John Crosbie #nlpoli #cdnpoli

Left to Right:  Bill Doody,  Brian Peckford, John Crosbie, Jane Crosbie,
and Beth Crosbie at the 1983 federal PC leadership convention

The outpouring of praise in memory of John Crosbie, who died on Thursday, has been such a flood of cliché and, in some cases, fiction that it does a disservice to the memory of one of the most significant political figures from Newfoundland and Labrador in the 20^th century.

Remarks by Edward Roberts,  Joe Clark, and Brian Mulroney were closer to the truth of the man than most. Roberts once noted that Crosbie wanted to be leader of anything he was ever involved with, starting with the Boy Scouts. Certainly, that is a testament to Crosbie’s ambition and determination, but in his interview last week, Roberts spoke plainly of Crosbie’s considerable intellectual talents that went with his ambition and determination.  

Likewise, Clark spoke of the respect that public servants and cabinet colleagues in Ottawa had for Crosbie both for his ability and for the professional way he dealt with them.  The politicians understood that Crosbie would be tough to deal with when he wanted to get his way, but they understood that Crosbie never failed to deploy the same fierceness in defence of the team when attacked from outside. The bureaucrats appreciated someone who understood their briefs, especially in portfolios like finance.

By contrast, Rex Murphy, so long removed from Newfoundland and Labrador physically and mentally that his writings on the province are a unique brand of safari journalism, gave the National Post his trademark overwrought prose.  He appears, as well, to have used an equally overwrought imagination to cover over the considerable gaps in his memory of what actually happened now almost a half century ago.  

The one thing Murphy got unmistakably right is to credit Jane Crosbie for her role in John’s political career.  Not to eulogise her before her time but Jane is as much the political force, and understood as such, as John ever was. People in Newfoundland and Labrador today who claim they want to get more women involved in politics – many of them people who know nothing of politics in the province and care even less about it – would do well to spend some time talking to Jane Crosbie and others like her. To say that “Jane was every bit his equal” may well sell Jane short, although the crucial part is that “the only difference [between the two] being she chose the off-stage role.”

From a decade of prosperity to $2 billion deficits: What happened?

By Roger Grimes

Reflecting upon becoming the eighth Premier of Newfoundland and Labrador 15 years ago this month, I found myself chatting with a few friends and associates about where the province found itself fiscally at that time, what happened during the next decade, and where we find ourselves today.

During my tenure as Premier, we were a persistent “have not” province with a deficit problem of roughly ten percent. We ran annual deficits of roughly $500 million on a total budget of $4.5 billion. Now, after a decade of unparalleled prosperity and “have” status within the Equalization system, we find ourselves with a twenty-five percent deficit problem comprised of a $2 billion deficit on an $8 billion total annual budget.

Setting the record straight on Meech Lake… again #nlpoli #cdnpoli

There may be nothing new in documents from the federal cabinet in June 1990 about the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. After all, Brian Mulroney and the federal Conservatives attacked Clyde Wells personally for the failure of the Meech Lake Accord.  Mulroney claimed there was a massive conspiracy to frustrate him.

The documents just confirm what we already knew.

But,  in the Canadian Press story about the notes from a cabinet meeting,  there is something new.  It’s a quote from a key player in the drama:

…fairness and balance for all the people of our province… #nlpoli

Excerpts from remarks by Clyde Wells, Leader of the Opposition, in the House of Assembly, in reply to the Speech from the Throne, March 10, 1988:

…We will vigorously oppose that which should be opposed.  We will criticize that which should be criticized.  We will examine and question everything.  It is our duty and our function.

Finally, we will approve the worthy and the proper.

Above all, we will discharge that great responsibility that all oppositions in the British parliamentary system have:  to make sure that government fully and completely accounts to the electorate for the expenditure of taxpayers’ funds, for the use of taxation authority, and for the management of the public affairs of this province, and we will not waver in our duty to ensure that they fully discharge the total responsibility with which they have been entrusted when they were given the awesome powers of being a government.

They are awesome powers but they are not theirs.  They are only holding them in trust for due exercise for the benefit of the people of this province and we will not waver in discharging our responsibility to make sure that the government does just that.

In doing so…we will act honourably.  We will neither unduly impede nor will we unduly facilitate, which, from an Opposition point of view, is worse than unduly impeding, … [If] you  unduly facilitate and you fail to fully and properly discharge your responsibility to be fully critical of the government and examine in detail what they are doing, you allow the government to do anything it wishes, the government deteriorates in quality …We will do so with respect for the function and responsibility of the government, we will acknowledge their good intentions, but we will expect similar acknowledgement and respect from government in return.

…the ultimate purpose of Opposition actions ought not to be to get them on the government side of the House.  As well as achieving that, our purpose is to ensure the betterment of the people of Newfoundland and Labrador, to bring about a situation where the able are working productively and the unable are cared for and are included in the activities of the life of this province, where the old can feel secure and comfortable and the young are preparing for and are optimistic and have a reason to be optimistic about their future, where everybody is participating, where everybody has equal opportunity.

We will be taking steps to ensure that there is fairness and balance, always fairness and balance for all people of this province in all governmental actions and in all governmental expenditures wherever they live, without regard to the political stripe of their MHA…

- srbp -

Former Hydro director points to another alternative to costly Muskrat Falls scheme

Add Edward Hearn, a former director of Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro to the growing list of people publicly questioning the proposed Muskrat Falls development.

In a letter to the editor of the Telegram, Hearn supports former Tory finance minister Dr. John Collins’ criticisms of the project.

Hearn says the project is liable to huge cost over-runs and that the resulting energy may be too costly to attract industrial development in the province.

Hearn suggests the province’s energy corporation should explore alternatives, including exercising taxation powers under the constitution.

While he doesn’t state it explicitly, Hearn is referring to the potential use of the public utilities board powers under the 1994 Electrical Power Control Act.  That Act was designed in part to allow the PUB to allocate power generated in the province for domestic use in a way that would not violate the terms of the 1961 Churchill Falls lease or the 1969 Churchill Falls power contract.

Under sections 8 and 9 of the EPCA, the public utilities board may order producers and transmitters to meet a power allocation ordered by the board.  The order would have to come as a result of an inquiry ordered under section 7:

(1)   Where a producer or a retailer believes that it may not be able to supply power sufficient to satisfy the current or anticipated power demands of its customers and prospective customers in accordance with the power policy set out in section 3, it may request the public utilities board to conduct an inquiry into the matter.

The Clyde Wells administration revised the Electrical Power Control Act in 1994.  The basis for the new Act was a report presented to the Brian Peckford administration in 1986 by Wells and other officials of Newfoundland Power at the time.  The Act as it was originally laid out applied equally to all electricity producers and transmitters in the province.

In answering a question from opposition leader Len Simms at the time, Wells said:

It authorizes the Public Utilities Board to redirect any power - any power, no exceptions - to meet the needs of the people of this Province. Not expropriating anything from anybody. It is to manage the power that is generated in this Province in such a manner as to first and foremost meet the needs of the people of this Province. It makes no specific reference to Upper Churchill. It makes no specific reference to power companies. It makes no specific reference to any individual generator of power.

What it does is establish the principle that the Public Utilities Board has to supervise the management of all hydroelectric power generated in the Province in such a manner as to meet first and foremost the needs of the people of this Province, and it sets guidelines as to what are the principles under which they can do it.

Wells introduced the bill at second reading on March 3 when he described the Act in detail.

- srbp -

Scuttling his own political future

Senator Fabian Manning went a long way this week to ensuring he won’t be able to make a comeback in elected politics any time soon.

The guy who beat him – Scott Andrews – revealed that Manning had committed the federal government to spend a couple of million or thereabouts on a road in the eastern end of the riding Manning used to represent. 

Only problem was the money wasn’t anything close to approved when manning made the announcement in late 2007.  Not only that but it wasn’t approved until this week and hastily announced the day Andrews scored a big political smack right in Manning’s possible future.

Manning did some media interviews on the affair.  In the process, he managed to come off looking like a guy scrambling to come up with excuses for his obvious blunder.

In the story printed by the Telegram (not online), writer Dave Bartlett attributes the following to the junior senator:

The senator then explained what happened.

He said the original project was funded under the Rails for Roads agreement, but the provincial Liberal government of Clyde Wells scuttled that program in 1988.

Neat trick that would be.

The federal and provincial governments signed the Roads for Rails agreement (see page 11 of the link) in 1988.  In exchange for money to upgrade roads across the island portion of the province, the federal government was relieved of its constitutional obligation under the 1948 Terms of Union to operate a rail service across Newfoundland.

In 1998, Brian Peckford sat in the Premier’s Office.  Clyde Wells was Leader of the opposition and didn’t get to the Eighth Floor until May, 1989.

But even then, Manning’s accusation that Wells scuttled the roads deal is completely out to lunch.  From 1988 until the program ended in 2003, the roads deal paid for a host of projects all of which were pretty well mapped out at the start, the year before Wells took office.

Not only did Fabe make the blunder of announcing money he didn’t have, he then made it infinitely worse by coming up with a completely bogus excuse once he got caught.

And it’s not like Manning wouldn’t know the rights of things.  He sat in the House of Assembly from 1993 until his local Tory buddies flicked him out of caucus.  Every year , Manning would have heard announcements about roadwork paid for by the Roads for Rails agreement.

Heck, even Loyola Hearn knew that the roads deal didn’t die in 1988.  CBC quoted Hearn on the very same announcement Manning was chatting up in December 2007:

Hearn, Newfoundland and Labrador's federal cabinet representative, said it's the biggest program of its kind since the roads-for-rails agreement hammered out in the late 1980s, when the Newfoundland Railway was closed down.

All things considered, Manning would be nuts to even consider taking another run at elected politics.  Better off  to sit in the Antechamber to the Kingdom of Heaven than blow holes in your own political hull the size of that one on the CBS bypass road.

-srbp-

"Reality Check" reality check on Equalization and the Family Feud

The crew that put together's CBC's usually fine "Reality Check" can be forgiven if they missed a few points by a country mile in a summary of the Family Feud.

Forgiveness is easy since the issues involved are complex and  - at least on the provincial side since 2003 - there has never been a clear statement of what was going on.  Regular Bond Papers readers will be familiar with that.  For others, just flip back to the archives for 2005 and the story is laid out there.

Let's see if we can sort through some of the high points here.

With its fragile economy, Newfoundland and Labrador has always depended on money from the federal government. When they struck oil off the coast, the federal government concluded it would not have to continue shelling out as much money to the provincial treasury. N.L.'s oil would save Ottawa money.

Not really.

Newfoundland and Labrador is no different from most provinces in the country, at least as far as Equalization goes.  Since 1957 - when the current Equalization program started - the provincial government has received that particular form of federal transfer.  So have all the others, at various times, except Ontario.  Quebec remains one of the biggest recipients of Equalization cash, if not on a per capita basis than on a total basis. Economic "fragility" has nothing to do with receiving Equalization.

In the dispute over jurisdiction over the offshore, there was never much of a dispute as far as Equalization fundamentally works.

Had Brian Peckford's view prevailed in 1983/1984, Equalization would have worked just as it always has.  As soon as the province's own source revenues went beyond the national average, the Equalization transfers would have stopped.

Period.

That didn't work out.  Both the Supreme Court of Newfoundland (as it then was called) and in the Supreme Court of Canada, both courts found that jurisdiction over the offshore rested solely with the Government of Canada.  All the royalties went with it.

In the 1985 Atlantic Accord, the Brian Mulroney and Brian Peckford governments worked out a joint management deal.  Under that agreement - the one that is most important for Newfoundland and Labrador - the provincial government sets and collects royalties as if the oil and gas were on land.

And here's the big thing:  the provincial government keeps every single penny.  It always has and always will, as long as the 1985 Accord is in force.

As far as Equalization is concerned, both governments agreed that Equalization would work as it always had.  When a provincial government makes more money on its own than the national average, the Equalization cash stops.

But...they agreed that for a limited period of time, the provincial government would get a special transfer, based on Equalization that would offset the drop in Equalization that came as oil revenues grew.  Not only was the extra cash limited in time, it would also decline such that 12 years after the first oil, there'd be no extra payment.

If the province didn't qualify for Equalization at that point, then that's all there was.  If it still fell under the average, then it would get whatever Equalization it was entitled to under the program at the time.

The CBC reality check leaves a huge gap as far as that goes, making it seem as though the whole thing came down to an argument between Danny Williams and Paul Martin and then Danny and Stephen Harper.

Nothing could be further from the truth, to use an overworked phrase.

During negotiations on the Hibernia project, the provincial government realized the formula wouldn't work out as intended. Rather than leave the provincial government with some extra cash, the 1985 deal would actually function just like there was no offset clause. For every dollar of new cash in from oil, the Equalization system would drop Newfoundland's entitlement by 97 cents, net.

The first efforts to raise this issue - by Clyde Wells and energy minister Rex Gibbons in 1990 - were rebuffed by the Mulroney Conservatives.  They didn't pussy foot around. John Crosbie accused the provincial government of biting the hand that fed it and of wanting to eat its cake and "vomit it up" as well.

It wasn't until the Liberal victory in 1993 that the first efforts were made to address the problem.  Prime Jean Chretien and finance minister Paul Martin amended the Equalization formula to give the provincial government an option of shielding up to 30% of its oil revenue from Equalization calculations.  That option wasn't time limited and for the 12 years in which the 1985 deal allowed for offsets the provincial government could always have the chance to pick the option that gave the most cash.  It only picked the wrong option once.

The Equalization issue remained a cause celebre, especially for those who had been involved in the original negotiations.  It resurfaced in the a 2003 provincial government royal commission study which introduced the idea of a clawback into the vocabulary.  The presentation in the commission reported grossly distorted the reality and the history involved. Some charts that purported to show the financial issues bordered on fraud.

Danny Williams took up the issue in 2004 with the Martin administration and fought a pitched battle - largely in public - over the issue.  He gave a taste of his anti-Ottawa rhetoric in a 2001 speech to Nova Scotia Tories. Little in the way of formal correspondence appears to have been exchanged throughout the early part of 2004.  Up to the fall of 2004 - when detailed discussions started -  the provincial government offered three different versions of what it was looking for.  None matched the final agreement.

The CBC "Reality Check" describes the 2005 agreement this way:

The agreement was that the calculation of equalization payments to Newfoundland and Labrador would not include oil revenue. As the saying goes, oil revenues would not be clawed back. Martin agreed and then-opposition leader Harper also agreed.

Simply put, that's dead wrong.

The 2005 deal provided for another type of transfer to Newfoundland and Labrador from Ottawa on top of the 1985 offset payment.  The Equalization program was not changed in any way. Until the substantive changes to Equalization under Stephen Harper 100% of oil revenues was included to calculate Equalization entitlements.  That's exactly what Danny Williams stated as provincial government policy in January 2006, incidentally.  The Harper changes hid 50% of all non-renewable resource revenues from Equalization (oil and mining) and imposed a cap on total transfers.

As for the revenues being "clawed back", one of the key terms of the 2005 deal is that the whole thing operates based on the Equalization formula that is in place at any given time. Oil revenues are treated like gas taxes, income tax, sales tax, motor vehicle registration and any other type of provincial own-source revenue, just like they have been as long as Equalization has been around.

What the federal Conservatives proposed in 2004 and 2006 as a part of their campaign platform - not just in a letter to Danny Williams - was to let all provinces hide their revenues from oil, gas and other non-renewable resources from the Equalization calculations.  The offer didn't apply just to one province.  Had it been implemented, it would have applied to all. 

That was clear enough until the Harper government produced its budget 18 months ago. What was clear on budget day became a bit murky a few days later when Wade Locke of Memorial University of Newfoundland began to take a hard look at the numbers.

Again, that's pretty much dead wrong.

It became clear shortly after Harper took office in 2006 that the 100% exclusion idea from the 2004 and 2006 campaigns would be abandoned in favour of something else.  There was nothing murky about it at all. So plain was the problem that at least one local newspaper reported on a fracas at the Provincial Conservative convention in October 2006 supposedly involving the Premier's brother and the Conservative party's national president. That's when the Family Feud started.

As for the 2007 budget bills which amended both the 1985 and 2005 agreements between Ottawa and St. John's, there's a serious question as to whether the provincial government actually consented to the amendments as required under the 1985 Atlantic Accord.

The story about Equalization is a long one and the Family Feud - a.k.a the ABC campaign - has a complex history.  There's no shame in missing some points.  It's just so unusual that CBC's "Reality Check" was so widely off base.

-srbp-

Williams lowers expectations for Lower Churchill...again

In an interview with The Telegram, Premier Danny Williams admits there are considerable hurdles to overcome in developing the Lower Churchill hydroelectric project. The story isn't available online.  [Amended;  by request, we've removed the article from the post. If it turns up online, we'll supply a link.]

Williams repeated his January estimate that the chances of the project going ahead are 50/50.

"Well, at best that would be late 2009," said Williams. "We're going through the environmental process. We're attempting to reach agreement with the Labrador Innu. I'm optimistic that can happen. (Then we'll
decide) what the nature of the project will be and get the financials in place and be ready to rock'n'roll."

Take that statement as being an admission the project is unlikely to proceed at all. The crucial element is project financing. If that isn't even being reviewed until 2009 - at the earliest - then it's a well as saying the project is not happening in the near future.

In the interview Williams exaggerates the development issues, referring to them as hurdles, and claiming that the hurdles are larger than on other mega-projects either under development or under consideration in the province. The other projects are all private sector ones.

The development issues aren't larger.

It all boils down to markets for the power and financing to make it happen.

In 2005, Williams rejected a joint project with Ontario and Quebec which would have seen both provinces purchase the power and assist in the financing and construction.

Williams rejected the proposal without explanation, inserting instead a so-called "go-it-alone" option which had not be evaluated by Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro or government officials before it was publicly announced. However, even in announcing his own idea of having the provincial government build project on its own, he left the door open to equity partners.

Shortly after he went to the federal government looking for a loan guarantee, still insisting the provincial government would build the Lower Churchill project - estimated to cost between $6.0 and $9.0 billion - on its own.

Despite receiving no such commitment from Stephen Harper, Williams insisted Harper promised a loan guarantee and used it as part of his political feud with his fellow Conservative first minister.

Williams has announced only two potential customers for Lower Churchill power. The State of Rhode Island and Nova Scotia's Emera have signed separate memoranda of understanding committing to explore the possibility of purchasing Lower Churchill power.

Beyond that, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro has had no serious discussions with potential external customers for the project's estimated 2800 megawatts. Even the plan to sell power to eastern Newfoundland - covering at least $2.0 billion of the total project cost - is contingent on the project going forward. That idea, floated by natural resources minister Kathy Dunderdale just before last fall's provincial election seemed to confuse the radio host interviewing her at the time since she insisted the plan wouldn't increase electrical power rates on the Avalon peninsula.

The Lower Churchill project figured prominently in several campaign announcements both during last year's Summer of Love pre-election spending spree and in the energy plan campaign prop.

There are some factual errors in the Peter Walsh story. The Wells administration came close to a deal on the Lower Churchill in the early 1990s, however political issues at the time and changed economic circumstances scuttled the negotiations.

Brian Tobin used development on Churchill River as the start of a re-election campaign he started in 1998. Ultimately none of his promised development occurred.

Roger Grimes had a tentative deal to develop the Lower Churchill but it was scuttled by political opposition within his own caucus and cabinet, heightened by the dramatic resignation of Hydro chairman and Williams associate Dean Macdonald from the Hydro board.

Walsh also repeats a claim that the 1969 Churchill Falls deal has produced $19 billion in revenue for Hydro Quebec versus $1.0 billion for Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro. Those figures are not substantiated by any factual analysis. It is, however, a popular myth.

-srbp-

Clyde Wells on the economy and stuff, circa, 1994

From broadcasttherock.com, Clyde Wells' 1994 speech to the graduating class at the School of Business.

We won't imbed these clips since they are set up to start automatically once you load the page. This is a quirk Broadcast should work out.

This is part one, including a tiny piece of the introduction and here's part two of the speech.

-srbp-