Left to Right: Bill Doody, Brian Peckford, John Crosbie, Jane Crosbie, and Beth Crosbie at the 1983 federal PC leadership convention |
The real political division in society is between authoritarians and libertarians.
13 January 2020
John Crosbie #nlpoli #cdnpoli
13 July 2015
Cripple you say? #nlpoli
Unnamed Conservative “insiders” have been talking about the Ches Crosbie nomination fiasco as if it was a rejection of a new Tory Jesus or something.
The way they talk you’d think people are waiting breathlessly for the pictures on Jane Crosbie’s Twitter feed of young Ches taking his first steps across Virginia Lake, just as his father and grandfather did at his tender age without getting so much as a bunion moistened.
Some of these nameless Conservatives - to use the words from the CBC story – .”believe Ches Crosbie could have raised at least $100,000 by now for his run in Avalon. Many of those donors will now sit on their wallets rather than give cash to another candidate.”
Now that’s an interesting claim.
10 July 2015
Overcooked Ambition #nlpoli
Nameless Conservative Party insiders predict that without Ches Crosbie as a candidate, the federal Conservative party will be crippled in Newfoundland and Labrador in the next election.
Supposedly Ches could have raised $100,000 dollars already. But without Ches, they won’t raise a penny. Volunteers will stay home, too.
But here’s the thing:
CBC’s story on Thursday is essentially more of the same completely preposterous Ches-the-Saviour-of-the-Conservative-Nation fairy tale that John and Jane Crosbie have been shovelling since Canada Day.
06 July 2015
Impotence and weakness #nlpoli
If you take John Crosbie’s version at face value, the Conservative Party rejected his son Ches as a candidate for the party in Avalon because of the intervention of David Wells.
Wells, the son of retired justice Robert Wells, is a senator from Newfoundland and Labrador. He is also an influential Conservative, the sort of fellow who normally goes about his business largely out of the public spotlight. .
Thanks to Crosbie, Wells is in the public eye. According to Crosbie, Wells didn’t “want Ches to be elected as an MP in the district of Avalon or any federal district because he would be too independent-minded and [Wells] wouldn't be in control as he has been now for a couple of years of most of the transactions between Newfoundland and the federal government.”
What the venerable Conservative was doing with that accusation was telling us less about the specific events that led to Ches’ rejection and more about a bigger story behind the scenes in Conservative politics.
02 July 2015
John Crosbie and the Last Crusade #nlpoli #cdnpoli
Every story told thus far about Ches Crosbie and the riding in Avalon has the unmistakeable odour of bullshit about it.
The latest twist, namely that Senator David Wells was scuttling a potential rival as The Biggest Conservative in Newfoundland and Labrador, is a bit more in the realm of plausible but it still doesn’t quite ring true.
Jihad against people who dissed Harper?
03 June 2014
John, Danny, and voter apathy #nlpoli
Every now and again, someone will talk about voter apathy.
Last week, Steve Kent was circulating the link to an article that claimed that youth engagement – getting young people more involved in the community and in politics – was a way of getting more people to vote at election time.
That’s what voter apathy is about, by the way: low voter turn-out at the polls. It’s a big issue in most of Europe and in North America. we’ll get back to it in a minute.
Kent was so keen on this article because he is working hard to become the youth engagement guru of Newfoundland and Labrador. He is especially proud of his first bill in the legislature – Bill 6 – that included a couple of clauses that say a town council can name people under the age of 18 years to positions called “youth representatives.”
27 May 2013
Like Father. Like Son. #nlpoli
So after a teaser column in the Telegram last week that was more creative fiction than serious history or memoir, John Crosbie explained why he loves the Muskrat Falls project in this Saturday’s instalment of Geriatric Townie Pass-times.
It’s really simple.
The project will be splendiferous.
Phantasmagorical.
Amazingly, marvellously, Keebler-elves-kinda-magical.
22 May 2013
There’s no crap like old crap #nlpoli
03 July 2012
What the cod moratorium wrought #nlpoli
Surely the one making the most cash is Ryan Cleary, pulling down a pay cheque as a member of parliament partly on the pledge to have an inquiry into why there are no cod. Hint: a whole bunch of people, including Cleary’s friend Gus Etchegary, killed just about all of them.
If he had been around a century and a half ago, Cleary would have been campaigning to find out where all the Great Auks went. Hint: we killed them all.
29 June 2012
And he is still wrong #nlpoli
The guy who helped create the monster called Nalcor thinks Muskrat Falls is a great idea.
But Lieutenant Governor John Crosbie backs it for a completely wrong reason.
20 May 2010
Cartoon U 3 – the fishery (part the first)
Specifically a gear replacement program funded by the provincial government and used by many fishermen as a subsidy to help them upgrade their equipment.
Walter Carter, the newly-appointed fisheries minister, holds up a stinky left-over from his two predecessors, John Crosbie and Harold Collins. All three men held the fisheries portfolio in succession in 1974. It used to be an important department.
Children and those with very short-term memories will notice that in those days cabinet ministers could actually operate without instructions from the Old Man of the day.
-srbp-
20 September 2008
"Reality Check" reality check on Equalization and the Family Feud
The crew that put together's CBC's usually fine "Reality Check" can be forgiven if they missed a few points by a country mile in a summary of the Family Feud.
Forgiveness is easy since the issues involved are complex and - at least on the provincial side since 2003 - there has never been a clear statement of what was going on. Regular Bond Papers readers will be familiar with that. For others, just flip back to the archives for 2005 and the story is laid out there.
Let's see if we can sort through some of the high points here.
With its fragile economy, Newfoundland and Labrador has always depended on money from the federal government. When they struck oil off the coast, the federal government concluded it would not have to continue shelling out as much money to the provincial treasury. N.L.'s oil would save Ottawa money.
Not really.
Newfoundland and Labrador is no different from most provinces in the country, at least as far as Equalization goes. Since 1957 - when the current Equalization program started - the provincial government has received that particular form of federal transfer. So have all the others, at various times, except Ontario. Quebec remains one of the biggest recipients of Equalization cash, if not on a per capita basis than on a total basis. Economic "fragility" has nothing to do with receiving Equalization.
In the dispute over jurisdiction over the offshore, there was never much of a dispute as far as Equalization fundamentally works.
Had Brian Peckford's view prevailed in 1983/1984, Equalization would have worked just as it always has. As soon as the province's own source revenues went beyond the national average, the Equalization transfers would have stopped.
Period.
That didn't work out. Both the Supreme Court of Newfoundland (as it then was called) and in the Supreme Court of Canada, both courts found that jurisdiction over the offshore rested solely with the Government of Canada. All the royalties went with it.
In the 1985 Atlantic Accord, the Brian Mulroney and Brian Peckford governments worked out a joint management deal. Under that agreement - the one that is most important for Newfoundland and Labrador - the provincial government sets and collects royalties as if the oil and gas were on land.
And here's the big thing: the provincial government keeps every single penny. It always has and always will, as long as the 1985 Accord is in force.
As far as Equalization is concerned, both governments agreed that Equalization would work as it always had. When a provincial government makes more money on its own than the national average, the Equalization cash stops.
But...they agreed that for a limited period of time, the provincial government would get a special transfer, based on Equalization that would offset the drop in Equalization that came as oil revenues grew. Not only was the extra cash limited in time, it would also decline such that 12 years after the first oil, there'd be no extra payment.
If the province didn't qualify for Equalization at that point, then that's all there was. If it still fell under the average, then it would get whatever Equalization it was entitled to under the program at the time.
The CBC reality check leaves a huge gap as far as that goes, making it seem as though the whole thing came down to an argument between Danny Williams and Paul Martin and then Danny and Stephen Harper.
Nothing could be further from the truth, to use an overworked phrase.
During negotiations on the Hibernia project, the provincial government realized the formula wouldn't work out as intended. Rather than leave the provincial government with some extra cash, the 1985 deal would actually function just like there was no offset clause. For every dollar of new cash in from oil, the Equalization system would drop Newfoundland's entitlement by 97 cents, net.
The first efforts to raise this issue - by Clyde Wells and energy minister Rex Gibbons in 1990 - were rebuffed by the Mulroney Conservatives. They didn't pussy foot around. John Crosbie accused the provincial government of biting the hand that fed it and of wanting to eat its cake and "vomit it up" as well.
It wasn't until the Liberal victory in 1993 that the first efforts were made to address the problem. Prime Jean Chretien and finance minister Paul Martin amended the Equalization formula to give the provincial government an option of shielding up to 30% of its oil revenue from Equalization calculations. That option wasn't time limited and for the 12 years in which the 1985 deal allowed for offsets the provincial government could always have the chance to pick the option that gave the most cash. It only picked the wrong option once.
The Equalization issue remained a cause celebre, especially for those who had been involved in the original negotiations. It resurfaced in the a 2003 provincial government royal commission study which introduced the idea of a clawback into the vocabulary. The presentation in the commission reported grossly distorted the reality and the history involved. Some charts that purported to show the financial issues bordered on fraud.
Danny Williams took up the issue in 2004 with the Martin administration and fought a pitched battle - largely in public - over the issue. He gave a taste of his anti-Ottawa rhetoric in a 2001 speech to Nova Scotia Tories. Little in the way of formal correspondence appears to have been exchanged throughout the early part of 2004. Up to the fall of 2004 - when detailed discussions started - the provincial government offered three different versions of what it was looking for. None matched the final agreement.
The CBC "Reality Check" describes the 2005 agreement this way:
The agreement was that the calculation of equalization payments to Newfoundland and Labrador would not include oil revenue. As the saying goes, oil revenues would not be clawed back. Martin agreed and then-opposition leader Harper also agreed.
Simply put, that's dead wrong.
The 2005 deal provided for another type of transfer to Newfoundland and Labrador from Ottawa on top of the 1985 offset payment. The Equalization program was not changed in any way. Until the substantive changes to Equalization under Stephen Harper 100% of oil revenues was included to calculate Equalization entitlements. That's exactly what Danny Williams stated as provincial government policy in January 2006, incidentally. The Harper changes hid 50% of all non-renewable resource revenues from Equalization (oil and mining) and imposed a cap on total transfers.
As for the revenues being "clawed back", one of the key terms of the 2005 deal is that the whole thing operates based on the Equalization formula that is in place at any given time. Oil revenues are treated like gas taxes, income tax, sales tax, motor vehicle registration and any other type of provincial own-source revenue, just like they have been as long as Equalization has been around.
What the federal Conservatives proposed in 2004 and 2006 as a part of their campaign platform - not just in a letter to Danny Williams - was to let all provinces hide their revenues from oil, gas and other non-renewable resources from the Equalization calculations. The offer didn't apply just to one province. Had it been implemented, it would have applied to all.
That was clear enough until the Harper government produced its budget 18 months ago. What was clear on budget day became a bit murky a few days later when Wade Locke of Memorial University of Newfoundland began to take a hard look at the numbers.
Again, that's pretty much dead wrong.
It became clear shortly after Harper took office in 2006 that the 100% exclusion idea from the 2004 and 2006 campaigns would be abandoned in favour of something else. There was nothing murky about it at all. So plain was the problem that at least one local newspaper reported on a fracas at the Provincial Conservative convention in October 2006 supposedly involving the Premier's brother and the Conservative party's national president. That's when the Family Feud started.
As for the 2007 budget bills which amended both the 1985 and 2005 agreements between Ottawa and St. John's, there's a serious question as to whether the provincial government actually consented to the amendments as required under the 1985 Atlantic Accord.
The story about Equalization is a long one and the Family Feud - a.k.a the ABC campaign - has a complex history. There's no shame in missing some points. It's just so unusual that CBC's "Reality Check" was so widely off base.
-srbp-
08 June 2007
The disingenuous Mr. Crosbie
He builds his claim on the contention that it was the intention of the Government of Canada in 1985 - when he was the Newfoundland and Labrador regional minister - to ensure that under the real Atlantic Accord the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador would receive 100% of oil and gas revenues as well as Equalization in full as if the oil revenues did not exist. He appears to be saying that it was the intention to have this situation continue in perpetuity.
Mr. Crosbie is either:
1. Extremely forgetful;
2. Deliberately misleading the people of Canada and in particular, the people of Newfoundland and Labrador; or,
3. Attempting to blame others for his own failures in 1985.
Either way, the 1985 Atlantic Accord makes no such provision as Mr. Crosbie claims.
Indeed in 1990, Mr. Crosbie himself specifically dismissed the issue - with characteristic sneering condescension - as being a case of the provincial government attempting to bite the hand that fed the province.
Mr. Crosbie's efforts at historic revisionism make Stalinist photo retouchers look like kindergarten finger painters.
Following is an extract from an unpublished follow-on paper to Which is to be master?
Additionally, specific sections of the Mulroney offer, and of the Atlantic Accord, deal with Equalization. It is important to note that these are not included in the section on revenue sharing in either document. Therefore, Equalization was not seen by either parties to the Atlantic Accord as representing a form of revenue to be shared among the parties. The Mulroney letter contains the sentence: “The Current [sic] Equalization provisions will apply.” This clearly established that the Atlantic Accord and any revenues related to offshore oil would be subject to the Equalization program; as such, the provincial government’s Equalization entitlement would normally be reduced by growth in offshore oil revenue.Whatever the reasons for Mr. Crosbie's claims about federal (i.e. his intentions) in the 1985 Atlantic Accord, there is no question that what he claims today is simply not true.
The Mulroney offer contained a caveat that there should not be a dollar-for-dollar loss of Equalization payments as provincial own-source revenues increased from oil production. As such the Atlantic Accord contains a section to provide a payment to the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador in the form of an Equalization offset. It is clear from the structure of this section of the Accord and of the enabling legislation that the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador accepted this offset as a temporary, transitional and declining offset.
The offset mechanism established in the original Atlantic Accord did not provide the level of Equalization protection implied in Mulroney’s letter, although it matched in general outline the declining format he proposed in June 1984. The offset provisions of the Atlantic Accord, as signed in 1985, had the effect of shielding only three cents of every dollar in oil revenue from Equalization.
This was apparent by 1989-90 and was raised publicly by the Wells administration following the signing of the Hibernia agreement. In a speech in Clarenville, Premier Clyde Wells countered arguments that Hibernia was a massive make-work scheme by pointing to the direct and indirect benefits accruing to the Government of Canada. One of those benefits was reduced federal transfer payments to Newfoundland and Labrador. John Crosbie dismissed complaints about reduced transfer payments in this way:"That’s the whole point to the [Equalization] formula… This is nothing to complain about; this is something to be joyous about. So why would they try to pretend that Newfoundland gains nothing from the royalties? I mean this is absolutely bloody nonsense…".*The Wells administration had been briefed on this aspect of the Accord prior to the Hibernia signing and a further brief was sent to cabinet in December 1990 ; it is likely the shortcomings of the federal proposal were known in 1985.
In a 1991 assessment conducted for the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Memorial University, economist Wade Locke confirmed that the Accord offset actually shielded as little as 3% of provincial revenues from Equalization. Locke had earlier cautioned against public expectation that Hibernia development would cure the province’s unemployment or debt problems. In an article published in the Newfoundland Quarterly, Locke concluded that "[w]hile it may be true that the sun will shine one day, it does not appear that have not will be no more because of Hibernia." Similar cautionary flags had been raised by Doug House and others, as early as the environmental review of Hibernia in 1983.
His own words condemn him.
07 April 2007
Is the goal a 1948 do-over referendum?
There are a few factual errors, but nothing that undermines the core point of the piece. Overall, there is a summary of the current state of the erstwhile nation of Dannyland. The picture isn't good. There's no way to make it good and it is the branding of this province as Dannyland that ultimately undermines whatever the triffid logo thing could possibly do.
A look at Newfoundland's history through a local lens explains why Mr. Williams' attacks on big business and Ottawa play so well around the kitchen tables of Gander and Corner Brook. Dragged into Confederation by the narrowest margin, the formerly independent colony has been rewarded with collapsed cod stocks, a hydro deal that virtually donates electricity to Quebec (which resells it to Americans for a tidy profit), two generations of talented young people decamping for work in Alberta and elsewhere, and the largest per capita debt and highest unemployment in Canada.
Cynics outside the province might suggest Newfoundlanders had something to do with bad economic planning, but locally, says Mr. [John] Crosbie, the feeling is "we're always being outsmarted and done in by mainlanders."Since this piece was written by a mainlander, he can be forgiven for assuming every single person on what the Post calls The Rock - a word destined to join the other "n" word on the list of banned ethnic slurs - buys into the nationalist mythology on which the latest caudillo thrives.
Rick Mercer, no longer living here, can also be forgiven for mistaking the appearance of near-unanimity back home as a sign that there is, in fact, near unanimous agreement with the Premier's goals even if there is a quibble about tactics. If we define the goal as motherhood and blueberry duff, then that would be true.
But it isn't the goal and so there are growing questions that run deeper than the correctness of the Premier's rant-du-jour. What exactly is this "fair share" Williams keeps talking about? What would a better deal on oil or Confederation look like so we can help spot it when it shows up? Williams himself apparently has no idea and so Newfoundlanders and Labradorians increasingly wonder what he is up to.
Is he planning to create the climate in which the fall election will turn into a referendum on Confederation? Is the first townie premier to run the place since well before the townies put 'er up on the rocks in 1934 going to take give the nationalist townies a do-over on the 1948 referendum? Only his man in the Blue Line cab likely knows for sure.
Since we are on the subject of wider goals, Offal News returns to that issue today. The cause is confirmation from the oil industry that there are no talks going on with the provincial government regarding Hebron. It isn't like Simon Lono has said that before, and been right. it is that Williams has suggsted there were talks going on - yet again - and yet again, the facts are something else.
Once you are done there, take a glance at nottawa. Mark Watton notes - riffing on the Post piece - that Williams makes much of the idea that he is on a self-less mission of good, that he doesn't need the job of Premier because he is independently wealthy.
nottawa points out that anywhere else in the a country a federal politician who tried the same sanctimonious, self-serving line on the press gallery, they would - to use a local phrase - have his guts for garters. He's absolutely correct.
What the Post doesn't say, though, likely because of their interview subjects, is that the demagogues of post-Confederation Newfoundland all wound up chased from office in some measure of public disrepute. At the risk of blasphemy, the same people who threw palm fronds to line the path of their newest saviour were among the first to line his via dolorosa and jeer.
Smallwood.
Peckford.
Tobin.
It is a short list, distinguished by nothing else if only by the volume of spittle ejected by anyone mentioning their name these days.
Danny Williams knows it.
That's one of the reasons why he reputedly detests the comparisons to people like Smallwood.
That's why - only three years into his mandate, Williams has already announced he'll be packing it in soon. That's why he is hunting for some sort of legacy, some sort of brand, other than the one he has already claimed for himself.
It's too late of course.
On this Easter weekend, and in the religion of Newfoundland politics, we need only wonder who will be playing the role of Barabas in the latest version of the pageant.