Showing posts sorted by date for query clawback. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query clawback. Sort by relevance Show all posts

28 August 2015

Chainsaw Earle keeps austerity on the table #nlpoli

NDP leader Earle McCurdy called the province’s major open line show on Thursday and by the sounds of things he hasn’t backed off the position that the size of the government’s financial problems will mean more cuts.

Sure he said he was opposed to austerity,  but what Earle did say was that the government will have to cut jobs, lay people off and slash spending to cope with its financial problems. 

Potato, potato, Earle.

21 August 2015

Moral victory: saying yes to less #nlpoli

A couple of years after his war with one prime minister, Danny Williams was locked in another war with another federal first minister.

Williams was demanding compensation for yet another supposed injustice. 

“What I said before and I said going in, this is about principles,”  Williams told reporters in November 2007 “but it's also about money as well. At the end of the day, the promise and the principle converts to cash for the bottom line ….”

The pattern set in 2004 was repeating itself.   

17 August 2015

The 2004 war with Ottawa revisited #nlpoli

The 2004 “war” with Ottawa over a version of federal Equalization payments to Newfoundland and Labrador is an early episode in the provincial Conservative administration.

The confrontation helped propel Premier Danny Williams to unprecedented heights of popularity.  This, in turn, affected the rest of his tenure as Premier.  It was a critical element in his quest for political hegemony in the province during his first term.

In SRBP’s review of Ray Blake’s new book on federal provincial relations, there are some comments about Blake’s chapter on Danny Williams and the war with Ottawa in 2004. The review wasn’t the place to get into that.  The subject is too big. 

This post will explain the problems with Blake’s accounts and with other accounts of the period.

11 February 2010

Government smears landmark agreement with false statements

The provincial government has tarnished the 25th anniversary of the Atlantic Accord by issuing a news release which contains false information:

In 2005, the Williams Government improved upon the benefits in the original Atlantic Accord by negotiating a new deal that retained a greater share of offshore revenues for the province. The new revenue-sharing arrangement reached between Premier Danny Williams and then Prime Minister Paul Martin resulted in Newfoundland and Labrador receiving 100 per cent of its offshore revenues for the first time, free from any clawbacks while an equalization-receiving province. he 2005 Accord enabled Newfoundland and Labrador to truly be the “principal beneficiary” of the petroleum resources off its shores. …[Emphasis added]

“The original Atlantic Accord has greatly assisted in the pursuit of long-term economic prosperity and self-reliance for Newfoundland and Labrador, and these benefits were secured and improved in 2005 when Premier Williams succeeded in convincing the Federal Government of the inequity Newfoundland and Labrador had endured for years in not receiving the full benefit of the exploitation of its offshore resources,” said Acting Premier Dunderdale.

All of that is completely false.

Provincial government officials should know it is utterly untrue false because they link to the text of the 2005 deal in the news release.  Here’s what the 2005 agreement says in plain English:

2. This document reflects an understanding between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador that:

  • Newfoundland and Labrador already receives and will continue to receive 100 per cent of offshore resource revenues as if these resources were on land; [Emphasis added]

There were no changes to revenue-sharing spelled out in the 1985 Accord. Under the 1985 agreement the provincial government alone sets and receives all offshore oil government royalties. The federal government collects only what it would from any other industry in the way of business and personal taxes.  

Despite ludicrous claims at the time it was signed, the 2005 agreement delivered nothing more than a single $2.0 billion payment to the provincial government. 

That’s it.

The Equalization formula continued to work as it is supposed to work.  As forecast in 2005, the provincial stopped qualifying for Equalization payments in 2009. 

When that happened, the “clawback” described in today’s news release didn’t hit zero. Rather it became a full  - 100% - clawback of all offshore revenues.

The 2005 made no changes to any of the provisions of the 1985 agreement.

The 1985 Accord alone forms the basis for the current offshore oil industry and for current provincial prosperity. 

Here’s the way your humble e-scribbler laid it out in 2004/2005:

First, [under what became the 1985 Accord] the provincial government would gain the right to manage the offshore jointly with the federal government, particularly with respect to setting the mode of production. This had significant implications for local benefits, as evident from construction of the gravity-based system (GBS) for Hibernia.

Second, the provincial government gained the right to collect revenues from the resources as if they were on land. This established that the provincial government would determine its own revenues to be collected from offshore oil and gas development and production just as a province like Alberta is able to do. These revenues would, de facto, be treated as “own source” revenues like income tax, sales tax and other similar levies.

Third, the province as a whole would benefit from the development of local jobs. Mulroney committed that oil-related infrastructure would be sited in the province, where possible. This was no small matter. Mulroney’s letter [Brian Mulroney to Brian Peckford, 1984] contains strong language and conveys a deliberate intent on the part of the future Prime Minister to provide this province with significant job and business benefits. “Local job creation and labour development would be of paramount concern.”

Fourth, the province would benefit since the provincial government would not see a dollar-for-dollar loss of Equalization payments that would naturally result from growth in the government’s own-source revenues. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador would receive all of its own-source revenue, potentially a portion of any federal shares in the offshore, and as well, additional payments to offset any losses from Equalization.

The same general approach was taken by the Liberal administrations which preceded Mr. Mulroney. For example, the comprehensive proposal made by the Government of Canada in 1982 stated that “it is recognized that Newfoundland should enjoy the major share of the revenue that offshore resources are expected to generate…” and that “the people of the province would realize the greatest and the most direct benefits from the development of offshore oil and gas resources in terms of growth and income, jobs, opportunities for new businesses, and significant new provincial government revenues.”

The federal Liberal proposal on revenue sharing was linked inextricably to the overall performance of the provincial economy and hence may be taken as further evidence of the extent to which the federal government before 1984 viewed the benefits from the offshore to this province to be greater than just the sums flowing to the provincial government’s treasury.

While local job benefits merited two short paragraphs in the original Mulroney letter, both the Accord itself and the enabling legislation provide an elaborate structure aimed at managing local benefits. No one can underestimate the value of local industrial benefits to the province; nor can anyone easily dismiss the contention that the architects of the Atlantic Accord saw local industrial development as a significant factor in establishing this province as the principal beneficiary of offshore oil and gas development. [Paragraphing altered to improve readability]

-srbp-

31 January 2009

Equalization flips, flops and fumbles

Danny Williams once scorned the O’Brien formula that counted only 50% of the province’s oil and mineral revenues saying that the concept had “Ralph Goodale’s fingerprints” all over it.

Premier Danny Williams called the report "some kind of joke - otherwise it was just a bad dream."

He said the idea unfairly penalizes Newfoundland and Labrador, and is essentially the same plan that led him to storm out of first ministers' meetings in the fall of 2004.

"It's got (former Liberal finance minister) Ralph Goodale written all over it," Williams told reporters at Confederation Building.  [Rob Antle and Jamie Baker, “Report would erase Accord gains”, Telegram, 6 June 2006]

Instead, Williams wanted a formula that didn’t count any of the province’s non-renewable resource revenues.  Danny Williams wanted that 100% exclusion so badly he went to war with Stephen Harper hurling every name imaginable at the Conservative leader for not living up to the campaign promise in two elections.

dec05 Never mind that in letters to the federal party leaders in December 2005 Williams stated that the provincial government wanted to see the 100% inclusion of non-renewable resource revenues.

Now, that 100% exclusion isn’t the good deal after all.

Now the one with Ralph’s fingerprints all over it is the right one.

And Danny Williams wants it.

The fingerprints one.

Not the no-greater-shame-than-a-promise-unkept one.

He wants it so badly he’s prepared to go to war to undo a slight targeted directly and deliberately at Newfoundland and Labrador.

Well, maybe not war, exactly he said a couple of days after launching the latest Equalization jihad.

Maybe a one year delay.

Still keeping track?

The tale of Danny Williams’ positions on Equalization since 2003 has more twists and turns in it than a road along Newfoundland’s rugged coastline, and the feisty Premier has followed every one doubling back on himself countless times in five short years.

Actually, the O’Brien 50% formula is good this time only because it apparently allows the 1985 Atlantic Accord – the real Atlantic Accord – to unlock more cash for the provincial coffers.

But Danny wasn’t always in love with the 1985 Accord.

Shortly after coming to office, Danny Williams launched the first of his now trademark hyperbolic assaults on a deal he said was robbing Newfoundland and Labrador of its offshore oil revenues and sending them off to Ottawa.

Nothing could have been further from the truth and those of us who dared say so publicly at the time suffered either scorn or curious pity for daring to doubt the Premier’s judgment.

When Williams snagged a $2.0 billion cheque from Paul Martin and Ralph Goodale in January 2005 as part of a new offshore transfer deal, the first thing he had to admit was that nothing had been further from the truth than the line he’d been spinning:

Newfoundland and Labrador already receives and will continue to receive 100 per cent of offshore resource revenues as if these resources were on land…

What’s more, a Telegram story from late January 2005 by Rob Antle contained this nugget of truth:

Because of quirks in the system - Accord offsets are tied to previous-year equalization drops - Newfoundland actually got back slightly more than 100 per cent between 1999 and March 2004.

The province took in $429 million in offshore revenues, a senior federal official said, while receiving total offset payments of $466 million.

Senior provincial officials had no beef with those figures, acknowledging that contention sounded accurate.

In effect, up to March 2004, the so-called clawback had no claws.

It never did.

And that 2005 deal?

Well, the public heard all sorts of predictions  - at the time - that the deal was worth $2.6 billion up front (even though the cheque was for $2.0 billion) and maybe even more later on.

Jack Harris, then the provincial New Democratic Party leader predicted $4.9 billion.  Wade Locke, destined to become the Premier’s favourite economist, predicted $5.2 billion over the first eight years of the deal.

Of course, at the time, projections (including one by Wade Locke) had the province going off Equalization within five years – just as it did – even without the insanely high oil prices that turned up.  The odds of getting more cash was in doubt from the beginning.

Nonetheless they persisted.

In fact, at least one of them got annoyed when someone point out that his math skills were suspect.

As it turned out, the deal was never worth more than the first cheque.

The provincial government doesn’t qualify for Equalization any more and as such can’t earn any more credits against the cash advance.  There is more than $1.1 billion sitting  in the credit column, according to the latest audited public accounts for the province  and odds are it will never be drawn down let alone generate double as the politicians originally predicted.

This pattern of flips, flops and alarums on the big issues isn’t the only aspect of the annual Equalization tirade.

In December 2007, former finance minister Tom Marshall announcing the government had opted for the O’Brien formula in late 2007, kicking the crap out of the 1985 Accord offset formula and former premier Brian Peckford along the way.  Four months later, Marshall announced the provincial government would be sticking with the old Equalization formula and the 1985 offset in his spring budget.  All the while, Marshall fell over himself trying to explain offsets and the virtues of O’Brien versus 1985.

Note at the time that Marshall indicated sticking with the old formula would offer the best cash return over the following five years.

Then there was the Great Cap. Wade Locke’s initial assessment [full article here] of the 2007 federal budget led him to recommend switch to O’Brien/50% in 2009 to maximize revenues.  He then sparked a controversy when he discovered caps on the province’s offset deals the feds hadn’t previously disclosed.  Locke’s analysis served as fuel for the provincial government’s attack on the federal government.  It produced no assessments of its own but relied exclusively on Locke’s public analysis.

Locke then produced a new analysis that still excluded an assessment of 100% exclusion but which found that  - get this -  the old fixed formula delivered a better deal than O’Brien/50%.

Incidentally, Danny Williams told a CBC Radio audience on March 26, 2007 that the provincial government planned to flip to O’Brien in 2009 to maximize its cash take.

Then, most recently, Wade Locke told NTV News on January 28 that the net loss to the province would be $500 million or less from the most recent federal budget.  Less than a day later, he revised his projections after speaking with provincial finance officials.

A proviso on his estimate prepared for the Atlantic Provinces Economic Council  released January 29  suggests more information is needed.   Nevertheless, Locke’s new assessment – prepared and released less than a day after his first assessment  - now backs the provincial version.

Oddly, Locke’s new observations do not appear to include an assessment of O’Brien/100%. It’s even more odd considering that his 2007 analysis suggested 100% exclusion was the best.  Now it is supposedly not good at all.

Confused?

That’s not surprising.

Confusion appears to be the order of the day when it comes to Newfoundland and Labrador and fiscal issues.

Makes you wonder, though, with all this flipping, flopping and general policy confusion, why would anyone – including reporters and politicians  - accept anything these guys say without evidence.

-srbp-

20 September 2008

"Reality Check" reality check on Equalization and the Family Feud

The crew that put together's CBC's usually fine "Reality Check" can be forgiven if they missed a few points by a country mile in a summary of the Family Feud.

Forgiveness is easy since the issues involved are complex and  - at least on the provincial side since 2003 - there has never been a clear statement of what was going on.  Regular Bond Papers readers will be familiar with that.  For others, just flip back to the archives for 2005 and the story is laid out there.

Let's see if we can sort through some of the high points here.

With its fragile economy, Newfoundland and Labrador has always depended on money from the federal government. When they struck oil off the coast, the federal government concluded it would not have to continue shelling out as much money to the provincial treasury. N.L.'s oil would save Ottawa money.

Not really.

Newfoundland and Labrador is no different from most provinces in the country, at least as far as Equalization goes.  Since 1957 - when the current Equalization program started - the provincial government has received that particular form of federal transfer.  So have all the others, at various times, except Ontario.  Quebec remains one of the biggest recipients of Equalization cash, if not on a per capita basis than on a total basis. Economic "fragility" has nothing to do with receiving Equalization.

In the dispute over jurisdiction over the offshore, there was never much of a dispute as far as Equalization fundamentally works.

Had Brian Peckford's view prevailed in 1983/1984, Equalization would have worked just as it always has.  As soon as the province's own source revenues went beyond the national average, the Equalization transfers would have stopped.

Period.

That didn't work out.  Both the Supreme Court of Newfoundland (as it then was called) and in the Supreme Court of Canada, both courts found that jurisdiction over the offshore rested solely with the Government of Canada.  All the royalties went with it.

In the 1985 Atlantic Accord, the Brian Mulroney and Brian Peckford governments worked out a joint management deal.  Under that agreement - the one that is most important for Newfoundland and Labrador - the provincial government sets and collects royalties as if the oil and gas were on land.

And here's the big thing:  the provincial government keeps every single penny.  It always has and always will, as long as the 1985 Accord is in force.

As far as Equalization is concerned, both governments agreed that Equalization would work as it always had.  When a provincial government makes more money on its own than the national average, the Equalization cash stops.

But...they agreed that for a limited period of time, the provincial government would get a special transfer, based on Equalization that would offset the drop in Equalization that came as oil revenues grew.  Not only was the extra cash limited in time, it would also decline such that 12 years after the first oil, there'd be no extra payment.

If the province didn't qualify for Equalization at that point, then that's all there was.  If it still fell under the average, then it would get whatever Equalization it was entitled to under the program at the time.

The CBC reality check leaves a huge gap as far as that goes, making it seem as though the whole thing came down to an argument between Danny Williams and Paul Martin and then Danny and Stephen Harper.

Nothing could be further from the truth, to use an overworked phrase.

During negotiations on the Hibernia project, the provincial government realized the formula wouldn't work out as intended. Rather than leave the provincial government with some extra cash, the 1985 deal would actually function just like there was no offset clause. For every dollar of new cash in from oil, the Equalization system would drop Newfoundland's entitlement by 97 cents, net.

The first efforts to raise this issue - by Clyde Wells and energy minister Rex Gibbons in 1990 - were rebuffed by the Mulroney Conservatives.  They didn't pussy foot around. John Crosbie accused the provincial government of biting the hand that fed it and of wanting to eat its cake and "vomit it up" as well.

It wasn't until the Liberal victory in 1993 that the first efforts were made to address the problem.  Prime Jean Chretien and finance minister Paul Martin amended the Equalization formula to give the provincial government an option of shielding up to 30% of its oil revenue from Equalization calculations.  That option wasn't time limited and for the 12 years in which the 1985 deal allowed for offsets the provincial government could always have the chance to pick the option that gave the most cash.  It only picked the wrong option once.

The Equalization issue remained a cause celebre, especially for those who had been involved in the original negotiations.  It resurfaced in the a 2003 provincial government royal commission study which introduced the idea of a clawback into the vocabulary.  The presentation in the commission reported grossly distorted the reality and the history involved. Some charts that purported to show the financial issues bordered on fraud.

Danny Williams took up the issue in 2004 with the Martin administration and fought a pitched battle - largely in public - over the issue.  He gave a taste of his anti-Ottawa rhetoric in a 2001 speech to Nova Scotia Tories. Little in the way of formal correspondence appears to have been exchanged throughout the early part of 2004.  Up to the fall of 2004 - when detailed discussions started -  the provincial government offered three different versions of what it was looking for.  None matched the final agreement.

The CBC "Reality Check" describes the 2005 agreement this way:

The agreement was that the calculation of equalization payments to Newfoundland and Labrador would not include oil revenue. As the saying goes, oil revenues would not be clawed back. Martin agreed and then-opposition leader Harper also agreed.

Simply put, that's dead wrong.

The 2005 deal provided for another type of transfer to Newfoundland and Labrador from Ottawa on top of the 1985 offset payment.  The Equalization program was not changed in any way. Until the substantive changes to Equalization under Stephen Harper 100% of oil revenues was included to calculate Equalization entitlements.  That's exactly what Danny Williams stated as provincial government policy in January 2006, incidentally.  The Harper changes hid 50% of all non-renewable resource revenues from Equalization (oil and mining) and imposed a cap on total transfers.

As for the revenues being "clawed back", one of the key terms of the 2005 deal is that the whole thing operates based on the Equalization formula that is in place at any given time. Oil revenues are treated like gas taxes, income tax, sales tax, motor vehicle registration and any other type of provincial own-source revenue, just like they have been as long as Equalization has been around.

What the federal Conservatives proposed in 2004 and 2006 as a part of their campaign platform - not just in a letter to Danny Williams - was to let all provinces hide their revenues from oil, gas and other non-renewable resources from the Equalization calculations.  The offer didn't apply just to one province.  Had it been implemented, it would have applied to all. 

That was clear enough until the Harper government produced its budget 18 months ago. What was clear on budget day became a bit murky a few days later when Wade Locke of Memorial University of Newfoundland began to take a hard look at the numbers.

Again, that's pretty much dead wrong.

It became clear shortly after Harper took office in 2006 that the 100% exclusion idea from the 2004 and 2006 campaigns would be abandoned in favour of something else.  There was nothing murky about it at all. So plain was the problem that at least one local newspaper reported on a fracas at the Provincial Conservative convention in October 2006 supposedly involving the Premier's brother and the Conservative party's national president. That's when the Family Feud started.

As for the 2007 budget bills which amended both the 1985 and 2005 agreements between Ottawa and St. John's, there's a serious question as to whether the provincial government actually consented to the amendments as required under the 1985 Atlantic Accord.

The story about Equalization is a long one and the Family Feud - a.k.a the ABC campaign - has a complex history.  There's no shame in missing some points.  It's just so unusual that CBC's "Reality Check" was so widely off base.

-srbp-

02 August 2008

The Looking Glass Cabinet

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone," it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master -- that's all."

Through the Looking Glass: and what Alice found there

Tom Marshall must have received his law degree from the University of Wonderland.

You know.

The place Alice went.

She ran into Tom's old law prof, Humpty Dumpty, who first taught him that the words on the page are meaningless plastic things. 

Humpty Dumpty's lessons took.

Last week, education minister Joan Burke said that, in picking a new president for MUN, the university board of regents would send over a list of names and cabinet would make the appointment since - as the law provides, according to Burke - the president's job is a cabinet appointment.

Hang on there, said a number of people including Grenfell professor Dr. Paul Wilson who insist that the words in the law - 'the board of regents shall appoint a president" - doesn't mean that cabinet does the job.

Marshall, a former attorney general, insists that Wilson is being a stick-in-the-mud, and that Wilson is "not helping" the university.

There's that favourite government phrase "not helping" or "being unhelpful".

In this case, it would mean pointing out the obvious bankruptcy of the government position, but that's really a separate issue.

Marshall, sounding a bit like a 1960s hold-over, insisted that the professor was being square, Man.

What's interesting is the way Marshall (LLB, U Wonder) described Wilson's view:

Everyone is entitled to their view. He’s given his analysis. I consider his analysis a literal interpretation — a strict, constructionist interpretation. A proper interpretation of the legislation would have to consider the wording in context. When you consider the wording in context, the minister of Education plays a very important role.

"Strict, constructionist interpretation". 

You will note of course, that no where in Marshall's comment does he say that Wilson is actually wrong.  Not at all.

Not if you actually read what Marshall said:  according to Marshall, the legislation properly read with all the words in their context means that the education minister plays an important role in the process.

Marshall  - clever fellow - didn't define that role, however.  The role envisaged in the legislation is that the education minister takes the name of the appointed person to cabinet for approval.  That's the role.  it's largely administrative in nature.

And no where does it say cabinet picks, which is what Burke insisted she and her colleagues will be doing.

But still, according to Marshall,  Wilson is wrong because he is using a "strict, constructionist interpretation"?

Here's a simple solution.

Let's put this before a judge.

They are easy to find down on Duckworth Street.  Odds are, we could find one of them with a few spare minutes in between trips to the neighbourhood Timmies to hear the learned former attorney general appear on behalf of the Crown to argue the matter.  Now we'd be doing this no just to resolve the dispute between Marshall and Wilson, but to settle on the legality of the cabinet's move in this extremely important crisis.

The justices would likely fight over the chance to hear this one.

And they get paid to resolve disputes.

After all, government has been extremely successful in this Mad Hatter, March Hare approach to the things before.

There was the now famous October 2004 interview Danny Williams gave to the CBC's Carole MacNeil.  According to Williams, once the province didn't qualification for Equalization, clawbacks wouldn't be 100 per cent but zero., even though when the province qualified for just a fraction of a penny of federal handout, the clawback was 99.9999999 per cent.

Then there was Tom Rideout's classic time travel episode:

Consider Rideout's efforts to explain that while today might well have been June 14 when the bill was passed, tomorrow did not actually mean June 15. Rather it meant some date four months hence:

"Since Green didn't say the act comes into effect today, we, in consultation with him, said what can come into effect today comes into effect today, what needs time to come into effect tomorrow comes into effect tomorrow, and tomorrow is Oct. 9, 2007"

Or Marshall gamely trying to criticise Brian Peckford and in the process fibbing royally about the province's finances.

Or on legal matters, just ask Don Burridge, the current deputy attorney general and, odds are, the poor sod who would carry this threadbare Stanfield's of an argument downtown to see what others made of it.

Burridge is the extremely talented lawyer who was in the unfortunate position of having to carry forward government's argument in Ruelokke.  The government argument, one suspects, was dictated to him by the learned barristers in cabinet but he gamely laid it out.

They tried the argument that a clause in the 1985 Atlantic Accord which said the hiring tribunal's decision was binding on both the federal and provincial, governments really meant that the courts couldn't intervene in the matter.

Mr. Justice Halley loved that one, one suspects, so much so that he likely had to stab himself repeatedly with a fork under his robes so that the pain would keep him from rolling on the floor in laughter.

We all know the outcome of that foray into the courts.

All of this just goes to show just exactly how desperate the cabinet is to try and escape the Memorial mess they've created.  Tom Marshall is trotting out all sorts of verbiage to try and obscure things.

The problem for Marshall in this little drama  is that he is stuffed in the role played before by Burridge. He is carrying a preposterous argument and he knows it.

But if he is game, there are a few people wearing black robes in the later summer heat who will gladly sit and enjoy the government's revival of Through the Looking Glass or Alice in Wonderland.

We'd all enjoy the play immensely even if the outcome is predictable.

-srbp-

19 June 2007

Eating one's cake and throwing it up too: the Crosbie historical fiction series

From the Tuesday Globe and Mail, a comment by John Crosbie and Roland Martin on the Equalization ruckus.

Following is the text, with Bond Papers notes inserted between square brackets.


Atlantic Accord: A deal is a deal, Mr. Harper

The people of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are neither greedy mice who gobble up cheese, as some, including this newspaper, would have you believe, nor do we, as some federal politicians have accused us, simply want to have our cake and eat it too. What we want is for Ottawa to honour the 2005 Canada-Nova Scotia and Canada-Newfoundland agreements on offshore revenues.

A recent Globe and Mail editorial stated that the current quarrel over equalization formulae "may be reduced to half a dozen simple words: 'as it exists at the time.' " We submit that the key words in the Feb. 14, 2005, agreements are: "The government of Canada intends to provide additional offset payments to the province in respect of offshore-related equalization reductions, effectively allowing it to retain the benefits of 100 per cent of its offshore resource revenues."

"As it exists at that time" is intended to clarify that the 100 per cent of benefits will be obtained by Nova Scotia and Newfoundland no matter what changes are made to the federal equalization program in the future. That is because these two bilateral agreements are economic development arrangements, no different in principle than Ontario's various federal-provincial auto-pact programs, Ottawa's recent multi-hundred-million-dollar funding of Quebec's aerospace industry or B.C.'s "Pacific Gateway" economic opportunity, all of which contribute to building a stronger and more prosperous Canada.

Don't forget that in the 1950s and 1960s, Alberta received both equalization and its oil and gas revenues until its economy had sufficiently developed. [Bond Papers: Actually Alberta received Equalization from 1957, when the program was created, until 1962. While technically correct - 1957 and 1962 are respective in the 1950s and 1960s - the Crosbie/Martin presentation is misleading. See, for example, Thomas Courchene, "A short history of Equalization".]

It might also be helpful to remind the news media, politicians, bureaucrats and the general public that in October, 2004, while the negotiations on the future of the original 1985 and 1986 accords were in progress, Paul Martin's government introduced significant short-term changes to the equalization program and signalled it would appoint an expert commission to study equalization and to recommend a long-term strategy. The commission's report is what the current Conservative government has adopted and is proudly praising.

It would be hard to imagine that in the middle of these fundamental fiscal policy actions by the federal government, Nova Scotia Premier John Hamm and Newfoundland Premier Danny Williams and all of their ministers and advisers would agree to enter into the February, 2005, Offshore Agreement and not insist that any deal protect their provinces against future changes in the equalization program, changes that might cancel out the benefits of these bilateral economic agreements.

[Bond Papers: While it might be hard to imagine, the phrase noted by the Globe editorial and debated by Crosbie and Martin is at the heart of the dispute. The key point not noted by Crosbie and Martin is that the 2005 agreement can be met in full and the Equalization program "as it exists at the time" by simply removing the cap unilaterally applied to the 2005 agreement(s). The federal government can reduce Equalization payments in keeping with the program as it exists, while honouring in full the 2005 agreement.

Federal officials apparently referred to a conundrum in an exchange with Wade Locke on this issue. The conundrum would come from differentiating between qualifying for Equalization and what payment was actually received.

One potential solution would be to consider the phrase in the agreement describing the additional offset mechanism as referring to the amount to which the province would receive without a cap being applied. This would limit the amount of Equalization actually paid to zero in some years but allow the offset to continue to function. This may all now be a moot point since the provincial government will no longer qualify for any Equalization payment at all by 2010-2012.]

It should be remembered that in, in October, 2004, former finance minister Ralph Goodale caused those negotiations to collapse when he proposed in writing that any new offshore revenue agreement include a "fiscal cap" that limited Nova Scotia and Newfoundland to the fiscal capacity of Ontario. Surely all Canadians remember the reaction to Mr. Goodale's proposal, including the emotionally charged lowering of the Canadian flag in St. John's. Then Mr. Martin, with the enthusiastic support of then-opposition leader Stephen Harper, wisely withdrew the concept of a "fiscal cap," and shortly thereafter the three parties agreed to the 2005 Offshore Agreement and related federal legislation.

[Bond Papers: Martin and Crosbie's characterization of the situation in 2004 is essentially bunk. The negotiations did not collapse in October 2004. In fact, they continued until December 22, 2004. The Premier decided on the disastrous flag tactic at that point, but restored Canadian flags once polling confirmed the strength of opinion against the move from across the country. In the subsequent January 2005 agreement, many of the provisions of the October agreement remained, even in slightly amended form. The only point removed was the fiscal capacity cap.]

Those who tell us that Newfoundland and Nova Scotia should stop complaining that the new deal contains a fiscal cap demonstrate a profound lack of understanding for the history of the 1985 Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord and the 1986 Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord. Worse, they mislead Canadians by implying the provinces are greedy and want to continue getting equalization once they reach the national average fiscal capacity.

[Bond Papers: This is a remarkable statement given that Crosbie has claimed as recently as last week that the intention in 1985 was to allow Newfoundland and Labrador to receive oil and gas revenues in full and Equalization in full, as if the oil and gas revenues did not exist.

Crosbie now appears to have abandoned that point in light of the historical record, as well as a rebuke from his former cabinet colleague on another aspect of the 1985 Atlantic Accord.

Martin has also previously made claims about the 1985 Accord which do not stand up to scrutiny.]

Quite the contrary. The 2005 offshore agreements do not get renewed in 2011-12 if either province is no longer receiving equalization.

Newfoundland's equalization payments have already declined from a peak of $1.2-billion in 1999-2000 to a forecasted $477-million in 2007-2008. Recent studies estimate it may no longer get equalization by 2009-2010.

The 1985 and 1986 accords were meant to make the two provinces "principal beneficiaries" of their offshore resources. Until the 2005 offshore agreements, the federal government was the principal beneficiary. That recognition of provincial benefit was the battle Dr. Hamm and Mr. Williams fought and won. If these agreements are not fully honoured, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, and, in fact, all of Canada, will have been done a great injustice.

[Bond Papers: Once again, Crosbie and Martin enter the realm of historical fiction. While it is true the agreements are intended to make the provinces the principal beneficiary of offshore resources, the agreements themselves contain no definition of the term. Contextual and contemporary evidence suggests that principal beneficiary was intended to mean the right to set and collect revenues as if the resources were on land, the right to manage the resources jointly with the federal government and to establish local benefits provisions in any development agreements. See, for example, "Which is to be master?".

Mr. crosbie position on Equalization entitlements and offshore oil and gas revenues has also changed considerably since he was a federal cabinet minister. in 1990, Crosbie dismissed provincial concerns about the so-called clawback of oil revenues through Equalization with these words: "I'm getting a little tired of them trying to have their cake and throwing it up too. They can't do both." Consider the delightful contrast with Crosbie and martin's next sentence.]

We are neither mice, nor greedy cake-eaters. We are proud Canadians.

We just want the opportunity to utilize our natural resources to become self-sufficient. We will resist any attempts to prevent this from occurring.

_______________

John Crosbie, a St. John's lawyer, and Roland Martin, a Nova Scotia business executive, have advised Nova Scotia and Newfoundland on their offshore accords.

12 May 2007

How times change, Part 3

From January 6, 2006:

Doyle Pleased With Harper's Letter

Norman Doyle, Conservative incumbent in St. Johns East, is pleased that Stephen Harpers' letter to Premier Williams contains a number of significant commitments to this Province.

In his letter, said Doyle, Stephen Harper made commitments on federal financial support for the Trans Labrador Highway and the Military Base at Goose Bay. He also committed the federal government to providing financial guarantees with regard to the Lower Churchill Project.

Doyle noted that Harper also committed to setting up a Territorial Defence Battalion, composed of 100 regular and 400 reserve soldiers, in the St. Johns area.

Mr. Harper also reiterated his willingness to invoke fisheries custodial management out side the 200 mile limit, said Doyle, and to exempt all non-renewable resource revenues from the ravages of the Equalization clawback.

Doyle recalled that it was Stephen Harpers commitment on offshore revenues that forced Prime Minister Martins hand on the issue in the Federal Election of June, 2004.

Unlike the Liberals, said Doyle, we don't have to be forced to help build a stronger Newfoundland & Labrador.

The Conservative Party believes that a stronger Newfoundland & Labrador means a stronger Canada so many of our Partys policies are designed to give the provinces the tools to help build a stronger and more prosperous nation.


-srbp-

01 April 2007

The need for public discussion

Following is an opinion piece originally published in The Telegram during the offshore discussions in 2004. It is based on the longer piece of the same name, posted below in four parts.

_______________________

Which is to be master?
Public discussion, more information needed on Atlantic Accord changes


“The absence of public debate prevents a thorough discussion of options, a chance to see dangers and avoid them.”


The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador currently receives 100 per cent of provincial revenues. Under the 1985 Atlantic Accord, the provincial government gained the right to set its own revenue regime for offshore oil and gas developments and it has done so through legislation and development agreements with the companies that have brought Hibernia, Terra Nova and White Rose on stream. It collects every penny of the revenues defined in the Atlantic Accord, and set out in those development agreements. In addition, it collects revenues, mostly taxes, from the business that have grown up around oil production.

The Williams administration, like the Grimes administration before it, claims money is lost through an Equalization “clawback”. There is no clawback in the way that word would normally be used. Ordinarily, Equalization is a glorified top-up scheme. Any provincial government making less than a national standard from its own-source revenues gets a cheque from Ottawa to make up the difference. Make more money; get less of a top-up. If there was a sudden growth in high technology manufacturing – if the province became a Celtic Lynx – Equalization would be reduced accordingly.

The Atlantic Accord contains a provision than offsets any losses in Equalization transfers resulting from growing provincial government revenues, for a period of 12 years. The calculation is made on a 10 province standard, so it is no surprise that last year the province collected $123.8 million in oil royalties and received $178 million in offsets. The major problem with the offsets – if there is a problem - results from the fact the offset provisions are triggered by quantity of oil produced, not on their economic impact as such. Once triggered, they decline over time irrespective of how many oil fields have been developed or what their economic benefit has been to the province. Danny Williams’ current proposal is apparently aimed at changing the offset provisions of the Accord.

There are at least two major problems with the proposal from the Williams administration that would, as Danny Williams recently put it, “renegotiate the Atlantic Accord”. The most significant problem is that there is no plain English description of the problem or of the government’s proposed solution: it isn’t in writing. How can anyone judge the success or failure of upcoming negotiations between the federal and provincial governments if we do not know what the Williams administration is seeking?

The second problem is in the way the argument has been framed. The Williams administration claims that by changing the offsets, the provincial government can become the “principal beneficiary” of the offshore, as the Accord intended. Unfortunately, the Atlantic Accord does not say the provincial government will be the principal beneficiary nor is “principal beneficiary” defined as meaning provincial government revenues. The Atlantic Accord delivers significant benefits to the province as a whole. The provincial government gets the right to co-manage the offshore with Ottawa. The provincial government sets its own revenues, as if the resource was on land. The province as a whole gets industrial benefits, something Brian Mulroney considered to be a major aspect of the Accord. Those industrial benefits go against the spirit if not the letter of inter-provincial free trade agreements and the North American Free Trade Agreement, Right now, the Accord is exempt from NAFTA.

“Principal beneficiary” is central to the Accord; redefining it changes the Accord fundamentally. Change the Accord’s underlying principals and it may well become a new deal, one that would be subject to NAFTA. Of all the Accord provisions, the one that would clearly not fit NAFTA is the industrial benefits provision. We can’t be certain, in largest part because the Williams administration proposal has not be clearly stated and thoroughly examined. There is enough information, though, to encourage the provincial government to be cautious.

It should not escape notice that in making its proposal, the Williams administration is merely picking up where the Grimes government left off. There is precious little difference among the three political parties in the province on this issue. In itself, that should be cause for concern, as Mark Twain warned. More important than mere contrariness though, the absence of public debate prevents a thorough discussion of options, a chance to see dangers and avoid them. Getting more cash from Ottawa is one thing. If that comes at a larger cost, namely bringing the Accord under NAFTA, then the Premier will need wider public support to continue on his path. If nothing else, the people of the province have a right to know what is being talked about. They will either reap the reward of the proposed changes or bear the burden.

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Which is to be Master? Part 1

Originally written in mid 2004, Which is to be master? was an attempt to dissect the Williams' administration's efforts to change the Atlantic Accord (1985).

The issue of offshore revenues and Equalization hasn't disappeared in the past three years. Since this paper contains some useful background information, Bond Papers offers it in sections.

__________________________________

Which is to be master?

An assessment of the Williams administration proposal to amend the Atlantic Accord



"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all."

- Charles Ludwig Dodgson, (Lewis Carrol), Through the Looking Glass


A. Introduction

It is now commonplace for people to believe that neither Newfoundland and Labrador nor Nova Scotia is being treated fairly by the federal government with respect to revenues from offshore oil and gas resources. As the story goes, the federal government claws back upwards of 85% of revenues to the two east coast provinces under the Equalization program, contrary to the two Accords that govern development of the oil and gas fields. Both Premier Danny Williams of Newfoundland and Labrador and Premier John Hamm of Nova Scotia contend that this clawback hampers their provinces from developing fully and from realizing the full benefits of the oil and gas resources off their coastlines.

This paper examines the Williams administration’s proposal to amend the Atlantic Accord. The findings are based on publicly available documents including the Atlantic Accord, the implementation legislation, the Williams government’s overhead slide presentation released to news media as well as papers and public comments offered by supporters of the provincial government’s approach.


B. The Williams Administration and the offshore

There is no single, concise, public statement of the Williams government’s proposal to amend the Atlantic Accord. To date the provincial government has released only a copy of an overhead slide presentation, apparently made to federal officials on 04 March 2004. In addition, the Premier has made public statements and issued at least three news releases on the subject. No other correspondence between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador is in the public domain.

The Blue Print, the Progressive Conservative election platform, contains several references to resources and revenues from the offshore. Since they are the party’s platform they must be taken as statements of policy for the new government, or at least a statement of intentions to guide the government’s overall policy. This assessment is based on these documents, statements by senior officials of the Williams administration published before October 2003 as well as comments by John Crosbie.

The Blue Print commits the Williams government to “seek jurisdictional control and ownership over petroleum and other economic resources in the offshore as a means to achieve greater prosperity for our Province and more opportunity for our people.”

With respect to oil and gas revenues and revenue sharing, the Blue Print commits the Progressive Conservative party to “press the federal government to remove all non-renewable resource revenues from the calculation of equalization payments. In exchange, we will commit, in a formal federal-provincial agreement if necessary, to spend non-renewable revenues to modernize economic infrastructure in the Province and to bring down the provincial debt, so that future generations of Canadians living in this Province will continue to benefit long after the resources are used up.”

The only specific reference to the Atlantic Accord is a commitment to use its industrial offset provisions to the fullest extent possible. The Blue print also commits the provincial government to seeking transfer to the provincial government of the 8.5% share of the Hibernia project held by the Government of Canada.

In early 2004, Premier Danny Williams began discussions with the province’s federal cabinet representative John Efford to ensure that the province received what Premier Williams described prior to a February meeting between the two as “100% of our offshore revenues.” According to Williams, Ottawa gave a bad deal to Newfoundland and Labrador in the Atlantic Accord. The proposal would change the Equalization offset provisions of the Atlantic Accord to “provide a payment equal to 100% of the net direct provincial offshore revenue”. Net direct revenue is defined as “Royalties and Corporate Income Tax which is generated in the NL offshore area, less the equalization clawback (currently at 70%)”.

The objective was described in similar terms by a March news release: “Premier Williams has been actively pursuing the federal government to allow Newfoundland and Labrador to receive 100 per cent of the provincial revenues from offshore oil and gas.” A similar statement was made in April: “Premier Danny Williams today reiterated his government’s position on the Atlantic Accord and reaffirmed the province will continue to aggressively pursue the federal government to allow Newfoundland and Labrador to receive 100 per cent of the provincial revenues from offshore oil and gas.”

Changes to the offset formula would end what both the Blue Print and Premier Williams have repeatedly described as a “clawback” of resource revenues by the federal government through reductions in the province’s Equalization entitlement. The notion of an Equalization clawback is clearly described in the Blue Print:
A Better Deal on Oil and Gas Revenues

The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador will collect billions of dollars in revenues over the next 20 to 30 years from oil, natural gas, and other minerals. Less than a quarter of the revenues will stay in the Province. Ottawa will simply deduct most of the increased revenues from equalization payments. This deduction is known as "the equalization clawback".

The clawback denies us the opportunity to build a better future for our children and grandchildren. We should not have to consume our non-renewable resources for current expenses and leave none of the inheritance for our children and grandchildren.
Of particular interest, both Premier Williams and other Conservative party commentators have linked provincial government offshore revenues with the concept of the province being the principal beneficiary of offshore development under the Atlantic Accord. In his news release of 12 March 2004, Premier Williams said:
"Essentially, we are asking the federal government to live up to the spirit and intent of the "principal beneficiary" component of the Atlantic Accord. Currently, the federal government receives 86 per cent of the revenues of our offshore petroleum resources, while the province receives a meager 14 per cent," added the Premier. "This revenue sharing is completely contrary to the spirit and intent of the accord and must be addressed now before these non-renewable resources are gone forever. Our province is facing a very serious fiscal situation which must be addressed. We are making tough choices to manage our expenditures and to grow our revenues at the provincial level. We, as a province, are putting into place a long-term plan to grow our economy; however, Ottawa must also be a part of the solution."
The overhead slide presentation describes the Atlantic Accord as being a ‘“Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador on offshore oil and gas resource management and revenue sharing.”’ The paper includes several slides purporting to confirm that “[a]nalysis shows that Newfoundland and Labrador will not be the principal beneficiary of the revenues generated from oil and gas developments.”

Similar arguments have been advanced by John Crosbie, who served as co-chair of the federal Conservative Party’s 2004 election campaign in Newfoundland and Labrador.
9. Mr. Martin’s commitment is worth nothing unless he puts in writing that “principal beneficiary” means that Newfoundland and Labrador is to receive 100 per cent of all offshore revenues, including royalties, provincial corporation income taxes, all fees and bonuses etc. on a net basis with no clawback effect and to be received until we become a “have” province with agreed benchmarks as to when “have” status is achieved. [Run-on sentence in the original. ]
Flowing from these statements of the provincial government position, four issues must be addressed. These are ownership of offshore resources, the origins of the Atlantic Accord and federal government intentions, the existence of a “clawback” in the Equalization program, and definition of the term “principal beneficiary”.

Continued in Part 2

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Which is to be Master? Part 3

F. The Williams administration’s rationale for change

The Williams administration is seeking changes to the Equalization offset provisions of the Accord so that the province will receive both direct and indirect revenues and the maximum possible Equalization payments. The provincial government’s position is based on three contentions.

First, reductions in any Equalization payment attributable to increased non-renewable resource revenues amounts to a “clawback” since these resources are finite. Second, as David Norris has argued for example, declines in Equalization amount to added revenue for the Government of Canada and hence violate the commitment that Newfoundland and Labrador should be the principal beneficiary. Third, the existing offset mechanism will run out before the most significant revenue benefit can be realized. Let us examine these in order.

The non-renewable “clawback”: The Equalization program has consistently operated as a form of top-up for certain province’s revenues. Any increase in a province’s own-source revenues would mean a lowering of the top-up amount. If Newfoundland and Labrador experienced a growth in revenue from information technology, it could reasonably expect to see its Equalization entitlement reduced. Newfoundland and Labrador is treated like all other provinces when it comes to the application of the Equalization program.

Clawback is a simple concept and applies in many areas of individual and business life. A clawback is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as meaning to “regain gradually or laboriously, to take back (allowance by added taxation, etc.)” WordNet and Dictionary.com similarly define clawback as “finding a way to take money back from people that they were given in another way; ‘the Treasury will find some clawback for the extra benefits members received’”.

Since the Government of Canada remits in full offshore revenues to the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, and applies no special tax or levy on those revenues, there is no clawback of these revenues as the term would be generally understood. Since the Atlantic Accord contains specific provisions to offset losses in Equalization, there is also no clawback of direct offshore revenues in that sense either.

The “clawback” argument is based on the contention that non-renewable resources hold a special status among provincial revenue sources. As the argument goes, these resources are finite and hence the period of time in which a province can derive benefit from the resources is finite. A province cannot achieve maximum benefit from non-renewable resources if it loses Equalization as revenues grow from these non-renewable resources. Hence these revenues should be exempted in some fashion from the Equalization calculation.

Two aspects of the argument on non-renewable resource “clawback” approach are worth considering in greater detail.

First, no source of revenue will exist for all time. Non-resource enterprises that generate sales tax and corporate and personal income taxes succeed and fail based on many factors. Western countries, states and provinces, that a decade ago made substantial income from the information technology sector and call centres, are now watching these revenues migrate to India and other Asian countries.

Even supposedly renewable natural resources such as fish can be destroyed by folly or a fundamental misapprehension of the circumstances affecting the health of the stocks. The reasonable lifespan of a mine or oil field may be 50 to 100 years. It took a mere 50 years for human misadventure to decimate the supposedly renewable fish stocks that had fed most of the Western world for five centuries.

Second, the “clawback” argument is one most often advanced by advocates of increased federal Equalization transfers to provinces. No one should forget that the Equalization program is funded entirely through federal general revenues. In other words, a significant portion of federal revenues derive from the very same sources for which the provincial governments claim a theoretical exemption from Equalization. Logically, what is sauce for the provincial fiscal goose should be sauce for the federal gander. The federal government holds obligations to provide services to residents of Canada just as the provinces do. Therefore, if one accepts that some revenues come from “non-renewable” sources, it would be logical for the federal government to seek the same exemption for its revenues as the one demanded by some provinces.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to calculate the level of federal funding from “non-renewable” sources. Were the amount to reach $10 billion – approximately the total outlay for Equalization – it is conceivable that the federal government would seek to eliminate the Equalization program altogether, possibly transform the system to one of low-interest loans or seek to control how province’s spend the Equalization transfer.

The 85:15 revenue split: In the overhead slide presentation, the provincial government includes several colourful charts that purport to show that the federal government receives 85 per cent of revenues from the offshore with the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador receiving only 15 per cent. A similar argument and similar slides are also found in the report of the Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada and in two research papers completed for that Royal Commission, one by David Norris and the other by John Crosbie.

Sadly for those wishing to assess the argument, none of these documents contains the data used to compile the charts. Neither the provincial government overhead slides nor Mr. Crosbie’s paper contain any figures. Mr. Norris does provide some evidence of his calculations. David Norris was a member of the provincial government team that negotiated the Atlantic Accord. A former provincial deputy minister of finance, Mr. Norris is currently a senior advisor to Premier Danny Williams. In 2002/2003, Mr. Norris served as senior researcher for the Royal Commission on renewing and strengthening our place in Canada. Mr. Norris is also author of one of the research papers the Royal Commission released with its final report. The fiscal position of Newfoundland and Labrador is broad overview of the provincial government’s financial status. It includes prominent sections on offshore revenues that undoubtedly form much of the basis for current government policy. In it, Mr. Norris argues, among other things that “The revenue analysis concludes that the Government of Canada is the “principal beneficiary” of future offshore oil revenues.” Given the obvious connection between Mr. Norris and current government policy and the fact that his paper is reasonably detailed, the remainder of this section will discuss the revenue split argument as he presented it.

Mr. Norris’ conclusion follows a lengthy preamble in which he sets the bases for his remarks and his assumptions on revenues and relative amounts flowing to each of the provincial and federal governments. He also quotes from section 2 (c) of the Atlantic Accord, the now famous “principal beneficiary” clause and deduces that “[a]ccordingly, revenue offset provisions were incorporated in the Accord which were intended to protect the province against sharp downturns in equalization entitlements.” He produces a chart showing the revenue sharing based on his analysis.

[Table 3-1 ]

On the face of it, his argument is persuasive. It does not stand up to closer scrutiny, however.

One of the fundamental problems with any economist’s projections is that they are based on assumption. Adjust the assumptions and the outcomes change, sometimes dramatically. Aside from the traditional economist’s folly of assumption, there are at least five reasons to doubt the validity of Norris’ contention.

First, the “principal beneficiary” provisions of the Atlantic Accord are undefined. It is erroneous to conclude that the phrase is synonymous with provincial government revenues. As a member of the negotiating team for the Atlantic Accord, Mr. Norris may be privy to information that does not exist in the public domain. Until such time as his contention is properly documented, we must remain skeptical of it. The matter of principal beneficiary is dealt with in greater detail below.

Second, as discussed above, the Atlantic Accord is based in part on the premise that the Equalization program would continue to apply. Knowing the premises on which the Accord was based, it is ludicrous for Mr. Norris and others to argue now the opposite of what was said 20 years ago. That single point is sufficient to cause Mr. Norris to remove the Equalization adjustment from his revenue chart above. Eliminate that single contention and the revenue sharing split moves from being a 76:24 split favouring the federal government to a 62:38 split favouring the province.

Third, the Accord’s Equalization offset provisions were never included in any public statement as being part of the revenue sharing arrangement between the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. Mr. Mulroney’s original proposal is absolutely clear on revenue sharing: “Newfoundland will be entitled to establish and collect resources revenues as if these resources were on land.” As such, it is ludicrous to now suggest that the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador intended Equalization to be used in the calculation of relative incomes. In fact, the Atlantic Accord makes no mention of how much revenue or what proportions of revenue are to flow to each order of government. The intention of the two parties, as evident from the signed agreement, is merely that the province may have the opportunity to raise such revenues as it can.

Fourth, and flowing in the same vein, the Accord Equalization offset provisions are not structured to ensure that the flow of maximum financial benefits to the province, i.e. revenues plus offsets, are timed to coincide with the maximum level of revenues based on actual development of the offshore fields. Simply put, the offset provisions begin when oil reaches a defined level - irrespective of value. They decline until an arbitrary period has expired, in this case 12 years. As it turned out, and indeed as anyone may have reasonably expected in 1985, production from one discovery was sufficient to trigger the offset provisions. It would be ludicrous to suggest that anyone believed all four commercially-viable discoveries that existed in 1985 could have been fully developed and in production within four years. Hence it is virtually impossible for the existing offset provisions to have coincided with a period of maximum revenue for the province using both the provincial government’s revenues plus Equalization offsets.

Fifth, even if one allows that his contentions about revenue sharing are correct, Mr. Norris presents only a portion of the revenues flowing to the province. As noted in Section D of this paper, the province is entitled to collect revenues of no fewer than six general types. In addition, the provincial government receives indirect revenues from such sources as personal income tax, new business start-ups and revenues that come from the construction and development phase of each project.

In his chart, Mr. Norris includes only royalties, which the federal government does not claim and corporate taxes, which are in fact collected by both the federal and provincial governments. The total economic impact of offshore oil development is not considered in his argument. If these wider sources of revenue are included in the province’s claim or the paper by John Crosbie, sadly, we cannot tell since they have not made this information public.

The offset runs out too soon: Under the existing Atlantic Accord Equalization offset formula, the period of maximum potential benefit expired last year. The maximum offset existed only for the first four years after the oil production trigger was reached. Within that time, the provincial government received the largest type of Equalization offset. After four years, the level of offset declines, such that while provincial direct revenues may well grow as White Rose and later, Hebron/Ben Nevis, come on stream, the level of additional money received from the Equalization offset will diminish by 10% per year. On this point, proponents of an amendment to the Atlantic Accord are correct. That is what the Accord provides.

In assessing this argument, it is important to compare the intentions of the Trudeau and Mulroney governments on the revenue issue. The intention of the Mulroney government is clear: the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador would receive the right to set its own direct revenues for offshore resources, as if the resources were on land. Additionally, for a period of 12 years, the province would receive additional money in the form of an Equalization offset. The province would also receive local job and industrial spin-off benefits. That is what the Atlantic Accord provides; that is what has occurred.

The Trudeau government approach was different in one key respect. “The province will receive all provincial-type taxes and the largest remaining federal tax, the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax, the PGRT. No one can question the generosity of this proposal. When would the provincial government be expected to share some of these revenues with other Canadians? Not until the Newfoundland Government’s fiscal capacity reached 110 per cent of the national average, with an adjustment for regional unemployment that would now raise this to about 125%.”

More significantly, the Trudeau revenue sharing arrangements reflect the strategic policy commitment the Government of Canada was prepared to make prior to 1984. The federal proposal, made in September 1982, ‘ “recognizes the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador’s fundamental goal of attaining economic development and self-sufficiency by creating a strong and diversified provincial economy able to contribute fully to prosperity throughout Canada.” This goal is shared, the document states, by the Government of Canada.’

Therein lays the major flaw in the Atlantic Accord as it was originally proposed and signed: the duration of the province’s maximum potential revenues (direct revenues plus Equalization offsets) is determined by oil production levels, irrespective of the actual market value of the oil or the impact of oil development on overall fiscal capacity. Under the Trudeau proposal, it would have been linked to overall economic development.

Given the nature of industrial megaprojects of the type offshore Newfoundland and Labrador, it is not at all surprising that each project takes a considerable period of time to bring on stream. The Hibernia development agreement was signed in September 1990; first oil was achieved fully seven years later. It was fully two years after that date that Hibernia reached a sufficient level of production to trigger the Accord’s Equalization offset provisions.

Admittedly, the provincial government did not have the benefit of experience in making its calculations about the Atlantic Accord’s various benefits. However, as the overhead slide presentation indicates, the provincial government apparently anticipated rapid development of the existing fields, continued offshore discoveries at the pace experienced between 1979 and 1984/85, higher royalty regimes and oil prices remaining at then-prevalent levels.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the validity of these assumptions in detail. Such an effort has not been undertaken to date and, in fact, much of the information required would be exempt from public disclosure since they were contained in documents submitted to cabinet. On the face of it, however, it would appear that the provincial government used optimistic projections when assessing the Mulroney offer. Any downward revision of their assumptions – for example, lower per barrel prices for oil – and the revenue impacts alter significantly.

Interestingly, according to slide 7, the provincial government expected that “have status” for Newfoundland and Labrador, i.e. that the province would no longer receive Equalization was “a foregone conclusion”. The one data table from 1985 that has been released (overhead slide 9) does not appear to support that contention, at least in so far as the chart might represent an anticipated worst case scenario. “Revenue and Equalization – 1985 Expectation” examines only royalties, instead of all revenue sources, and only from the Hibernia project. The graph clearly shows that royalties alone from Hibernia would not be sufficient to replace Equalization. In fact, anticipating the Accord offset provisions would begin in 1991, the graph shows the province expected Equalization transfer to climb beginning in 2004/05 and exceed pre-Hibernia levels by 2013.

That said, there can be no doubt that the Atlantic Accord Equalization offsets are working as intended by the Government of Canada and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. The provincial government expectations provided in the overhead slide presentation are not reflected in any aspect of the Atlantic Accord or the subsequent implementation legislation.

Given several years of experience and based on the intention of the federal government prior to 1984, it is possible to make a case for amending the Accord’s Equalization offsets. This will be addressed below.

Continued in Part 4

Which is to be Master? Part 4

G. Why is Alberta different from Newfoundland and Labrador?

This question has been asked many times in relation to oil and gas development. In some senses, it is like asking why a duck is different from a horse. Two significant differences are important to bear in mind when assessing oil and gas resources.

First, note that Alberta’s resources are on onshore. They are physically within the jurisdiction of the Government of Alberta. More importantly, however, and with the exception of the tar sands, Alberta’s oil and gas resources are relatively easy to develop. A small group of middle-class investors can raise the funds - scarcely more than $100, 000 - needed to drill an oil well in Alberta. Located as they several hundred kilometres out to sea in the North Atlantic, oil and gas resources offshore Newfoundland and Labrador can only be exploited by the combined efforts of multi-national oil companies able to invest the hundreds of millions needed for a comprehensive exploration and drilling program. A structure like Hebron/Ben Nevis which is fragmented and contains heavy oil demands even greater investment to bring to on stream.

Second, note that Alberta’s oil and gas resources have been exploited since the late 1940s. As such, Alberta is home to a well-established oil industry with secondary and tertiary development and a sophisticated, experienced support system of government and business. By comparison, the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore is scarcely seven years old if measured from the time of first oil production. It takes time to develop fully a mature oil and gas industry. Newfoundland and Labrador is still in the early years of its growth.

In that light, the Atlantic Accord offset provisions are also deficient. They fail to account for the relative underdevelopment of the offshore industry in this province. They also fail to consider the length of time which was likely required to bring existing fields on stream or that would be required to find any new, commercially-viable fields.

H. The federal share of Hibernia

When Brian Mulroney first proposed a deal on offshore oil and gas resources to Brian Peckford, it was done in the context of the National Energy Program. That program included significant federal revenues from oil and gas developments throughout the country and, at one point, anticipated the federal government would hold a 25% interest in every development on what was termed frontier lands. Mr. Mulroney proposed that “[i]f, on assuming office the new government decides to vest in itself the Crown carried shares offshore Newfoundland and Labrador, then these rights and shares will be shared equitably by both governments.”

This Crown share proposal survived in the Atlantic Accord as section 40, however, by the time the Accord implementation act was drafted and passed, the Mulroney government had eliminated federal shares in oil and gas fields except as may have been obtained through PetroCanada.

The Hibernia shares held by the federal government are not the type of shares anticipated by the Atlantic Accord. Hence, their disposition cannot be governed by any intentions signaled by the Accord. The Government of Canada invested in the Hibernia project as a means of salvaging it, at a time when one of the commercial partners withdrew. The federal government invested in Hibernia under very specific circumstances, not as part of a broader government policy on oil and gas resources. Moreover, these shares would not exist as Crown shares if the project had proceeded as originally proposed by the consortium of oil companies or had other commercial partners emerged who were willing to purchase the interest owned by Chevron in Hibernia. As a consequence, the federally-owned shares fall outside the scope of revenues to which the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador could reasonably have expected to have some portion.

It is interesting to note that the overhead slide presentation makes no reference to transferring the federal shares. The only publicly available reference to share transfer remains the Blue Print and letters to the three federal Conservative leadership candidates and the letter inadvertently sent to New Democratic Party leader Jack Leyton.

The Hibernia shares carry with them a prospect of immediate cash return either through their sale or through a transfer from the Government of Canada to the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. They also carry with them liabilities; the owners of the shares must be prepared for the costs associated with closing the Hibernia field whenever it runs out. It would be foolhardy for any Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to acquire shares in Hibernia without considering, and disclosing publicly, all the implications of owning a portion of the Hibernia field.

I. Being the “Principal Beneficiary”

The Atlantic Accord is as much a child of politics as it is one of policy. Brian Mulroney was leader of the Progressive Conservative Party and Leader of the Opposition when he wrote to the premiers of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland and Labrador to propose an agreement that he believed would settle the ongoing negotiations on offshore resource development.

The Mulroney proposal “would recognize the right of Newfoundland and Labrador to be the principal beneficiary of the wealth of the oil and gas off its shore, consistent with a strong and united Canada.” This sentence appears in the second paragraph of Mulroney’s letter. It sets one of the basic principles underlying the Accord. This phrase is particularly interesting since the idea of “principal beneficiary” had not previously appeared in public discussions of offshore resources.

While the phrase “principal beneficiary” is undefined in Mulroney’s original correspondence, it is clear from a reading of the original proposal and the subsequent Atlantic Accord, that the province as a whole was to benefit in at least four significant ways.

First, the provincial government would gain the right to manage the offshore jointly with the federal government, particularly with respect to setting the mode of production. This had significant implications for local benefits, as evident from construction of the gravity-based system (GBS) for Hibernia. Second, the provincial government gained the right to collect revenues from the resources as if they were on land. This established that the provincial government would determine its own revenues to be collected from offshore oil and gas development and production just as a province like Alberta is able to do. These revenues would, de facto, be treated as “own source” revenues like income tax, sales tax and other similar levies.

Third, the province as a whole would benefit from the development of local jobs. Mulroney committed that oil-related infrastructure would be sited in the province, where possible. This was no small matter. Mulroney’s letter contains strong language and conveys a deliberate intent on the part of the future Prime Minister to provide this province with significant job and business benefits. “Local job creation and labour development would be of paramount concern.” Fourth, the province would benefit since the provincial government would not see a dollar-for-dollar loss of Equalization payments that would naturally result from growth in the government’s own-source revenues. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador would receive all of its own-source revenue, potentially a portion of any federal shares in the offshore, and as well, additional payments to offset any losses from Equalization.

The same general approach was taken by the Liberal administrations which preceded Mr. Mulroney. For example, the comprehensive proposal made by the Government of Canada in 1982 stated that “it is recognized that Newfoundland should enjoy the major share of the revenue that offshore resources are expected to generate…” and that “the people of the province would realize the greatest and the most direct benefits from the development of offshore oil and gas resources in terms of growth and income, jobs, opportunities for new businesses, and significant new provincial government revenues.” The federal Liberal proposal on revenue sharing was linked inextricably to the overall performance of the provincial economy and hence may be taken as further evidence of the extent to which the federal government before 1984 viewed the benefits from the offshore to this province to be greater than just the sums flowing to the provincial government’s treasury.

While local job benefits merited two short paragraphs in the original Mulroney letter, both the Accord itself and the enabling legislation provide an elaborate structure aimed at managing local benefits. No one can underestimate the value of local industrial benefits to the province; nor can anyone easily dismiss the contention that the architects of the Atlantic Accord saw local industrial development as a significant factor in establishing this province as the principal beneficiary of offshore oil and gas development.

The Atlantic Accord and enabling legislation predate both the North American Free Trade Agreement and various inter-provincial accords on free trade. The Schedule of Canada, Annex 1, “Reservations for Existing Measures and Liberalization Commitments” of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) specifically exempts the Atlantic Accord implementation legislation and its local benefits provisions from NAFTA.

It has long been the contention of those familiar with the Atlantic Accord that any substantive change would negate the reservation or, at least, give an interested party sufficient grounds to challenge the reservation established when NAFTA was signed. The Williams administration has not addressed the issue of the Accord and NAFTA, likely since it believes the changes to the Equalization offset section are not sufficient to trigger a NAFTA-related review of the Accord or jeopardize the Accord’s current NAFTA exemption. A simple change to the offset provisions would not normally constitute a significant change to the Accord itself and hence the NAFTA reservations would remain intact.

A change to the Accord’s fundamental principles would constitute a substantive change to the Accord. The objectives of the Accord are enumerated in Section 2 and include the commitment that Newfoundland and Labrador is to be the principal beneficiary of offshore resource development. Their ordering is no accident or whim; the words used are not selected by happenstance. They reflect the considered view of the signatories as to the major purposes the agreement is to achieve.

It appears that the Williams administration is seeking to alter a fundamental principal of the Atlantic Accord. By linking the argument on Equalization offsets to the objectives of the Accord, the provincial government may well open the industrial benefit provisions of the Accord will be lost and offshore Newfoundland and Labrador will be subject to international free trade for goods and services. If this is an objective of government policy, then it should be debated in full so that the general public can make an informed choice. If it is not, then the provincial government must make clear the scope and impact of the changes it is proposing. The overhead slides are not sufficient.

J. Amending the offset: an alternative approach

As presented by the Williams administration, the proposal to amend the Atlantic Accord Equalization offset provisions is founded on somewhat shaky ground. It relies primarily:

- on general confusion over what benefits currently are provided by the Accord;

- an argument about supposed “clawbacks” that is either flawed in theory or which ties the province to other logical arguments that would work against the province’s overall revenues;

- a re-definition of the concept of “principal beneficiary” that may jeopardize substantial benefits to the province as a whole;

- an approach that ignores the intentions of the Government of Canada through two administrations; and that,

- ignores the practical circumstances affecting development of resources offshore Newfoundland and Labrador.

The Atlantic Accord Equalization offset provisions are clearly deficient when viewed from the standpoint of development of the province’s economy. The existing Accord approach is built on a simple calculation that makes no allowance for issues affecting development of the fields or the overall impact which offshore oil and gas resources have had and will continue to have in developing and diversifying the economy of one of the country’s financially weakest provinces.

Based on the foregoing, the provincial government should reformulate its proposal to the federal government to produce an amendment that is simple, based on logical, practical and historical premises and which will have a definite termination. Disentangle the Accord proposal from other arguments and make it as straightforward as possible. What remains is a robust concept:

Amend the Atlantic Accord offset provisions to give the provincial government a full Equalization offset, as currently calculated by the Accord for the first four years, until such time as the province’s fiscal capacity reaches 110% of the national average and its employment rate meets or exceeds the national average or for a period of 25 years, which ever comes first.

It is hard to imagine that any Liberal administration in Ottawa could reject a proposal that is founded on the very ideas it predecessors advanced 20 years and more ago. The proposal leaves intact the broader benefits which two national governments have intended for this province to receive from oil and gas resources off its shores. It is a proposal that is divorced utterly from the extreme and often partisan rhetoric which has surrounded recent discussions of public policy in this province.

K. Conclusion

The commonplace conclusion mentioned at the outset of this paper is based on mistaken information or incomplete information. The provincial government sets its own revenues for offshore oil and receives its revenues in total. The Atlantic Accord is clear on this point and no one has publicly suggested that the Accord provisions on this point are not being followed. As for the supposed Equalization clawback, losses in Equalization are offset under the Atlantic Accord according to a formula agreed to by the provincial government in 1985. The formula appears to be working as intended. No one can make a thorough assessment of this matter however, since the provincial government has not released thorough, accurate information on revenues, on the Accord offset provisions nor on provincial government expectations in 1985.

In general, however, the following can be said with confidence:

1. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador currently receives 100% of provincial revenues from offshore oil and gas resources.

2. The Equalization offset provisions of the Accord are functioning as intended, although amending the Equalization offset provisions is desirable for the provincial government. A better deal is attainable based on the stated intentions of the Trudeau administration before 1984.

3. Altering the definition of “principal beneficiary” to refer only to provincial government revenues may jeopardize other benefits the Accord provides to the province.

4. Disposition of the federal government’s share of the Hibernia project is outside the Atlantic Accord. Acquiring the shares must be examined in greater detail since they carry responsibilities and financial implications once the field is exhausted.

Brian Peckford’s phrase “One day the sun will shine and have not will be no more” is now part of our political vocabulary. That phrase, about sun and “have not” embodied for many people their hopes about the future of Newfoundland and Labrador and the unprecedented opportunity offered by oil and gas for ending our status as a people dependent on hand-outs from richer cousins in the rest of Canada. The very term “have not” derives from the Equalization program – receiving provinces are said to be “have nots”; the money comes from the “haves”.

Peckford’s goal was to use oil and gas wealth to end the indignity of a proud people living on a form of national dole. At the time he spoke, more than 60 per cent of the province’s annual budget came from federal transfers, much of that from Equalization. The Atlantic Accord may not be perfect, it may not cover all contingencies, but it is the deal that has produced tremendous economic and social benefit in Newfoundland and Labrador. We tinker with it at our peril. The percentage of provincial revenues coming from federal transfers has declined. This is due in part because of federal changes to transfer programs, but also in part because of growth in new industries like oil production. As Rob Strong wrote recently, though, it is important to remember that the East Coast oil and gas industry is still growing. There is much more to come.

The Williams administration is proposing to alter a landmark document in the province’s economic and political history, the net effect of which, at the very least, would increase federal transfers to the province. The Atlantic Accord is not holy writ, but it is a large part of the province’s current wealth. More importantly, it holds the prospect of providing considerably more wealth with future discoveries in the Orphan Basin and the Laurentian sub-basin. The Premier is proposing his changes, however, without an informed public discussion, without releasing a concise statement of the provincial government’s position and, as it would seem, without relying on the plain meaning of words. Given the importance of the Accord to the province, we should be careful in seeking adjustments to it.

It should not escape notice that in making its proposal, the Williams administration is merely picking up where the Grimes government left off. In fact, there is precious little difference among the three political parties in the province on this issue. In itself, that should be cause for concern, as Mark Twain warned. The absence of debate or substantive discussion carries with it greater implications than the denial of contrariness. Without a clear understanding of what is being sought< how can anyone – politicians, reporters or the public at large - judge the government’s success or failure?

Getting more cash from Ottawa is one thing. If it comes at a larger cost, namely bringing the Accord under NAFTA, then the Premier will need wider public support to continue on his path. Newfoundlanders and Labradorians have a right to know what is being talked about because they are the ones who will either reap the reward of these changes or bear the burden.