Showing posts with label offshore regulatory board. Show all posts
Showing posts with label offshore regulatory board. Show all posts

27 July 2018

Bay du Nord and Equity #nlpoli

In a staged political event Thursday that was woefully short of basic details,  the provincial government and Equinor announced they will proceed with development of the Bay du Nord field in the Orphan Basin.  The news release for the event referred to a framework agreement only.

Bay du Nord is located approximately 500 kilometres east of St. John's,  in between 1.0 and 1.2 kilometres of water.  Equinor and its partner Husky Canada believe the field contains at least 300 million barrels of light crude.

The project will cost $6.8 billion to bring into production using a floating production storage and offloading vessel similar in concept to the FPSOs used for Terra Nova (1996)  and White Rose (2002).  The provincial government acquired 10% equity in the project in addition to royalties under the Offshore Oil  Royalty Regulations (2017).  The provincial government will therefore pay $90 million initially as well as $680 million during the construction phase.

Project sanction is expected in 2020 with first oil in 2025.

The following table shows a comparison of Terra Nova,  White Rose, and Bay du Nord, with all dollar amounts in 2018 dollars.

06 May 2013

Why separate? #nlpoli

Last week, the federal Auditor General pointed out many serious problems with the state of offshore search and rescue.

Last week, the usual gang grabbed any microphone they could find to call  - yet again - for everything from a provincial public inquiry into the state of search and rescue in the province to a new agency to regulate safety in the offshore oil industry.

The idea that we had to split safety from other aspects came up during the offshore helicopter inquiry.  The idea is popular.  Helicopter safety inquiry commissioner Robert Wells included it as one of his recommendations in volume one.

But here’s the thing:  what is a so-called separate safety agency supposed to do that we aren’t doing now or couldn’t accomplish any other way?

14 November 2012

Time to Rescind the Pork Appointment #nlpoli

Last December, the federal cabinet appointed intergovernmental affairs minister Peter Penashue’s campaign manager in the 2011 to a plum seat on the joint federal-provincial board that regulates the province’s offshore oil industry.

It was a pure pork-barrel appointment since Reg Bowers has absolutely no background that might have made him  qualified to sit on the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.  A series of appointments by his provincial Conservative friends doesn’t count.

Bowers landed a sweet gig:  six years, subject to reappointment.  Hob-knobbing with international oil industry types.

Flip ahead a year and Penashue has tried to distance himself from the controversy.  A letter from Penashue to constituents released on Tuesday notes that Bowers was responsible for campaign administration.  Penashue says he made it clear that the campaign would follow Elections Canada rules.

“No one is more surprised than I am at the allegations that have arisen since the campaign,” wrote Penashue.  “No one is more disappointed. That’s why there is a new Official Agent in place to examine all of the paperwork and to work with Elections Canada to correct any mistakes.”

There have been enough questions about Penashue’s campaign finances since last summer for him to have relinquished his cabinet job until Elections Canada finished its probe into the campaign. The fact he hasn’t done so is one thing.

But In his letter to constituents, Penashue pointed to his official agent during the campaign and his responsibility, as a function of the position he occupied, for the state of Penashue’s campaign accounts, finances and documentation.

Something was clearly amiss in Penashue’s campaign.  The problems with Penashue’s campaign may well have resulted from nothing more exotic than incompetence.  But that incompetence should be seen plainly enough by now, on the face of it, to cause the federal cabinet to request Mr. Bowers’ resignation from the offshore board.  If he doesn’t to leave voluntarily, then he can be removed. 

Peter Penashue’s letter laid the groundwork for it.

Let’s just get on with it.

-srbp-

17 May 2012

Here we go again #nlpoli

Few people who pay attention to public life in this province will forget the abuse the provincial government  - particularly former Premier Danny Williams  - heaped upon Max Ruelokke for having the temerity to be a better candidate to head the offshore regulatory board than the guy the premier wanted to stuff in the job.

Ruelokke had to sue the provincial government to force them to do what the law directed.

So detestable was the provincial government’s – i.e. Danny’s  - behaviour that the judge who heard the case stated in his decision:

Having considered the above, I find that the conduct of the Respondent (in relation to the Applicant) has been callous and “reprehensible” and is deserving of “reproof and rebuke”.  Accordingly, I will exercise my discretion and award the Applicant his solicitor and own client costs.

We may be headed for the same mess again.

09 March 2012

CNLOPB announces 2012 call for bids on offshore parcels #nlpoli

From the offshore regulatory board:

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) announced today the details of a Call for Bids in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area. Call for Bids NL12-01 (Area "C" – Laurentian Sub-basin) will consist of six parcels, which comprise 1,589,738 hectares.

Interested parties will have until 4:00 p.m. on November 1, 2012 to submit sealed bids for parcels offered in Call for Bids NL12-01. The sole criterion for selecting winning bids will be the total amount of money the bidder commits to spend on exploration of the respective parcel during Period I (the first period of a nine-year licence). The
minimum bid for each parcel offered is $1,000,000.

The C-NLOPB hereby wishes to inform prospective bidders for parcels NL12-01-01, NL12-01-02 and NL12-01-04 (these parcels are adjacent to the French Exclusive Zone around the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon,
France) that it has been advised by the Government of Canada that on May 17, 2005, the Government of Canada and the Government of the French Republic signed the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the
Government of the French Republic relating to the Exploration and Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Fields (the Agreement). 

The Agreement provides a framework for the conservation and management of hydrocarbon resources in fields straddling the maritime boundary between the two countries.  The Agreement will enter into force on the date on which the Government of Canada and the Government of the French Republic have informed each other that all necessary internal requirements have been fulfilled. While France has ratified the Agreement, Canada is putting in place the domestic arrangements to allow it to proceed with its ratification process.

As a result, the Government of Canada has advised the C-NLOPB that if the Agreement enters into force prior to or during the term of a licence covering any of the above parcels, this necessarily will result in the application of additional terms and conditions for those parcels,
through legislation, regulations, amendments to licences or otherwise, in order to ensure compliance with the Agreement.

The C-NLOPB recommends to prospective bidders that they consult the text of the Agreement, which is available from the C-NLOPB upon request to information@cnlopb.nl.ca.

This Call for Bids contains provisions for rentals during the term of an exploration licence and during the term of any resulting significant discovery licence. This Call for Bids contains a sample exploration licence which incorporates a sample significant discovery licence.

These areas have been previously assessed to identify any mitigative measures that may be required in relation to exploration activity on these parcels.

Subject to Ministerial approval, successful bidders will be issued an exploration licence for a term of nine years; however, during Period I a well must be spudded to validate the licence for the full nine-year term.

Notification of any changes made to this Call for Bids will be posted to the C-NLOPB's website.

For a complete copy of the text of the Call for Bids, visit the C-NLOPB website at www.cnlopb.nl.ca.

- srbp -

* paragraphing changed for online legibility.  SRBP added two links related to the Canada-France agreement on transboundary hydrocarbon resources

09 December 2011

Connies pork-up offshore board #nlpoli #cdnpoli

The federal Conservatives took a leaf from the provincial Conservatives’ book on Thursday and added a political pork appointee to the board that regulates the oil and gas industry in Newfoundland and Labrador.

Long-time Tory Reg Bowers was intergovernmental affairs minister Peter Penashue’s campaign manager in the last federal election. He’ll serve for a six-year term, subject to re-appointment.

The official announcement of his appointment is pretty vague on the details of Bowers’ background that make him an appropriate appointment.  All the release says is that Bowers has “30 years of experience in developing regional business prospects in Newfoundland and Labrador. He has worked on numerous projects creating opportunities for communities in his home province.”

Before he left politics abruptly in late 2010, Danny Williams set the wheels in motion to appoint his communications director to a provincial seat on the joint federal-provincial board.  Williams’ successor Kathy Dunderdale carried on with the appointment. Dunderdale and her natural resources minister word of Matthews’ new job secret until word of it leaked early in 2011

The botched appointment died in a ball of flames amid public condemnation of the blatant patronage it represented. 

The furor included a now famous attack on Dunderdale by Williams:

In my opinion, Elizabeth Matthews – of all the women I have met in politics including my ministers – was the most competent woman I had come across.

Bowers joins another federal appointee with no relevant background in the offshore oil and gas business:  Conrad Sullivan, brother of former Conservative fisheries ambassador Loyola Sullivan,

The two provincial appointees on the board - retired labour union boss Reg Anstey and Ed Drover – also lacked any relevant experience in dealing with offshore oil and gas issues prior to their appointment to the board.

- srbp -

29 November 2011

Offshore board slags CBC #nlpoli

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board is taking CBC Newfoundland and Labrador to task for its coverage of an incident last week in which a supply ship struck a semi-submersible platform offshore Newfoundland and Labrador.

cnlopb letter

The online version of one CBC story about the incident is available on the cbc.ca/nl website.  You can find the story with the comment mentioned in the letter in the video of the Here and Now Friday night broadcast.

The CBC line set up an attack on the board by labour/NDP spokesperson Lana Payne in the comment that immediately followed the reference the board took exception to in the fourth paragraph.

The letter is available on the offshore board website.

- srbp -

The Mother Corp Returns Fire Updatehere.

18 August 2011

Offshore board responds to helicopter inquiry report

From the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board [paragraphing altered for readability; original here]:

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) today responded to the final report of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry  entitled "Report and Recommendations arising from the Transportation Safety Board's Report".

The submission of this report signals the completion of the inquiry. The C-NLOPB wishes to extend its gratitude to Commissioner Robert Wells, Inquiry counsel and staff, parties with standing, families of the victims [of the Cougar 491 crash]  and to all others, most notably, Robert Decker, who contributed to the Inquiry and, in doing so, to improvements in offshore helicopter safety.

The report contains four recommendations.

Recommendation 1 is directed at the C-NLOPB and the remaining three are directed at Transport Canada
or Governments. The Board's response to each  recommendation is as follows:

Recommendation 1 - Alert Service Bulletins

We have accepted this Recommendation and have directed the Operators to develop a plan for compliance in conjunction with work they are already doing in response to Phase I Recommendation 7, dealing with Airworthiness Directives. We will ask the Phase I Implementation Team to provide oversight of the Operators' work.

Recommendation 2 - Helicopter Passenger Suit

We have referred this Recommendation to Transport Canada and the Canadian General Standards Board for consideration as part of their ongoing work to create a  new Helicopter Passenger Transportation Suit standard. There is a broadly-based committee engaged in this work,  including C-NLOPB, CNSOPB, Operators and suit manufacturers.

Recommendation 3 - TSB Recommendations

We have passed this Recommendation along to Transport Canada.

The C-NLOPB has already been engaged in a Focus Group to assist Transport Canada in their plans to respond to Recommendations in the Phase I and Phase II report. 

We have requested that the Operators determine what plans Cougar and Sikorsky have for retro-fitting the Cougar fleet.

Also, we have asked our Aviation Advisor to review with Transport Canada any plans for removal of the "extremely remote" provision. He will also discuss with them any plans to review the adequacy of the 30-minute run-dry requirement.

Recommendation 4 - Separate Regulator

We have forwarded this Recommendation to both Governments for their consideration. Recommendation 29 (b) in the Phase I report recommended that consideration be given to the creation of a separate and autonomous safety division within the C-NLOPB.

The C-NLOPB has acted on this recommendation by separating the safety and operations functions into two separate departments. The Operations Department will be headed by Mr. Howard Pike and the Safety Department will be headed by Mr. Dan Chicoyne.

Mr. Chicoyne was recently hired by the Board and he will take on the responsibility of Chief Safety Officer. He has extensive experience in safety and was the Chief Accident Investigator for the Canadian Forces, as well as the Director of Flight Safety for the Canadian Forces.

Mr. Chicoyne is also a former fixed wing and helicopter pilot in the Canadian Armed Forces and held the rank of Colonel.

While the C-NLOPB asked Commissioner Wells to review the TSB report, it also conducted its own review.

The Board's review did not identify any deficiencies or gaps in the current implementation plan. 

The Board is now satisfied that the implementation strategy developed in response to Phase I, with the change recommended by Commissioner Wells, fully encompasses all elements of the TSB report that needed to be addressed by the C-NLOPB.

Media Contact:
Sean Kelly M.A., APR, FCPRS
Manager of Public Relations
(709) 778-1418
(709) 689-0713 cell
skelly@cnlopb.nl.ca

- srbp -

15 August 2011

Offshore board releases second part of offshore helicopter safety inquiry

From the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board:

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) received the Phase II Report of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry today and is releasing it to the public immediately.

"The Board would like to thank Commissioner Wells along with commission counsel and staff for their continued hard work during Phase II and in completing this Report. The C-NLOPB will review the report and recommendations proposed by the Commissioner and will respond once the review has been completed,” said Max Ruelokke, Chair and CEO of the C-NLOPB.

The C-NLOPB will take up to 10 days to review the report and recommendations. The Board will not be commenting on the report until it has completed its review.

To obtain a print copy of this report, please contactinformation@cnlopb.nl.ca with a full mailing address. The report will be sent within three business days. Persons wishing to pick-up a copy of the report at the C-NLOPB office are asked to state this in their request.

Media Contact:
Sean Kelly M.A., APR, FCPRS
Manager of Public Relations
(709) 778-1418
(709) 689-0713 (cell)
skelly@cnlopb.nl.ca

- srbp -

07 July 2011

Skinner throws AG under bus

[Updated in another post]

Natural resources minister Shawn Skinner threw outgoing Auditor General John Noseworthy under the bus on Wednesday as he contradicted the AG’s claim he can’t get access to some of the offshore regulatory board’s records.

Voice of the Cabinet Minister ran a story based on Skinner’s comments with the afternoon call-in show’s new host Pete Soucy.  Here’s the whole thing in case the disappear it:

The government is refuting claims by a talk show caller that the auditor general cannot gain access to the books from the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board. The A.G. complained recently that he was unable to obtain the information he was looking for.

However, the minister of natural resources, Shawn Skinner, replied on VOCM Backtalk with Pete Soucy that that claim is untrue. He said there is a provision for the auditor general to review commercially sensitive information.

That’s pretty odd considering Noseworthy has been very friendly to the current administration on so many occasions.  Even the timing of his initial attack on the offshore board in 2008 could be seen as a way to help the incumbent Conservatives out in their efforts to put negotiating pressure on the oil companies or to poke at the guy who embarrassed Danny Williams so badly in Williams’ bizarro struggle to make Andy Wells the board boss.

So what gives?

Well, it could be the rumour Noseworthy will be running for the Liberals in the fall.  There doesn’t appear to be any substance to it at the moment but the rumour is strong.  Maybe Skinner wanted to start a pre-emptive strike on Noseworthy’s credibility.

And – as with the bullshit about Dean MacDonald being a long-time Liberal – rumours have a way of being accepted unquestioningly as fact by some in this town, if enough people repeat the same fairy tale often enough. well, that or if the right people say so.

That doesn’t mean Noseworthy won’t run in the fall. It just means there are no signs at the moment – even behind the scenes – that Noseworthy will be a candidate.  Now odds are that the opposition parties are both falling over themselves to get Noseworthy as a candidate just because someone said the guy would be a good catch.  See those rumours at work again? 

But there’s a difference between that and the idea Skinner is about to announce or that he is already locked in.  If Skinner was trying to undermine Noseworthy, he was acting on the basis of shite intel.

That isn’t the only plausible explanation for Skinner’s comment.  Now this is Voice of the Cabinet Minister after all, so there is a possibility they just misunderstood what Skinner said.

And, it could also be that Skinner is just wrong, again.

After all, it isn’t like he has never said things that are patently, obviously and demonstrably false before.

Who knows?  Lots of strange things are turning up in the news these days as the political world slowly twists itself in a whole new bunch of shapes.

- srbp -

02 July 2011

AG finishes term with more fumbles

Outgoing auditor general John Noseworthy held to his pattern of making less-than-accurate claims or claims without evidence, this time with respect to the offshore regulatory board.

Noseworthy’s claims and the accurate information from the board are in a story available at the Telegram website.

In his latest accusation, Noseworthy said he did not have full access to the offshore board records.  Fact is, he did.  What Noseworthy couldn’t get was proprietary information belonging to the oil companies.

“We invited him in. He had sent four people in, they were here for four months conducting an audit. He had full access to the board,” [offshore board CEO Max] Ruelokke said.

But Ruelokke said Noseworthy’s staff did not have access to information provided to the board by oil companies — which the companies deem to be proprietory [sic]— and that’s because of section 119 of the Atlantic Accord Act.

The act states companies have to approve the release of the information to any third party.

“When we asked (the companies) to do so, on behalf of the auditor general, they refused to do that. So we couldn’t release it to him,” Ruelokke said.

The distinction is significant.

Your humble e-scribbler has raised questions about Noseworthy’s attack on the board – and that’s what it has been – from the beginning.

The most recent post on the topic raised the question  of why Noseworthy had failed to produce a report or bothered to update the public on it since he launched his public attack on the board in 2008.  Maybe Noseworthy’s most recent unfounded accusation was an effort to deflect attention away from his own shortcomings.

While Noseworthy enjoys local “media cred’ – that is, they will never, ever question any of his pronouncements – the retiring auditor’s record is far from pristine.

Noseworthy missed millions in House of Assembly overspending that continued well into 2006. The accurate figure turned up in some fairly simple analysis done by the Green commission. 

Despite having access to financial records kept by the comptroller general, Noseworthy did not once report on the obvious overspending in some House of Assembly accounts until after his auditors stumbled across irregularities in 2006.

From the rings to spending by individual members of the legislature to the actual rules in place during the period, Noseworthy or his crew simply didn’t do the homework in many cases to know what they were looking at. That didn’t stop him from making claims that were baseless or that lacked evidence.

And to cap it all, Noseworthy still hasn’t completed the tasks set out for him in a 2006 cabinet order.  Instead he substituted his own commentary on individual member’s spending in an incomplete report he issued to wide media coverage.

And on that one Noseworthy also missed one fairly obvious problem in the House scandal: diversion of public money for partisan purposes. It’s obvious wrong and there was way more to it than just the $11,000 he did report.  Three times that turned up during subsequent criminal trials of former members of the House.  And while Noseworthy couldn’t have reported that while the investigations and trials were under way, it was the most fundamentally corrupt practice he should have seen raised in his original audits.

But he didn’t.

Instead, Noseworthy focused on trinkets.  In one news conference, Noseworthy said that he and his staff “did not find” any rings.  That led many to believe initially that the rings did not exist. They quickly turned up, however if one looked. Obviously, Noseworthy and his staff didn’t look.   

In perhaps the most bizarre case, Noseworthy replaced his actual recommendations for a report on government operations and substituted one he never made.  He then reported compliance with his invented recommendation in a review he produce of government compliance with his reports.

The matter gets to be all the more serious when you realise the subject of the original report was an apparent lack of adequate management of public money handed out to private sector companies.

Noseworthy has never explained the discrepancy in what he reported originally and what he claimed happened later on. Nor did Noseworthy report in his self-assessment that one of the companies covered in the original report had gone bankrupt in the intervening two years.

- srbp -

24 February 2011

Just wondering about implications

Since safety is current the responsibility of the offshore regulatory board and since that came from both the 1985 Atlantic Accord (not to be confused with the one time transfer of federal cash in 2005) will the federal and provincial government’s have to amend the original agreement in order to create a separate offshore safety board?

And if they do that, will one of the parties want to change around some other details of the deal as well?

After all, cracking open the original deal is a bit like opening Pandora’s box.  You never know what would hop out.

- srbp -

20 November 2010

Offshore board announces results of bid call

From the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (19 Nov 10):

“The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board
(C-NLOPB) announced today the results of the 2010 Call for Bids NL10-01 (Jeanne d’Arc Basin )for exploration rights in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area. Bidding closed on November 17, 2010 and successful bids were received on both parcels offered totalling $16,300,000.

The bids represent the expenditures which the bidders commit to make in exploring the respective parcels during Period I. If companies discover significant quantities of petroleum resources as a result of the exploration work, they may then seek a Significant Discovery Licence from the C-NLOPB. Any significant discovery licences issued in respect of lands resulting from these exploration licences will be subject to rentals which will escalate over time.

The following bids have been accepted:

Call for Bids NL10-01 (Jeanne D’Arc Basin)

Parcel 1 (139,617 ha)
Husky Oil Operations Limited (67%)
Repsol E & P Canada Ltd. (33%)
$1,150,000

Parcel 2 (29,783 ha)
Husky Oil Operations Limited (50%)
Statoil Canada Ltd. (50%)
$15,150,000

Subject to the bidders satisfying the requirements specified in the Call for Bids and Ministerial approval, the Board will issue an exploration licence for both parcels in January 2011. The licences will be for a term of nine years, with an initial period of five years.”

- srbp -

17 November 2010

Offshore board releases helicopter inquiry report

From the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board:

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board
(C-NLOPB) received the Report of the Offshore Helicopter Safety Inquiry today and is releasing it to the public immediately.

"On behalf of the Board, I thank Commissioner Robert Wells, commission counsel and the staff of the commission for their work during the course of Phase I of the Inquiry and with respect to the completion of this report," said Max Ruelokke, Chair and CEO of the C-NLOPB.

"I would also like to extend our thanks and appreciation to those who testified during the Inquiry for their time, commitment and contributions."

The C-NLOPB will take up to 30 days to review the recommendations and move toward the development of an implementation plan. The Board will not be commenting on the report until it has completed its review.

To obtain a print copy of this report, please contact information@cnlopb.nl.ca with a full mailing address. The report will be sent within three business days. Persons wishing to pick-up the report are asked to state this in their request.

- srbp -

20 May 2010

Special oversight for deep water drilling offshore Newfoundland and Labrador

From the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Regulatory Board:

“It is prudent practice for a regulator to conduct an internal review following an incident like the one in the Gulf of Mexico to determine if more can be done from an oversight perspective to address concerns about the risks of offshore drilling. Chevron’s plan to drill the Lona O-55 exploration well in the Orphan Basin, which was spudded on May 10, 2010, has undergone two levels of environmental assessment in accordance with C-NLOPB’s requirements and the company has met the regulatory requirements for drilling in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area. However, in light of the situation unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico and heightened public concern over drilling operations currently underway in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area, the C-NLOPB has taken the following measures for overseeing well operations at Chevron’s Lona O-55 well. We have met with Chevron in St. John’s and advised them of these measures, which are in addition to requirements contained in the Drilling and Production regulations and associated guidelines. Chevron has confirmed that they will facilitate the C-NLOPB’s oversight.

A team has been established within the C-NLOPB to provide regulatory oversight of Chevron’s operations. This team is comprised of the Chief Safety Officer, the Chief Conservation Officer, members of the Board’s Management Team and selected senior staff with extensive experience in the regulatory oversight of drilling programs. Chevron is expected to ensure the timely posting of daily reports (seven days a week) so that up-to-date information is always available to this team.

Chevron is required to meet with the C-NLOPB’s oversight team every two weeks to review matters of interest. The Board’s Chief Safety Officer will chair these meetings.

Chevron is required to provide the C-NLOPB’s Well Operations Engineer with copies of the field reports prepared in respect of the following: testing of the blowout preventer (BOP) stack; function test of the acoustic control system; function test of the Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) intervention capability and function test of the automode function (AMF) system, together with an assessment of the readiness of the ROV system in terms of equipment, procedures and spare parts.

Chevron is expected to monitor developments at the Deepwater Horizon incident and provide periodic assessments on the impact of any lessons learned from that situation to operations at Lona O-55, in particular any lessons learned with respect to well operations, BOP equipment or spill response readiness.

The frequency of audits and inspections onboard the Stena Carron will be approximately every three to four weeks. Normally, audits and inspections are conducted on offshore operators every 3-4 months.

Prior to penetrating any of the targets, Chevron must hold an operations time-out to review and verify, to the satisfaction of the Chief Safety Officer and the Chief Conservation Officer, that all appropriate equipment, systems and procedures are in place to allow operations to proceed safely and without polluting the environment.

Prior to penetrating any of the targets, Chevron should assure itself and the C-NLOPB that all personnel and equipment for spill response identified in its oil spill contingency plan are available for rapid deployment.

Chevron must also make arrangements for a representative of the C-NLOPB to be onboard the Stena Carron to observe the cementing operations of the last casing string set prior to entering any target zones. The observer will also be present to witness the BOP testing, well control drills, and results of the pressure test of the cementing job.

In the case of the BOP testing, a representative of the Certifying Authority will also be present.

In due course, Chevron must provide, for review and assessment by the C-NLOPB’s oversight team, a copy of the proposed well termination program to be issued to field personnel for implementation.

Chevron must also make the necessary arrangements for a representative of the

C-NLOPB to be onboard the Stena Carron to observe the well termination program.”

-srbp-

04 May 2010

Hebron deal may affect future offshore spill response #oilspill

Premier Danny Williams assured the people of the province on Monday that his administration will ensure that “the necessary policies, procedures and processes are put in place…” to deal with an offshore oil spill like the one in the Gulf Of Mexico.

During Question Period in the provincial legislature, Williams also said that “the people of the Province can be assured that we will adopt the best practices in the world. As we come to this process now in the Gulf of Mexico, if there are any new devices or methodologies or technologies that are developed, we will make sure that they are adopted in our offshore.”

Williams said that offshore petroleum board “is responsible primarily for any offshore problems. If it comes to any leakages or seepages that come from tankers or ship transports, then that is the responsibility, of course, of Transport Canada.”

Williams also told the legislature that “we are dealing with a heavy crude oil out there, so from a fishing perspective, there is less likelihood that it would affect the fishery although it would certainly affect the gear.”

But as Bond Papers noted exactly one year ago, under section 5.1 of the Hebron financial agreement, “The Province shall, on the request of the Proponents…support the efforts of the Proponents in responding to any future legislative and regulatory changes that may be proposed by Canada or a municipal government in the Province that might adversely affect any Development Project, provided such action does not negatively impact the Province or require the Province to take any legislative or regulatory action respecting municipalities.”

In other words, should the federal government – Transport Canada, for example – try to beef up offshore regulations, the provincial government would be obliged to oppose such changes if the oil companies felt they would “adversely affect” the Hebron development and asked the provincial government for support.

That intervention might be much easier in a situation involving heavy oil if, as the Premier asserted, “there is less likelihood that it would affect the fishery although it would certainly affect the gear.”

Of the fields in production or under development, only the Hebron field contains heavy oil.  The producing fields – Hebron, Terra Nova and White Rose – all pump light, sweet crude of about the same weight compared to water (API) as the oil currently spilling into the ocean in the Gulf of Mexico (API 34).

While prevailing winds and currents may not bring the oil from any of those fields to shore in Newfoundland and Labrador, there’s no public indication of how far across the Atlantic a spill might go and what impact it might have in Europe. 

Williams also did not discuss an contingencies to deal with an oil disaster on the south coast of the island, the coast of Labrador or in a Gulf of St. Lawrence development such as one potentially at Old Harry.

Williams did say that, as far as the provincial government’s offshore equity stakes go,  “the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador stands behind the environmental liabilities no different than the Abitibi situation. When environmental disasters happen, we go to our primary source of responsibility and then the government, of course, is the backup at the end of the day.”

-srbp-

22 February 2010

Offshore board completes strategic environmental assessment

From a news release issued earlier today:

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) has completed the “Southern Newfoundland Strategic Environmental Assessment”.

The strategic environmental assessment (SEA) was conducted with the assistance of a working group chaired by the C-NLOPB and with members from provincial and federal government departments, non-governmental agencies, the Fish Food and Allied Workers Union and local community organizations. The SEA provides an overview of the physical and biological environment, highlights sensitive areas and describes data gaps for the SEA area.

The Southern Newfoundland Strategic Environmental Assessment final report is available at the offshore board website

-srbp-

28 September 2009

Offshore board calls for land plot nominations

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) today announced a call for nominations from industry stakeholders for lands in the offshore area that would be considered for a possible call for bids in 2010.

A call for nominations is a preliminary step prior to a competitive call for bids.  It  provides interested parties with the opportunity to nominate areas of interest to be included.   CNLOPB can also nominate lands on its own initiative for inclusion.

The offshore board is not bound to proceed with a call for bids in respect of any lands nominated, nor is a nominee obligated to bid on any lands nominated and included in a subsequent call for bids.

Interested parties will have until 4:00 p.m. on November 2, 2009 to submit sealed nominations to the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board. Further information is available from the board’s website.

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25 May 2009

Offshore board S-92 inquiry release and terms of reference

Issued Monday by the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board:

C-NLOPB Announces Commission of Inquiry Terms of Reference

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board today released the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry into Matters Respecting Helicopter Passenger Safety for Workers in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

On April 16, 2009, the C-NLOPB appointed Hon. Robert Wells Q.C. to head the Commission of Inquiry.

The C-NLOPB has been working to develop the Terms of Reference and put the necessary supports in place for the Commissioner to begin his duties.

The purpose of the Inquiry is to determine what improvements can be made so that the Board can determine that the risks of helicopter transportation of offshore workers is as low as is reasonably practicable in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

The Commissioner’s mandate will be to inquire into, report on and make recommendations in respect of matters relating to the safety of offshore workers in the context of Operators’ accountability for escape, evacuation and rescue procedures while traveling by helicopter over water to installations in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area, in compliance with occupational health and safety principles and best industry practices.

Specifically, the Commissioner shall inquire into, report on and make recommendations in respect of safety plan requirements for Operators and the role that Operators play in ensuring that their safety plans are maintained by helicopter operators; search and rescue obligations of helicopter operators by way of contractual undertakings or legislative or regulatory requirements; and the role of the C-NLOPB and other regulators in ensuring compliance with legislative requirements in respect of worker safety.

Commissioner Wells stated that the process will provide ample opportunity for the public to express their views in respect of practices which will reduce risks of helicopter transportation in the offshore area.

“The public will be able to make written submissions and there will be formal and informal hearings,” said Commissioner Wells. “There will also be a need to consult other offshore safety regulators in other jurisdictions in respect of best practices and obtain the services of independent specialists with expertise in areas relevant to the Inquiry.”

The Commission of Inquiry offices are located at Tara Place, 31 Peet Street, Suite 213, St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, A1B 3W8. It is expected that the offices will be fully functional and staffed in the coming weeks.

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Terms of reference below. Media Contact: Hon. Robert Wells QC. Inquiry Commissioner (709) 753-7000 or (709) 579-0469 e-mail: robertwells@nl.rogers.com or Sean Kelly APR, FCPRS Manager of Public Relations C-NLOPB (709) 778-1219 (709) 689-0713 (cell) e-mail: skelly@cnlopb.nl.ca

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Commissioner’s Terms of Reference for the Inquiry into matter respecting helicopter passenger safety for workers in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area

 

WHEREAS the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C NLOPB) was established by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and the Government of Canada as a joint, independent, arms-length regulator of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas resources in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area;

AND WHEREAS the C-NLOPB has a mandate to interpret and apply the provisions of the Atlantic Accord and the Atlantic Accord Implementation Acts to all activities of Operators in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area and to oversee Operator compliance with those statutory provisions;

AND WHEREAS the C-NLOPB is required by legislation, before issuing an authorization for work or activity, to consider the safety of the work or activity by reviewing the system as a whole and its components, including its structures, facilities, equipment, operating procedures and personnel;

AND WHEREAS the C-NLOPB oversees the safety of Offshore Activities by review and approval of an Operator’s plans and implementation to determine that risks have been reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable;

AND WHEREAS the crash of Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A flight 491 was a serious accident in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area;

AND WHEREAS pursuant to the Accord Implementation Acts an inquiry into a serious accident is mandatory, and the C-NLOPB has determined that an inquiry into safety matters respecting transport by helicopter to the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area is essential for the C-NLOPB in carrying out its mandate as it relates to overseeing safety in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area;

NOW THEREFORE the C-NLOPB, pursuant to s. 165 of the Federal Accord Act (s. 161 of the Provincial Act), directs that an inquiry be made into safety matters respecting transport by helicopter to the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area the terms of reference of which are set out herein;

1. Establishment of the Inquiry

There is established a commission of inquiry on matters respecting worker safety associated with helicopter transportation in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area that are within the jurisdiction of the C-NLOPB. The Commissioner shall be the Honourable Robert Wells, Q.C.

2. Definitions

In these Terms of Reference,

“Accord Acts” means the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act and the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act;

“Board” means The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board;

“Commissioner” means the individual appointed pursuant to para. 165 of the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act and section 161 of the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and Labrador Act;

“Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area” means the offshore area as defined in the Accord Acts.

“Operator” means a company which has been issued an authorization pursuant to the Accord Acts to conduct work or activity within the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

“Participant” means a person who makes an oral presentation or files a written submission to the Commissioner pursuant to the Rules of Procedure and Practice;

“Rules of Procedure and Practice” means the procedures as may be implemented by the Commissioner;

“Secretariat” means the Commissioner’s support staff.

3. Purpose

The purpose of this Inquiry is to determine what improvements can be made so that the Board can determine that the risks of helicopter transportation of offshore workers is as low as is reasonably practicable in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

4. General Mandate

The Commissioner’s mandate will be to inquire into, report on and make recommendations in respect of matters relating to the safety of offshore workers in the context of Operators’ accountability for escape, evacuation and rescue procedures while traveling by helicopter over water to installations in the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area, in compliance with occupational health and safety principles and best industry practices.

5. Specific Mandate

Specifically the Commissioner shall inquire into, report on, and make recommendations in respect of:

(a) safety plan requirements for Operators and the role that Operators play in ensuring that their safety plans, as represented to and approved by the Board are maintained by helicopter operators,

(b) search and rescue obligations of helicopter operators by way of contractual undertakings or legislative or regulatory requirements,

(c) the role of the C-NLOPB and other regulators in ensuring compliance with legislative requirements in respect of worker safety.

6. Limitation

The Commissioner’s mandate does not include an examination of any issues related to the airworthiness of aircraft, training of flight crew, or flight procedures or any other matters which are included in the Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigation into Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A Crash except to the extent specifically described in paragraph 5 hereof.

The Commissioner’s mandate does not include an examination of the provision by the Government of Canada (Department of National Defence) of Search and Rescue facilities for all marine incidents and the location of such facilities within the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador

7. Powers of the Commissioner

Consistent with s. 165(2) of the Federal Accord Act and s. 161 (2) of Provincial Accord Act, the Commissioner shall be vested with the powers conferred by the Inquiries Act, R.S., 1985, c. I-11 and the Public Inquiries Act, 2006, SNL2006 c. P-38.1.

8.  Inquiry Methodology

The Commissioner shall design, make known and enforce rules, practices and procedures for the proper conduct of the Inquiry and where necessary may amend such rules, practices and procedure from time to time.

Phase I – (Parts A and B to be undertaken concurrently)

A. The Commissioner shall solicit the views of the public in respect of practices which will reduce the risks of helicopter transportation in the offshore area.

Mechanisms by which this phase of the inquiry is to be conducted made include:

(i) interviews and surveys,

(ii) calling for written submission, and

(iii) formal or informal hearings as the Commissioner deems appropriate.

B. The Commissioner shall gather information in respect of the specifically identified mandate issues described in paragraph 5 hereof.

Mechanisms by which this phase of the inquiry is to be conducted may include:

(i) research studies,

(ii) consultation with other offshore safety regulators in other jurisdictions in respect of best practices,

(iii) inspections and investigations,

(iv) calling for written submissions, and

(v) informal or formal hearings as the Commissioner deems appropriate.

  • Any information gathered by the Commissioner during Phase I of the Inquiry which in his view should be addressed by the C-NLOPB or any other regulatory agency with urgency shall be brought to the attention of the C-NLOPB at a time and in a format the Commissioner deems appropriate. 
  • To the extent that it reduces duplication of efforts and facilitates expeditious consideration of issues raised, the Commissioner shall maintain regular and frequent communication with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigation into Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A Crash.

The Commissioner may retain and as needed request the services of independent specialists whose function would be to provide information on and interpret information and issues relevant to the Inquiry. Independent specialists retained by the Commissioner may be requested by the Commissioner to appear before the Commissioner as experts.

The Commissioner shall provide a Report to the Board on completion of Phase I, which Report shall be provided by March 31, 2010 unless an extension should become necessary.

Phase II Upon completion of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada Investigation into Cougar Helicopter Sikorsky S92-A Crash, the Commissioner shall undertake a review of the Report therefrom and particularly the findings and shall advise the C-NLOPB:

(a) which findings should result in actions being recommended to be undertaken by C-NLOPB and how they should be implemented,

(b) which findings should result in actions being recommended to be undertaken by other legislative or regulatory agencies.

The Commissioner may retain and as needed request the services of independent specialists whose function would be to provide information on and interpret information and issues relevant to the Inquiry.

Independent specialists retained by the Commissioner may be requested by the Commissioner to appear before the Commissioner as experts.

Participation by Parties with Professional and Commercial Interests

The Commissioner shall provide criteria for Standing for those with professional and commercial interest in helicopter transport to the Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Area.

The Commissioner shall also provide procedures by which Standing will be granted.

Parties with Standing shall provide the Commissioner with written submissions outlining the issues within the Inquiry Mandate upon which such parties have an interest. The Commissioner may request from such parties further submissions either by way of written reports or oral presentations.

The Commissioner may provide for sessions in which evidence is presented to the Commissioner and where appropriate may allow for cross-examination of such evidence.

Scheduling

The Commissioner will provide notice of the detailed schedule and announce specific dates, locations and topics respecting the public sessions, if any, of the Inquiry. This notice will be issued a minimum of thirty (30) days prior to the start of the sessions and shall identify the specific issues on which information is being sought. The Commissioner will hold sessions at such locations, within the province of Newfoundland and Labrador, and at such times as the Commissioner deems appropriate.

9. Consultation by Commissioner with the C-NLOPB

The Commissioner, the Secretariat, or both may consult the Board for the purposes of clarifying any matters respecting the Terms of Reference, the Inquiry process and any matters relating to support of the Inquiry.

The Commissioner may consult the Board to provide information in relation to matters within the Inquiry Mandate.

The Commissioner or Secretariat shall not consult the Board for the purpose of discussing any substantive matters respecting purpose of the Inquiry and the recommendations to be made.

Notwithstanding the above provision the Commissioner shall bring to the attention of the Board matters that come to the Commissioners attention during the Inquiry that are of an immediate nature relating to any safety issues within the jurisdiction of the Board.

10. Support for Commissioner

The Board shall provide funding to the Commissioner so as to fulfill the mandate and effectively achieve the objectives of the Inquiry.

The Commissioner shall occupy such space for offices and hearing rooms and employ staff as may be necessary in consultation with the Board and in accordance with Board policy and practices.

The Commissioner may engage professional services (public relations, technology, website) so as to fulfill the mandate and effectively achieve the objectives of the Inquiry.

The Commissioner shall not express any finding or recommendations regarding criminal or civil responsibility of any person, body or organization.

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13 March 2009

News release: C-NLOPB REACTS TO LOSS OF COUGAR FLIGHT 491

The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB), issued the following statement in relation to the loss of Cougar’s Flight 491 and its fifteen passengers and two crew on route from St. John’s to the Hibernia Platform and the Sea Rose FPSO.

The C-NLOPB Board and staff wish to express deepest sympathies to the families, friends and co-workers of the passengers and crew aboard Cougar’s Flight 491. This tragedy affects all who work in the offshore oil and gas sector and all of us as Newfoundlanders and Labradorians. Our hearts and prayers go out to them.

The C-NLOPB has been working very closely with responding agencies since the incident occurred and monitoring search and rescue efforts. The ditching of Cougar’s Flight 491 is an air accident and the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are the lead agencies in the investigation of this incident. The C-NLOPB will fully cooperate with these agencies in the investigation.

The C-NLOPB will also be an observer during the recovery operation. If there are lessons to be learned from this event for the C-NLOPB, we will ensure those lessons are implemented. T

he C-NLOPB has regulatory responsibility for safety on oil and gas facilities operating in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area. The C-NLOPB verifies that operators have appropriate safety plans in place. The guidelines for the development of the Safety Plan are on the Board’s website .

The basic safety requirements for working on an offshore oil and gas facility include:

• Successful completion of a medical exam

• Completion of a basic offshore survival course

• Personnel must use certified personal protective equipment and apparel when working offshore

• Also, personnel are provided with a flight suit which must be worn during transport.

The C-NLOPB is committed to overseeing offshore oil and gas activities to verify that safety is the first priority in offshore operations.

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