in all of North America. That is equivalent to – could deal head on with La Romaine or any other projects that come on stream from Quebec.

That’s an odd statement since Hydro-Quebec’s La Romaine project, announced is 2009, is estimated to cost $6.5 billion.  The Lower Churchill has not yet been sanctioned and the provincial government’s energy company is still picking its way through cost estimates and route analyses.

The original expressions of interest package for the Lower Churchill - released by the provincial government in 2005  - is no longer available online from either the provincial government or its energy company but the government’s estimated cost  - $3.3 billion - is contained in a report compiled by TD Economics at the time.

The provincial government cancelled the expressions of interest process in 2006, preferring to “go-it-alone”.  With the cancellation of the EOI process, the provincial government effectively rejected a joint proposal from Hydro-Quebec and Ontario Hydro to develop the project in co-operation with the province.  That proposal included upgrades to transmission capability to Ontario which would have been borne by the Ontario and  Quebec partners.

Once Williams rejected the proposal Hydro-Quebec turned to Plan B.  That involved development of about 4,000 megawatts of wind energy within Quebec and another 4,000 megawatts of hydro power from new projects all within Quebec.

The go-it-alone option also didn’t turn out that way even after Williams rejected the proposal.  As natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale revealed last September, Danny Williams and others spent five years in secret talks trying to lure Hydro-Quebec into a deal on the Lower Churchill.  In the process Williams abandoned his previous commitment that he wouldn’t cut a deal with Hydro-Quebec on the Lower Churchill unless it involved redress for the 1969 deal that led to the development of Churchill Falls.

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14 May 2010

Desperation: NALCOR edition

As a rule, you don’t enhance your credibility by saying things which are demonstrably at odds with established facts.

Take for example a news release just issued by the provincial government’s energy company.  It reads like something from Hisself for polling season, not Ed Martin, but that’s another issue.

Just get a load of this bit:

Currently, there is a surplus of transmission capacity on the transmission grid which Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie was obligated to offer to Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, a subsidiary of Nalcor Energy, under the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT), before suggesting more expensive upgrades. The surplus was never offered to Nalcor Energy. Instead, Nalcor was told it would have to pay for upgrades that were not required.

The most obvious problem for this is that NALCOR was not seeking to move energy today.  They wanted to option a block of power for 30 years to service a project which, as everyone knows, doesn’t even exist. As such, any current surplus – no pun intended – is irrelevant.

The studies for the future demand showed that capacity will be needed down the road a ways to handle the power coming from a project which still exists only in the over-wrought imaginations of the Old Man and his entourage.

Not surprisingly, though, this extra capacity would be exactly the sort of thing which – as NALCOR’s release confirms – both the company and the Premier have said repeatedly they’d be prepared to pay for whether it was in Quebec or New Brunswick.

So why is Ed Martin issuing news releases late on a Friday tilting at imaginary windmills?

Aside from desperately trying to ignite some distraction from the Expropriation FUBAR Follies or giving your humble e-scribbler yet more to ridicule, only the Old Man likely knows for sure.

But let us assume, for a second, that there is a surplus currently and NALCOR is willing to buy space today or was willing to scarf it up at any time back to 2006 when they first stuck in their request.

As part of the ongoing discussion they could have worked out a deal with Hydro Quebec at any point.  In fact, once the capacity studies were done, they had 45 days to either close the deal or merely indicate their intention to buy.

They didn’t do that.

Instead they started a round of procedural motions in front of the Quebec energy regulatory board.

Then after a couple of years of wrangling, they have managed to lose every single one of the five motions they brought.  They lost them not because the process was biased but because the motions themselves  - like this release - lacked merit and substance.

After all, if there is capacity on the line and if there was a project and if NALCOR was ready and willing to pay to get power to market, the company would have optioned the space rather than tried to stop the clock.

Since they haven’t optioned the space, then anyone with two clues can draw a logical conclusion.

Res ipsa loquitur, as the lawyers would say.

The facts speak for themselves.

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13 May 2010

Potato, potato: hydro version

vocm.com is making much of the fact that NALCOR and Hydro Quebec are taking different interpretations of the ruling yesterday by Quebec’s energy regulator.

The truth of the whole affair is actually in VO’s news story.

Here’s what happened:  part of the ruling yesterday was on an effort by NALCOR to suspend the timelines under Quebec’s open access tariff rules that give a company with power to ship 45 days to either book the space or to signal and intention to book the space.

NALCOR didn’t want to book the space now, especially on a project that doesn’t really exist.  No markets.  No money.  Still mired in environmental assessments and all that.

So two and three years ago, they simply couldn’t afford to book space and build new lines for a project that – at the current pace – likely won’t even be sanctioned before the date NALCOR still claims they’ll be shipping power. Even today they still can’t afford to book the space because the project is entirely a figment of everyone’s imagination.

And here’s the line in the VO story that clinches it:

Nalcor counters that the Regie refused to suspend the timelines association with their request while the company was following formal complaint procedures, resulting in a termination of Nalcor's application.

So instead, there’s even more talk about a project to ship power to New Brunswick through the island of Newfoundland.  While that option has always been technically feasible, it has also always proven to be a route that doesn’t make economic sense.  You just can’t ship the power to distant markets in a way that you can still make money.

The reason is geography, especially for the Lower Churchill.  Look at it on a properly oriented map and you’ll notice it is actually farther away from any major market than any other hydro project in eastern Canada (current or proposed).

But whatever the problem with the Lower Churchill is, we know one thing for certain:  NALCOR boss Ed Martin  doesn’t think it is Hydro Quebec. 

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Lower Churchill: Imaginary project. Imaginary News Stories. (and one they ignore)

CTV  - via the Canadian Press’s Shawn McCarthy - got it wrong.

Badly wrong.

So too did the Globe:  they relied on McCarthy’s story.

VOCM got it wrong, too. 

They relied on NALCOR and the provincial government.  After all, Danny Williams admitted he hadn’t read a translation of the decision;  he was relying on four pages of “errors” from the decision by the Quebec energy regulatory board on three applications by Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro related to transmission lines through Quebec.

The Montreal Gazette got it right.

So too did CBC St. John’s, graced for the first time in a while by Hisself live and in person.

Here’s the CBC lede:

Quebec's energy regulator has turned down a request from Newfoundland and Labrador to intervene in an ongoing dispute over pushing power from a proposed hydroelectric megaproject across Quebec's power lines.

And here’s the Gazette [link above]

Hydro-Quebec's existing power lines don't have the capacity to transport energy from a new hydroelectric project in Labrador south to export markets, Quebec's energy board said in a controversial ruling Wednesday.

The CP story started out completely wrong:

Quebec’s energy regulator dealt a blow to Newfoundland and Labrador’s plan to develop a massive power project on the Lower Churchill River, denying the province’s push to have Hydro-Québec transmit electricity to markets in the U.S. and Canada.

One of the reasons CBC got the story right is because they have the actual decision.  They weren’t relying on the opinions  - legal or otherwise – of the same rocket scientists who delivered the Abitibi FUBAR Follies.

The Lower Churchill project has no markets and it has no money, other than what is coming from provincial taxpayers.  As such, it is a project that exists on paper;  it’s an imaginary project.

There is also absolutely nothing stopping NALCOR from doing what Danny Williams has committed to doing all along;  running power through Quebec and, if need be, paying for new transmission facilities to carry the power. Therefore, there is no reason to believe this decision by the Quebec energy regulator affects the Lower Churchill project at all;  therefore it is an imaginary news story, at least as presented by the people who got it wrong.

And by the way, in the got-it-wrong, imaginary news category,  the new CBC story  that the Premier is thinking of taking his campaign against Hydro-Quebec to the Untied States is way off:

The Régie de l'énergie dismissed a complaint of fair dealing from Nalcor, Newfoundland and Labrador's Crown-owned energy corporation.

NALCOR’s three applications to the Regie included in the decision on May 12 were about technical questions in the way certain calculations were made in preparing an assessment of the costs and implications of Hydro’s plan to wheel power from the imaginary Lower Churchill project to five destinations.

This wasn’t a “fair dealing” issue either directly in the sense of the other lawsuit NALCOR is pursuing, nor was it a decision against fair dealing, as implied by the sentence. 

But for all that, there is a huge Lower Churchill story the mainstream media continue to ignore.  What a time to bring it up, as Danny Williams is ranting once again about the evil Hydro-Quebec:

Despite five years of secret efforts, Danny Williams could not persuade Hydro-Quebec to take an ownership stake in the Lower Churchill without having to pay any compensation for the 1969 deal. That’s the story natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale  - inadvertently - revealed last fall. 

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25 March 2010

Shawn the Bullet Dodger

labradore makes a couple of very interesting points about Danny Williams and the failed New Brunswick Power deal, what with a major story that remains unreported in the mainstream a full six months after it broke.

Frankly it’s hard to know what’s more interesting here:  Shawn’s failure, Danny’s intervention or the reason why the mainstream media continues to ignore a gigantic energy story in Newfoundland and Labrador that is directly related to the first two.

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Related: “Five years of secret talks…”

13 March 2010

The Zen of media intimidation

If a story goes unreported, did it actually happen?

In Mexico, as in post-communist Russia, pesky reporters sometimes turn up dead pour encourager les autres.

In other parts of the world, you don’t have to shoot people to stop things from being reported.

There are other ways.

And some of the the reporters will even deny that the lesser forms of intimidation even happened.

But that doesn’t mean there isn’t intimidation nor does it mean stories  - sometimes really big and important stories - don’t get reported.

But if they don’t get reported, did they actually happen?

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24 January 2010

Hydro: the wet weekend round-up

1.  A foundation of purest sandstone:  For those who are still following these things, the Telegram’s Rob Antle has a tidy little summary of the case which is the bedrock on which the provincial government’s legal challenge of the 1969 Churchill Falls power contract rests.

Self-Check:  How many paragraphs down did you get before you realised that – in and of itself - the case has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the 1969 ruckus?

2. More money for Quebec, yet more billable hours edition: The papers in la pas-si-belle-pour-Danny province have been filled with stories about the hearings over transmission and the promise to sue over good faith or lack thereof.

3.  Rien could possibly be further from the verite. In a scrum the other day, Hisself could recall the pages on which appeared stories in La Presse about the whole Labrador hydro thing from one angle or another.  Helene Baril’s summary of the issue in her January 12 story is tidy and accurate.  Ditto one on the 19th of January.

Not so another one on the 19th in which she writes:

Quatre ans plus tard, le premier ministre Danny Williams est toujours aussi déterminé à développer le Bas-Churchill sans l'aide de personne, et surtout sans celle d'Hydro-Québec.

Still prepared to develop the Lower Churchill without Hydro-Quebec?

Hardly.

Malheureusement en anglais seulement, 

Perhaps it’s time someone worked up:

a.  a French translation of the Dunderdale comments and,

b.  a French version of “Nothing could be further from the truth”.  ‘Pfft”  - another DW staple likely to be heard many times in the next few months -  already translates itself.

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18 December 2009

Purely coincidental: Hydro-Quebec/NB Power version

Some of these things are linked.  Some may be purely coincidental.

1.  Hydro-Quebec plans to buy NB Power including the Point LePreau nuclear generating plant.  October 29.

2. Ontario Senator Lowell Murray thinks it’s time for the federal government to get interested in the Hydro-Quebec/NB Power thingy. December 15.

3.  Ontario considering sale of hydro-electric generation, transmission and distribution assets. December 16.

4.  Government of Canada announcements plans to sell off the Candu reactor division of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.  December 17.

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15 December 2009

Bon Deal. Bad Deal.

Turns out buying NB Power could be a very bad deal for Hydro-Quebec.

Of course, that would make it a very good deal for New Brunswickers.

Update:  As Mark correctly noted in a comment, a bad deal for one doesn't make it a good deal for the other.

If you read the article, though, you will see that many of the points made early on discuss what are the positive aspects for New Brunswick.  There are positive aspects for Hydro-Quebec as well; the variation just depends on what the price of power turns out to be down the road.

And of course, by the end of the article, Claude Garcia  of the Montreal Economic Institute, makes an argument based about MEi's projections for power prices over the medium- to long-term.

Despite the huge difference between the price offered and the real value of the assets being acquired, no allowance is made for the increase in electricity prices likely to result from the enforcement of a new international treaty significantly limiting carbon emissions. This deal is not acceptable as currently structured. The price is too high for the benefits to be obtained.Despite the huge difference between the price offered and the real value of the assets being acquired, no allowance is made for the increase in electricity prices likely to result from the enforcement of a new international treaty significantly limiting carbon emissions. This deal is not acceptable as currently structured. The price is too high for the benefits to be obtained.


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13 December 2009

On the one hand…

Jean-Thomas Bernard, economics professor at Laval, finds the Hydro-Quebec move to the Maritimes a bit puzzling since he believes that HQ will have to bring expensive power online to feed the Maritimes.

"My position is that cheap hydro is gone, definitely gone," Bernard said.

"We still have a fair amount of (undeveloped) hydro but this is expensive hydro. We're talking about 10 cents (per kilowatt hour), 12 cents," he said, referring specifically to the Romaine megaproject far from Montreal on the province's north shore - poised to begin bringing 1,550 megawatts of power online for Hydro-Québec in 2014.

On the other hand, Jean-Thomas Bernard also thinks that New Brunswick would actually win from this deal:

However, Bernard said in the long-term Hydro-Québec may regret this deal because the corporation may wind up selling its power to New Brunswick at a much cheaper rate than to its other customers in the United States or in Ontario.

The same issue is at the heart of both Bernard’s comments.  He is looking at the pricing issue and the cost of developing new power projects.

In the short-term HQ gains markets;  in the medium to long term it may face a situation where it could sell the power more lucratively elsewhere but be forced to sell at lower prices in New Brunswick under the terms of the MOU.

It’s an interesting observation about a complex issue.

But here’s an idea for you to consider:  if La Romaine and other new HQ projects are being developed at the price of around 10 to 12 cents per kilowatt hour, how would the Lower Churchill compare to that?

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07 December 2009

NL Hydro intervenes in Hydro-Quebec FERC application

The way some people talk, you’d think this was the first time Newfoundland and Labrador’s energy company had intervened in the United States over wheeling rights for electricity from Labrador.

Well, for those who think that, guess again.

The year was 1997 and then-mines and energy minister Rex Gibbons announced:

"Hydro's objective is to secure the province's right to transmit electricity from Labrador to North American markets on terms that are open and non-discriminatory. … This is consistent with FERC's Order 888, requiring that `Customers in the United States should not be denied access to cheaper supplies of electric energy, whether such electric energy is from a domestic source or a foreign source'."

As it turned out, NL Hydro cut its first deal with Hydro-Quebec a couple of years later to sell surplus power from Churchill Falls.  The first deal was a straight sale to Hydro-Quebec.  The price at the Quebec border was basically the same as the price obtained at the US border or farther south, after all the wheeling and other charges were taken into account. As you can see from this 2000 backgrounder, NL Hydro has been on top of the whole issue for some time.

Curiously enough, the situation hasn’t really changed all that much in 10 years or so, despite all the chest thumping that’s been going on lately. NL Hydro gets roughly the same price per kilowatt hour from the April deal that it got from the previous deal  - signed in 2004 – that saw the power sold to Hydro-Quebec at the border.

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06 December 2009

The Transmission Skirmish: more documentation

The Telegram’s Rob Antle did a bang-up job of shedding some extra light on the ongoing skirmish between Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro and Hydro-Quebec over transmission of electricity through Quebec.

So far all anyone has had has been the Premier’s characterisation of the whole affair.

Well, for the record, here is the link to what appears to be the ongoing kerfuffle as it appears before the Quebec energy regulator agency, the Regie d’energie.

But if you scoot along to the United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission – better known as FERC – you’ll find there a copy of a decision taken last November.  This is one of the documents cited in Antle’s piece.

Now the interesting thing is that all of this fuss happened before last spring’s announcement of a deal to wheel power through Quebec and sell it to Emera. Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro will pay Hydro-Quebec $19 million annually in wheeling charges on the block of power.

The Premier was fulsome in his praise for the deal at the time:

“This is truly a historic and momentous occasion for the people of our province, as never before have we been granted access through the province of Quebec with our own power…”.

Curious that he is now talking as if that whole deal never happened and that the provincial energy corporation can’t ship a watt of power through Quebec.

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01 December 2009

No thanks to renegotiating ‘69 deal: Quebec

Quebec natural resources minister and deputy premier Nathalie Normadeau says Hydro Quebec isn’t interested in renegotiating the 1969 Churchill Falls power contract.

Okay, so like no one saw that coming.

And it’s not like Danny Williams can blame anyone in this province for feeding sooper sekrit information to the bad guys in Quebec.  He just said that to avoid answering simple questions and  - almost naturally – local media gave the unfounded comments top billing. 

crapstory Yes, front page of the print edition of the Telly and the top news spot on its website!

All for a load of shop-worn hooey.

In the meantime, as the Premier indicated in the legislature on Tuesday, Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation got its own legal opinion before sending the request to renegotiate off to Hydro-Quebec. 

And, as he told the House of Assembly on Monday,

As a result, we feel that we need to pursue this and the best way to pursue this is in good faith. The best way to pursue good faith is to have this information [the conclusions of the provincial government’s legal review] passed over to CF(L)Co. It is my understanding that CF(L)Co have announced today that president, Ed Martin, has now written the other shareholders of CF(L)Co to see whether, in fact, in good faith, this matter would be open for renegotiation, and that is a very good thing.

Did you notice that phrase:  “other shareholders in CF(L)Co.”

That would be Hydro-Quebec.

So if Danny Williams is wondering about who is passing sooper sekrits to the enemy, he can look no further than Ed Martin.

Of course, the entire traitor line is just one to distract from what is really going on:  a big bluff. 

After all, if NALCOR and the provincial government were really convinced they could cut a deal, if they really thought they had stumbled on the magic bullet to cure a 40 year old grievance, they’d never have done it in public perhaps before the letter to Hydro Quebec even got to Montreal.

Nope.

If you had any leverage at all, you wouldn’t pull a stunt.

You’d pull the lever.

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The 1969 Churchill Falls Power Contract

For those who might be interested in these things, here’s the 1969 power contract between Hydro-Quebec and Churchill Falls(Labrador) Corporation in pdf format.

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23 November 2009

Five years of secret talks on Lower Churchill: the Dunderdale Audio

In early September, natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale revealed that the provincial government tried unsuccessfully for five years to get Hydro-Quebec to take an ownership stake in the Lower Churchill project.

A key component of the offers to HQ included the pledge to set aside any talk of redress for the 1969 Churchill Falls contract.

The talks were never revealed publicly until Dunderdale’s admission.

The news was all the more astonishing given that Premier Danny Williams stated repeatedly between 2001 and 2005 that he would not cut a deal with Hydro-Quebec on the Lower Churchill without some from of compensation – redress – for the inequitable 1969 contract that sees Hydro-Quebec buy virtually all the Churchill falls output for fractions of a cent per kilowatt hour.

To date, not a single conventional media outlet has reported Dunderdale’s comments.

Amazingly, not a single conventional media outlet has picked up the very obvious point about setting aside any grievance over the 1969 contract despite Williams repeated pledges to make redress a part of any Lower Churchill deal that involved Hydro-Quebec. 

That grievance is a core part of Williams’ intervention in the New Brunswick Power proposal.  On Friday, he noted the appropriateness of the Atlantic Premier’s meeting at Churchill Falls since “it symbolizes exactly what's happened to Newfoundland and Labrador at the hands of Hydro-Quebec.”

While excerpts have been posted at Bond Papers and at labradore previously, this is the first time, the audio file has been posted: Kathy Dunderdale, September 4, 2009, live on VOCM Open Line with Randy Simms (he’s the fellow pictured with mayoral chain ‘round his neck).

 

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Related:

21 November 2009

Yet more on the NB Power, Hydro Quebec, Danny Williams racket

 

1.  Shawn Graham had some strong words in advance of yesterday’s meeting of the Atlantic premiers. At the end of the meeting things were not much different.

2.  An independent panel will review the NB Power deal.

3.  A quick review of recent events will show that as far as the argument goes from Newfoundland and Labrador, something under the bed is still drooling.

4.  Note the reference in that 2006 post to selling power by avoiding Quebec.  Little did your humble e-scribbler  - or anybody else in the province for that matter – know until recently.

4.  The completely invented (i.e. false) nature of some of the comments used in the pure emotional arguments about the boogey man are glaringly obvious if you know something of the actual story.  Danny Williams said yesterday that “it's obviously symbolic that we're here today at the place where the original Upper Churchill deal was done.”  That’s in the Telegraph-Journal story in the first link.

Apparently they were in Montreal, not Churchill Falls.  Yes, Williams was being his usual hyperbolic, figurative, never-literal self, but that sort of comment is taken as fact by too many people – perhaps even Williams himself – given how little is evidently known about the 1969 boogey man in the first place.

Take as another f’rinstance, the tale of Ottawa’s role in the whole affair as described in the story about the power corridor

5.  And if you want a sense of the reason why hysteria, fantasy and emotion are so powerful, consider Russell Wangersky’s observations on the nature of modern media and the audience they work hard to serve.

We're conditioning ourselves to expect the crack cocaine of immediate gratification - and when we can't get that short, sharp shock immediately, we move on to somewhere where we can.

Indeed we are.

And his words are worth the time given that so much of what he says is both a cause and a symptom of a very current issue in the province. It’s a topic tackled around these parts before:

On another level, though, what the Premier meant in that case is actually irrelevant. What it is simply worth noting that not a single reporter thought it worth asking a simple question. Not one thought to ask what he meant, just to be clear. Inquisitiveness - supposedly at the core of the journalistic profession, let alone the source of our species' progress - was absent.

Not one wanted to know.

Reporters reflect the society in which they work. There's no way of knowing if the Internet has changed the way people are thinking or if it merely facilitated a trend already present. Television was decried as an idiot box and in some respects, Carr and others are simply transferring the epithet to the box sitting on or under many of our desks.

The source of the change is not as important as the consequences of the shift, the lessening desire to know things.

Chenza at court, the court of silence, as the Tamarians would say.

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20 November 2009

The Tempest Tick-Tock: key events in the Hydro Quebec and NB Power tirades



It helps to put a timeline on things sometimes.
2006

May:  While a bill that is supposed to create the energy corporation is introduced as the first bill of the session, the text of the bill doesn’t show up until near the end of the spring 2006 session. The record for the bill is bizarre.  It shows the bill passed through second reading and committee stage four days after it passed first reading.

2007

June 4 and 5:   In a couple of short sessions and with very little public debate and discussion, the legislature passes two bills revamping the hydro corporation and creating the energy corporation.  This amounts to a massive  reworking of the province’s energy corporation, originally created in 2006.  

Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro forms the initial core of the company but internal structure  creates series of interlocking directorates of subsidiaries.

NL Hydro retains exemption given in 2006  to EPCA restriction that electricity producers in province delivering to customers in province may only be engaged in electricity activities.  PUB must still set Hydro rates to ensure profitability.

At some point in the re-organization, CF(L)Co becomes a subsidiary of NALCOR instead of CFLCo.  This makes NLH – the Lower Churchill proponent – equal within the internal corporate structure  to the company that was once its subsidiary.

June 13 and 14: In a high-speed process and with very little debate or public scrutiny, the  House of Assembly amends the Electrical Power Control Act 1994 (EPCA) to lay out method for making water management agreement where two projects exist on same watercourse.   Amendments to take effect on date set by cabinet. 

2008

June 3 and 4:   At high speed and with very little debate, the legislature approves major changes to the energy corporation legislation. Includes significant changes to the rules governing creation of subsidiaries, as well as massive changes to the province’s Access to Information laws to shield the company activities from scrutiny.  Cabinet retains the ability to transfer any function to the energy corporation it wishes to transfer, regardless of what it is about. 

June 3 and 4:  At high speed and with very little debate, the legislature passes a water rights management bill later revealed to strip CF(L)Co of its lease to Churchill Falls.

December 16:  Surprise seizure of hydroelectricity generation and transmission assets of three private sector companies on the island of Newfoundland (AbitibiBowater, Fortis and ENEL).  Assets assigned to NL Hydro.  NALCOR given responsibility for all government negotiations with Abitibi on compensation.

2009

January 16:  EPCA  amendments made in 2007 come into force.  Amendments are gazetted along with regulations but there is no news release or other public notice.

April:  Talks start on water management agreement between Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro and CF(L(Co) .

August 31:  Ed Martin (CEO of provincial energy corporation) tells Toronto Star that he :
… doesn't see the Quebec issue as a major stumbling block, as regulation requires the province to allow access to its grid in return for a set tariff. Hydro Quebec and Nalcor are just working out the details. 

Any costs to Ontario would build in the price of that tariff, but what's most important is how that final cost would compare to the next-best alternative. [Emphasis added]
01 Sep:  Emergency session of the legislature called for September 8 to deal with amendments to 2008 water rights legislation. 

Amendments and session are given rather benign description initially:
"This amendment is necessary in order to facilitate an agreement between Nalcor Energy or its subsidiary and CF(L)Co," said Minister Dunderdale. "As these negotiations are currently underway, we wanted to get into the House early and make this amendment to avoid any uncertainty to the parties involved. We thank the opposition for their cooperation on this matter and we look forward to further discussion on the amendment when the House reconvenes next week."
03 Sep:  In a speech to a national audience, Premier attacks Hydro Quebec for supposedly throwing up roadblocks to lower Churchill development.

04 SepDunderdale reveals the full  - the real - story.  (Locals media have not covered Dunderdale’s comments two and a half months later)

09 Sep:   Amendments pass in House emergency session.  True nature of story is revealed in comments during the debate:
“They [Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation lawyers and directors] felt that we had extinguished their rights to the whole watershed area that they require to produce electricity in the Upper Churchill and that would cause them some concern,” said [natural resources minister Kathy] Dunderdale.
Unspecified time in September:  Deal reached with CF(L)Co on water management.

October 23:  According to NALCOR, this is the date the CF(L)Co board met and rejected the deal agreement.

October 29:  NB Power deal.

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18 November 2009

Danny Williams and the Philosopher’s Stone: Converting Principles to Cash

 

“It's giving away their future.”

Danny Williams on the NB Power sale

__________________________________________________________________

At the heart of a little flame war last week on one local blog came a rather surprising nugget of hard news that Newfoundlanders and Labradorians likely have never seen and may well never see covered at all – let alone in depth -  by local media.

Telegram blog writer Geoff Meeker noted a comment by Premier Danny Williams in the House of Assembly on April 30, 2008.  In answering an opposition question about putting $100 million into debt reduction for Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro, the Premier said:

It was a previous Liberal government that wanted to actually privatize Hydro. This particular government wants to strengthen Hydro, wants to make it a very valuable corporation: a corporation that will ultimately pay significant dividends back to the people of this Province; a corporation that perhaps some day may have enough value in its assets overall as a result of the Hebron deal and the White Rose deal, possible Hibernia deal, possible deals on gas, possible deals on oil refineries and other exploration projects, where hopefully we might be able to sell it some day and pay off all the debt of this Province, and that would be a good thing. [Emphasis added]

That’s right.

Danny Williams spoke publicly about selling off some or all of the province’s energy corporation to pay down public debt.

CBC’s provincial affairs reporter David Cochrane added to the discussion online and offered some additional insight into the Premier’s thinking:

We pulled him outside for a scrum to ask about it. Even before we asked a question he clarified his comments. He said he misspoke in the legislature. He wasn't talking about selling Nalcor. He was talking about selling the individual assets it acquires.

For example, if the Hebron stake is eventually worth 5-billion [sic] dollars and someone wants to buy, Williams said he would consider selling it to reduce debt.

That was consistent with past comments he had made when the government rolled out its plan to revamp Hydro into an energy company.

As established in the first part of this series – Control and Resources -  that isn’t what Williams had been saying consistently at all.

To the contrary, selling any asset of the energy corporation would run directly counter to the stated goal of acquiring control over the province’s resources and hence its development and future.  Being masters of our own destiny is tied directly to resource ownership.

But Cochrane was right:  Williams had talked about selling some or all of the energy corporation before.  As Cochrane showed, Williams had mentioned the idea in October 2005 in a story Cochrane had done on Ed Martin’s arrival as chief executive officer of the fledgling corporation that would be eventually known as NALCOR Energy:

Williams says his top priority is for the company to become an investor in every form of energy development – or, as he calls it, to get a piece of the action.

"I would like to see Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro gain a strong asset base, so in fact then the government of Newfoundland, as a shareholder, also benefits from that asset base," he said.

"If energy continues to grow in value as it is now, perhaps what we could now buy for a billion dollars could be worth $10- or $20 billion in 10 or 20 years' time, which means that those assets have a value whereby we could pay off our debt," Williams said. [Emphasis added]

The 2005 comment is not as clear as the 2008 version in the legislature but they are along the same lines. 

And certainly in 2005, Williams wasn’t splitting hairs over regulated (electricity) versus non-regulated (oil and gas) assets as Williams apparently did in the unreported portion of the media scrum in April 2008.  As Cochrane described it:

Williams did not say he would sell off all the assets (i.e power generation and transmission capacity). He was talking energy assets in the oil and gas sector.

Now while it doesn’t appear that Williams has said this “many, many times” as Cochrane asserted elsewhere in that comment, there is no question Williams has spoken of selling off some or all of the energy corporation in order to pay down public debt, if the price was right.

Nor is it the only reference to selling energy assets, even though the idea is not contained in the energy plan or the campaign manual.   In a clause of the New Dawn agreement, released in September 2008, one provision covers the potential sale of the Newfoundland and Labrador interest in the Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation:

image

On the one hand, the Williams administration has a clear policy connecting the principle of control of energy resources with ownership of equity stakes in energy projects.

Yet at the same time,  the Premier has spoken publicly about the potential that these assets could be sold to reduce public debt.

And on top of that, an agreement with the Innu Nation includes a specific provision covering the potential sale of the Newfoundland and Labrador majority shares in the company that operates the  Churchill Falls power complex.

Clearly the two notions cannot live in the same space.

Well, they can actually if one considers another statement by Danny Williams which describes another aspect of his political philosophy:

What I said before and I said going in, this is about principles, but it's also about money as well. At the end of the day, the promise and the principle converts to cash for the bottom line for the people of Newfoundland and Labrador.

That’s a comment Danny Williams tossed out in November 2007 during the racket about broken political promises with Stephen Harper.

Williams used the word “principles” in the familiar sense.  A “principle” is a fundamental rule.  A “principle” may also be expressed as a value like openness, honesty, or integrity.

The dispute was a matter of principle, in that sense; a promise made is a commitment to act that must be fulfilled.  If someone breaks his or her word without good cause or explanation, the relationships between people can no longer function.

lead But “principle” in the way Danny Williams used it on that occasion in 2007 identifies the “principles” as nothing more substantive than the basis for a claim of damages or the source of a grievance.  Relief or compensation can be had by identifying a sum of money, or, as Williams puts it: “the principle converts to cash.”

The notion is hardly surprising for a lawyer who spent a lot of time arguing for damages for his clients, even if there are few others who would – on the face of it – accept that principles of any kind can be transformed to coin.

Yet Danny Williams obviously operates on the belief that he has a political Philosopher’s Stone in his pocket.  Like its legendary alchemical predecessor that converted base metal to gold, this stone would convert electricity and oil into dollars.

The curious thing is that none of this has been reported clearly and consistently within the province.   It is doubtful that a majority of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians know anything but the old and familiar notion that links control of resources with the future. 

Yet there is no mistaking that the Williams administration has another policy firmly in place  - at exactly the same time - which would allow for the sale of resources in a fashion that directly contradicts the notion of control on which the administration claims popular support for its policies.

Little wonder in April 2008 then that Danny Williams responded so strongly when reporters asked him to scrum on his statements.  Again, as the CBC’s David Cochrane described it:

We pulled him outside for a scrum to ask about it. Even before we asked a question he clarified his comments. He said he misspoke in the legislature. He wasn't talking about selling Nalcor. He was talking about selling the individual assets it acquires. [Emphasis added]

In the end, the reporters in the scrum opted to report nothing of the comments at all, including the Premier’s “clarification.”

Regardless of what the reporters decided on that busy work day, the Premier’s comments and the unsustainable internal contradiction in them are obvious in both the Premier’s criticism in the legislature of Hydro privatisation on the one hand and then the expressed interest in flipping assets to pay off debt on the other.  It doesn’t matter how often the Premier said it.

The comments take on new importance though given the Premier’s recent attack on the sale of NB Power to Hydro Quebec. 

And at the same time, as the province faces tight provincial finances, the question of exactly what is government policy on energy, control and sale of resources to meet financial needs deserves to be answered clearly and unequivocally.

Such a question can only be answered, however, if someone deigns to ask it.

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11 November 2009

Where’s Joey? The Churchill Falls contract signing, 1969

Signing the contract to develop Churchill Falls in 1969 are, left to right, Yvon de Guise and Jean-Claude Lesard of Hydro Quebec and Donald McParland and Eric Lambert of Brinco, the private sector company that held rights to develop natural resources in Newfoundland and Labrador. [Photo reproduced from Philip Smith, Brinco: the story of Churchill Falls, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975).]

Contrary to popular mythology the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador did not negotiate the deal to develop the hydroelectric complex at Churchill Falls.

 

churchillfallssigning1969

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09 November 2009

Lower Churchill a long way off

In another Telegram story not available on line Danny Williams admits the Lower Churchill is still a long way from being a reality:

“We’re not looking at a Lower Churchill in the near term. “

He then expressed his hope to have the project approved within two years and started some time after that.

But that’s just his hope, not a prediction of anything.

As Bond Papers readers have known for some time, the project is full of problems, not the least of which is a lack of markets and financing, the two elements crucial to building the multi-billion dollar project.

Again, it’s pretty much old hat since he’s been dampening expectations about the project since at least early 2008.

Many people didn’t quite know what to make of it. Now we know that Williams had been consistently rebuffed for five years in his efforts to get Hydro Quebec to take an ownership stake in the project.

That wasn’t what Williams said publicly at the time but then again, when people don’t know what’s going on they can’t ask uncomfortable questions.

Incidentally, it has been two months now and not a single conventional news media outlet has bothered to follow up on the stunning revelations from natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale about the secret pitches to Hydro Quebec.

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