"Two trees stood on a cliff, both buffeted by fierce winds. One remained rigid and cracked under the strain. The other moved as the winds grew strong or ebbed.
This tree grew to great height."
Don't be too surprised if you start hearing rumours that Stephen Harper is about to retire from politics.
After all, those rumours started originally back in March, not coincidentally just before the Conservatives decided to reject the budget, disrupt the House and ultimately force a confidence show-down in the House of Commons. Bear in mind that this whole thing came about despite polling that showed the Conservatives well behind the Liberals everywhere except Alberta and that Paul Martin remained the overwhelming choice of Canadians to be prime minister.
Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military strategist once advised that where one is weak, one should appear strong. The Conservative push toward an election can be seen as little more than offensive action designed primarily to avoid dealing with a number of internal party problems including divisions over substantial policy matters and the lingering doubts about Harper's ability or willingness to leader the party into the next election.
Questions of leadership were evident in the way Harper treated Belinda Stronach. His own account of the dressing down he gave her is littered with signs of an internal struggle for control of the party. Faced too with the weaknesses that still exist within his party, Harper's solution was to attack the Liberals and thereby force his supporters to rally around the Conservative flag.
Closer to home, Premier Danny Williams used the same approach last October. His polling numbers were strong on the surface but underneath lurked some weaknesses, as revealed by Corporate Research Associates polling obtained by The Telegram under the new Access to Information Act. The premier also had alienated a number of provincial premiers immediately before a major national conference that would discuss, among other things, federal-provincial financing arrangements. Their resentment of the offshore proposal - what appeared to them as a major dodge around the current equitable but imperfect Equalization program - would have led to a nasty confrontation behind closed doors.
Williams' solution was to storm out of the meeting, claiming that the federal government's offshore offer was an insult. His polling numbers shot through the roof and any doubts about him and his leadership disappeared both in public or in the privacy of the pollsters' telephone calls.
Sometimes the approach works, as with Danny Williams. Sometimes it fails, as with Stephen Harper.
The Labrador by-election and two recent polls give clues as to why the Conservative Party's - really Stephen Harper's - push for the writ didn't work.
Successful national Canadian political parties are coalitions. Both the Liberal Party for most of its history and the Mulroney Conservatives did not have an immovable ideological core. They could embrace diverse views of social, economic and constitutional policy. Political parties learn to manage the disputes that erupt between members, between factions or among members from different regions. The bargaining and horse-trading that people decry are actually the mechanisms by which people can advance their particular causes without resorting to violence.
It may not be pretty but it is democracy.
Unsuccessful national parties, like the New Democrats and the Reform parties either represent a particular region or, most typically, reflect some ideological yardstick used to measure the purity of their members. There is no small irony, therefore that the initials of two Canadian ideological parties are the same, even if they represent polar opposite political views. The Communist Party of Canada, the Moscow-oriented clan and the Conservatives both go by the initials CPC.
The Unite the Right movement held at its core a belief that Canada needed a political party which represented what are called right of centre views, but which was essentially able to embrace both the substantial differences between the red Tories - the Progressive Conservatives - and the Reform cum Alliance Party. This was an effort to create another coalition party which, truthfully, is the only type of political party that could hope to win an election in a country as diverse as Canada.
On the surface, the recent CPC losses in the House and in Labrador can be seen as communications failures; the party used messages about corruption which were not heard by anyone outside their own ranks. This is revealed in the Leger poll. In Labrador, the CPC hammered on issues that did not address the views of the constituents they were trying to court. They talked about defence spending, that would benefit one portion of the riding, even though that was by no means a core issue for the majority of voters. At the same time, the CPC
talked about defeating the government's budget that included money for community infrastructure.
By the same token, Stephen Harper pledged not to force an election if the public didn't want it. When poll after poll revealed no one wanted an election, the CPC merely shifted gears. Peter MacKay likened elections to root canal - painful but necessary.
Make no mistake: these were monstrous communications failures. They represent massive political failures.
Look closer to home, in eastern Newfoundland and you can easily see the effects of the charge of the political light brigade that go beyond the national polling numbers like the ones from Leger or these from Ekos.
Two stalwart Conservatives, one of them an architect of the new party have destroyed their political base in what ought to be safe Conservative territory. Loyola Hearn is now openly talking of quitting politics. His reputation is battered. He is alienated from the local Conservatives both by the actions of his party and by the workings of his own jawbone.
This poses a problem, however. The CPC is supposedly a coalition party. Its leader is reputedly a master political strategist. Some of its key people - like Hearn and MacKay have fought successful campaigns provincially and federally or at least have the political savvy to know how to run a coalition team.
How is it possible for this combination to make such glaring errors?
The answer is that the CPC is dominated by ideologues that come not from only the old Reform Party. This is not to give into the temptation to dismiss the views held by Reformers; rather it acknowledges them for what they are - a group with strong views that is more likely to look for purity of belief, to exclude those seen as impure, to look inward rather than outward.
Consider the language used to describe Liberals. The enemy - even that word suggest the depth of their feeling - is corrupt and immoral. They and their supporters are criminal - mafia and whores. They lack principle. Voters are cowered by the dastardly villains. One need only listen to Stephen Harper's language or browse the blogs of CPC supporters to find this singularity of perspective. The use of moral judgments is striking.
How does one legitimately compromise with - even live with - untermenschen?
Added to that ideological singularity is a leader who is also apparently unyielding. His dressing down of Stronach suggests a man with little tolerance for opposition. This is hardly the stuff of a coalition builder. Harper's detractors all point to his unshakeable belief in his own correctness. Comments by Preston Manning ring in one's ears. According to Manning, Harper saw no value in holding town hall meetings to discuss fiscal policy with people lacking the education to comprehend the sophisticated concepts involved.
One of the finest examples of Harper's inflexibility came at the end of the last federal election. His national headquarters issued a news release that accused Paul Martin of supporting child molesters. When he faced reporters, Harper refused to disown the release. Leading a party that spoke of integrity, Harper refused to admit that someone had made an error and by doing so made the focus of the story the obvious gap between words and deeds. Credibility suffered and with it went Harper's hopes for a majority government.
Stephen Harper appears to have surrounded himself with old friends who share his outlook. Some have brought their game theory approaches, and with it, the unshakeable belief that their numbers not merely model reality - they are reality. Game theorists in Vietnam fiddled with individual variables and got lost in the tactical movements at the expense of the strategic. Stephen Harper opposed C-43, then supported it, then opposed it and then supported it - all tactical manoeuvering. The CPC voted for one part of the budget and against another - more transparent manoeuvering. One suspects that the game theory scenarios suggested that these were the optimum tactical approaches at each point.
Genuine strategy would see that each step is part of a longer journey and that the optimum step at each discrete moment on the road may lead ultimately to the wrong destination. Strategy understands the need to give with the wind sometimes.
On the surface, the Conservatives have committed some readily apparent political blunders.
The question that must be asked is why this is so.
The answer lies in the leader and in the party itself.
For the future, the Conservative Party faces the challenge of having a leader who is a four- or five-time failure. Many may feel the need to find a new leader.
But consider the timelines.
The prime minister has committed to an election in January.
By the time the House closes next month, and even if Stephen Harper resigned immediately, the party could not hold a leadership convention and begin the process of internal revitalization that it would need to win.
The only way the Conservative Party could win in January is for the Liberal Party to collapse.
Consider that the tree which grew strong did not depend on the other tree for its success.
